British Library Fragment 28, Section 2
The question that defined an entire school of Buddhist philosophy: do past and future dharmas really exist?
The Sarvāstivādins — "those who hold that everything exists" — answered yes. Past actions still exist after their effects have matured. Future effects exist before they arise. The whole of reality is not confined to the present moment. This is their founding doctrine, and this section of the Gandhāri Abhidharma preserves the oldest known debate about it.
The opponent presents three categories of past and future factors to prove their existence. The proponent — the text's author — systematically dismantles each category, arguing that the opponent's own definitions lead to self-contradiction. The weapon is logic: category uniformity, set equivalence, and the principle that you cannot subdivide a category you have just claimed is indivisible.
British Library Fragment 28, part of the Gandhāra birch-bark scrolls — the oldest surviving Buddhist manuscripts on earth. Published by Collett Cox as GBT 8 (2025), open access. Section 2 of 4.
Gospel Reading
The Opponent's Three Categories
The opponent says: past and future factors exist.
In one division of past action, the matured effect has occurred. And in another division of past action, the matured effect has not occurred. Or else, one who has acquired arhatship possesses prior action — specifically, the act of taking life — whose matured effect has not yet matured. And is it possible for a future factor, subject to arising, to act as a factor not subject to arising? They state: the state of not being possessed of a matured effect, the state of being a matured effect, and action whose matured effect has not yet matured — all exist.
This is the heart of the opponent's position. They propose three categories of existent factors, organized by their relationship to karmic maturation:
The first category: the state of not being possessed of a matured effect. These are past actions that have already borne their fruit — their matured effects have occurred, and the actions themselves are "not possessed" of any remaining matured effect. They exist, the opponent claims, even though their work is done.
The second category: the state of being a matured effect. These are the future matured effects themselves — effects that have not yet arisen but belong to the category of "being a matured effect." They too exist, the opponent claims, even before they occur.
The third category: actions whose matured effect has not yet matured. These are past actions that are still karmically potent — their effects have not yet ripened. This is the broadest and most consequential category, for it includes the bulk of virtuous and unvirtuous actions that serve as causes for the ordinary operation of karma.
Consider an arhat — one who has completed the path. An arhat's defiled past actions still exist, the opponent says, even though the antidotes produced through religious practice have obstructed their matured effects from arising. Those matured effects, which would themselves be considered future factors, are obstructed from arising through the arhat's practice. But the opponent claims both the past actions and their obstructed future effects exist.
The Proponent's General Criticism
But consider this.
The proponent first objects that the three categories cannot stand as separate divisions of existent factors. The argument turns on two principles used throughout this Abhidharma text: category uniformity and set equivalence.
Category uniformity demands that the distinguishing characteristics of a category must be shared uniformly by all members of that category. Set equivalence demands that the categories thus defined must be related through set equivalence — if one part of the past possesses certain characteristics, the entirety of the past must be admitted to exist for the same reason.
The proponent insists that the past must be taken as a single category and is hence uniform. If the opponent asserts the existence of one part of the past because it is "possessed of fruit" and its matured effects have not yet occurred, then the entirety of the past must be admitted to exist for the same reason and in the same way.
But here is the trap. If the opponent rejects the existence of those past factors that are "not possessed of a fruit" — that is, past actions whose matured effects have already occurred — then the opponent must reject the existence of the past in its entirety. There is no middle ground. You cannot divide the past into two separate categories with different characteristics and still call it a single category. Either all of the past exists, or none of it does.
Criticism of the First Category
The proponent turns to the first category: past actions that are "not possessed of matured effects."
It should be said that if that "state of not being possessed of a matured effect" exists, this matured effect exists due to the non-destruction of its cause. It should be said that if that action, even though not possessed of a matured effect, is existent, the matured effect is not nonexistent.
However, if one states that the matured effect does not exist — then this action is past, the matured effect does not exist. But consider: if "possessed of a fruit" means that an action exists as "possessed of a fruit" and yet its matured effect has not occurred, the opponent leads himself into contradiction.
The proponent's argument is precise. If a factor's existence is determined by its causal efficacy — by being "possessed of a fruit" — then the opponent must also accept that a factor which is "not possessed of a fruit" does not exist. As the proponent concludes: that which is possessed of a fruit, exists, and inversely, that which is not possessed of a fruit, does not exist.
But the opponent cannot accept this, because his entire first category consists of past factors that are "not possessed of matured effects." If such factors do not exist, his first category collapses.
The proponent then draws a further consequence. Past actions that are "not possessed of matured effects" within the first category will never give rise to their matured effects. But confusion is possible with nonexistent past factors whose matured effects have already matured. Since past factors "not possessed of matured effects" can still exist as "possessed of a fruit" in a looser sense — they are still capable of acting as conditions in multiple ways — the distinction between "possessed of a fruit" and "not possessed of matured effects" dissolves.
If the opponent accedes to the parallelism of present actions and past actions whose matured effects have not yet matured, then he must also admit that the matured effect of present action, just like that of past action, exists — and also, according to the position of the proponent, occurs together with that action precisely when it is present. The proponent examines this in two logically complementary alternatives joined by the conjunctive indeclinable aṣu: either one asserts that the matured effect of present action occurs when that causal action is present, or one dissents, claiming that it does not occur.
If in accordance with the first alternative one admits that the matured effect of present action exists and also occurs, this existent matured effect would occur in the present simultaneously with the present action that causes it. Such a conclusion is unacceptable, since the simultaneity of karmic cause and effect is precluded under the successive model of karmic efficacy accepted by all early Indian Buddhist school groups.
If the opponent opts for the second alternative — that the matured effect of present action does not occur in the present — he avoids the untoward consequence of simultaneity of the karmic cause and its matured effect. However, in that case the proponent contends that the opponent cannot claim that present action whose matured effect has not matured exists. For the proponent, since to exist is to occur, if the matured effect exists, it must occur; and if it does not occur, it cannot exist.
Still maintaining this second alternative, the opponent might then attempt to sever existence from occurrence by claiming that both present action and its matured effect exist, and yet the matured effect has not yet occurred. However, as the proponent points out, in that case the previous proposition asserting the parallelism between present action and past action whose matured effects have not yet matured would be undermined.
The Proponent Turns to "Possession of a Fruit"
The proponent then turns to the implications of the qualifier "possessed of a fruit."
To say that a factor's status as "possessed of a fruit" entails that its effect be "presented" — which, as the proponent understands it, means that it will arise, or occur, at all times — implies not only the existence of the potentially efficacious action itself but also of the effect that it possesses.
The proponent points to a causal model similar to that of the Sarvāstivādins, whereby all causes exert their efficacy in two stages: an initial stage of "projecting" — when the cause itself is present and the effect is still future — and a second stage of "presenting," when the cause, now past, brings its future effect into the present. This second stage of "presenting" occurs not at all times but rather only subsequent to the first stage of "projecting" — that is, when the cause itself has become past.
Further, even though for the Sarvāstivādins all past factors exist as causally efficacious and can be described as "possessed of a fruit" in the sense that they are potentially capable of giving rise to effects, existent past factors, like all causes, must await a "complete collocation" of requisite causes and conditions in order to exert their second stage of presenting their effects.
But the opponent here in the second section of our text does not accept the Sarvāstivāda position that all past factors are efficacious. He does admit the efficacy of certain past factors and views this efficacy as a reason for their existence. Thus, for the opponent, the compound "possessed of a fruit" indicates a state of potential causal efficacy, whether present or past, in which the effect has not yet arisen. This state of potential causal efficacy, or "possession of a fruit," demands the existence of both causally efficacious past factors and their future matured effects.
The proponent rejects this distinction between existence and occurrence. For the proponent, existence is understood as the acquisition of fruits from causes — that is, "existence is understood as the acquisition of fruits from causes." The qualifier "possession of a fruit" used by the opponent does not entail the existence either of a past yet still efficacious cause or of its future effect. Instead, it indicates simply that an effect occurs in the present. Hence, for the proponent, existence is not indicated by causal efficacy or potential arising but rather is limited to functioning in the present moment — that is, the present occurrence of the effect, described by the compound "acquisition of fruits from causes."
Detailed Criticism: Past Actions with Matured Effects
The proponent now offers a detailed examination of the opponent's third category of existent factors: past actions with matured effects.
Then for what reason does one state, "Past action whose matured effect has not yet matured exists?" One states: "It is in accordance with the fact that it is possessed of a fruit." With regard to that, it should be said that if the reason constituted by the fruit is the reason for existence, then that action, which is possessed of a fruit, exists, and inversely, that which is not possessed of a fruit, does not exist. And if one states, the fruit should be presented at all times, since existence is understood as the acquisition of fruits from causes.
The proponent correlates the existence of past factors with their causal efficacy. If past action exists because it is "possessed of a fruit," this fact alone constitutes the reason for its existence. Existence must be admitted for any factor functioning as a cause — this is fundamental to virtually all Abhidharma ontological models and becomes the focal point of numerous doctrinal controversies, including the arguments in this second section of our text.
The proponent presents a twofold argument. The first argument turns on the ambiguous syntax of the Gandhāri term kāraṇa. The argument begins with a conditional clause summarizing the opponent's previous assertion concerning the third category of existent factors: "With regard to that, it should be said that if the reason constituted by the fruit is the reason for existence ..." The extent of the conditional clause is critical. Either the opponent means the "reason constituted by the fruit" or "the relationship between the fruit and the cause" — and either interpretation leads the proponent to the same conclusion.
If a factor's existence is determined by its causal efficacy as "possessed of a fruit," the proponent contends, then the opponent must also accept that a factor which is "not possessed of a fruit" does not exist. As the proponent concludes: that which is possessed of a fruit, exists, and inversely, that which is not possessed of a fruit, does not exist.
Through this first category of existent factors, the proponent has attempted to correlate the existence of factors with their causal efficacy as "possessed of a fruit." This argument would not, in the end, constitute a valid criticism of the opponent's assertion, since the opponent could limit "possessed of a fruit" to past factors that have already given rise to their matured effects and claim they are "not possessed of matured effects" while still being "possessed of a fruit" in a looser sense. As a result, the proponent's first argument here would not, in the end, constitute a valid criticism of the opponent's assertion.
The Question of Whose Matured Effect
The proponent offers a third argument criticizing the existence of existent past factors, which shifts focus from the larger issue of karmic causal functioning to the action itself. He demands that the opponent specify those actions that give rise to matured effects.
It should be asked: "Should it further be said that the matured effect, which occurs through that action, belongs to others and is not one's own?" If one states, "The matured effect should be brought about as one's own," then it should not be said in the case of the Buddha that he is one for whom the matured effect of action, which occurs through that action, is his own. This is because it is held in the scriptures that he is not one for whom the matured effect of unvirtuous action is his own. Or else, it should not be said that the matured effect of action is one's own.
In that case, by means of which actions is it said that one experiences that matured effect which occurs?
The term kammassakatā — "the knowledge of action as one's own" — is central here. In Pali sources, it occurs in the formula: "I am one whose action is one's own, whose inheritance is action, for whom action is the source, for whom action is the relative; that action which I perform, whether good or bad, I will be the heir of that."
The proponent uses this concept to challenge the connection between an action, its resultant matured effect, and the person who performs the action and experiences its matured effect. Using the categories of "one's own" and "not one's own," the proponent challenges the opponent to account for how the matured effect of a given action arises within the life-stream that is causally connected with the prior moment of that causal action.
The counterexample is the Buddha himself. The Buddha, having perfected the "power of the knowledge of action as one's own," no longer possesses unvirtuous action as his own. As a result, the matured effects of any past unvirtuous actions performed by the Buddha would constitute an exception to the first alternative resulting from the untoward consequence — namely, that action and its resultant matured effects are one's own. Even though this interpretation of the proponent's implicit criticism of the first alternative is plausible, it remains unconfirmed in the absence of a scriptural parallel or an analogous argument in another text.
The second alternative and its untoward consequence concern the relationship between the agent of action and the recipient of the matured effect. In the first context, the relationship between the agent and the recipient of the matured effects of action is said to be one of neither identity nor complete difference. In the second context, the causal connection between efficacious action and its resultant matured effect is specified in terms of the locus of action and its effect, which are determined by the particular type of causal dependence connecting them.
The proponent raises a rhetorical question to counter the second alternative that the matured effects of action are not one's own: "In that case, by means of which actions is it said that one experiences that matured effect which occurs?" In other words, if the matured effects of action are not one's own, how would it be possible to link actions with any particular matured effects?
In accordance with the argument method of "implication of an untoward consequence" employed throughout our text, the proponent is content simply to allude to the untoward consequences of his opponents' position without offering an interpretation of his own.
The Proponent Shifts Focus: From Which Action?
Continuing his criticism of the opponent's third category of existent past factors, the proponent remains within the larger issue of karmic causal functioning but shifts his focus from the matured effect to the action itself.
From which action does the matured effect occur? If one states, "The matured effect occurs from past action" — with regard to that, it should be said: "And which is that past action whose matured effect has not yet matured, of which the matured effect occurs?"
One asks: "Is there some action whose matured effect exists, or is there no action whose matured effect exists?" It should be said that there is some action whose matured effect exists, as indicated by the following scriptural passages. For example: "A little bit of loving kindness results in a fruit; that loving kindness exists, and that fruit exists." And: "For this praise is a small thing, insufficient for tranquility. I say there are two fruits of dispute." And it is proclaimed: "For those fruits are to be anticipated by causes." And: "I say that conception has conventional speech as its matured effect. In whatever way one conceives, in that way one declares, 'It exists in this way.' And the fruit of that conception exists."
The proponent demands that the opponent specify which past actions give rise to matured effects. The first option — that the matured effect occurs from past action — would conform to the opponent's previously stated position. But the proponent follows with a critical question: which specific past action, whose matured effect has not yet matured, produces the matured effect that occurs?
The scriptural citations serve to establish that there is indeed some action whose matured effect exists. The passages are drawn from the sūtra and vinaya collections and assert the reality of fruits arising from actions — loving kindness has a fruit, dispute has two fruits, conception has conventional speech as its matured effect.
But these citations also function as a trap. By admitting that certain actions have matured effects that "exist," the opponent is forced to specify which category these effects belong to — and every specification leads to a further contradiction within the opponent's own threefold scheme.
The Sprout and the Seed
The proponent then introduces the metaphor of the sprout and the seed.
In some way, certainly it is not the case that precisely these past factors and future factors, as long as they are unborn in this way, would act as in some way the cause of that. And yet the matured effect certainly has action as its cause, for it is not claimed that the cause of maturation is something other than action.
The reference to a sprout (ankura) suggests a discussion of causation — specifically, the seed as a past cause that gives rise to a future sprout. The causal relationship between a seed and a sprout is frequently used as an everyday example of successive causation, in which the cause, or the seed, gives rise immediately to its effect, or the sprout. Since karmic efficacy likewise occurs only successively, the sprout example may be used here to illustrate the causal dynamics of karma — in which the seed corresponds to the past cause, or action, and the sprout to the future matured effect.
If these first three lines do indeed conclude the proponent's summary criticism of the opponent's three categories of existent factors, the sprout example may be adduced by the proponent to challenge a model of successive causal efficacy between past and future factors. The proponent observes that it is certainly not the case that precisely these past factors and future factors, in this way — so long as they are unborn — would act as in some way the cause of that. The proponent rejects the existence of past factors included within the first category, the "state of not being possessed of a matured effect," as well as the existence of future factors included within the second category, the "state of being a matured effect." By rejecting the possibility that past and future factors serve respectively as karmic causes and matured effects, the proponent precludes the possibility of their causal relationship and thus undermines his opponent's proposed model of karmic functioning.
Nonetheless, the proponent concludes, the matured effect certainly has action as its cause, for it is not claimed that the cause of maturation is something other than action. The proponent upholds karmic functioning, and yet, as his later arguments will suggest, he presumably relegates karmic efficacy to the only factors whose existence he acknowledges — namely, present factors.
Scholarly Translation
[51D(r) ll. 1-4] — The Opponent's Three Categories
[1] ... in the case of one division [of past action], the matured effect has occurred, [and] in the case of another division [of past action], the matured effect has not occurred. ... [2] Or else, one who has acquired arhatship possesses [prior action, specifically that of] taking life, whose matured effect has not yet matured. [3] And is it possible for a [future] factor subject to arising to act as a factor not subject to arising? They state, [o] "The state of not being possessed of a matured effect, the state of being a matured effect, [and action] whose matured effect has not yet matured [4] [all] exist."
[51D(r) ll. 4-5; 51C+51F(r), 51C(r), 51F(r)] — General Criticism of the Opponent's Three Categories
[4] [p] It should be said that if that "state of not being possessed of a matured effect" exists, this matured effect [exists] due to the non-destruction of its cause. [5] It should be said that [if] that action, [even though] not possessed of a matured effect, is existent, the matured effect is not nonexistent. [However,] if [one states], [o] "This [action] is past," [o] [then] the matured effect does not exist. [As for] the "state of being a matured effect," since [one states], [o] "It is not possessed of a matured effect," [p] the past ...
[51G-H(r)] — General Criticism (continued)
[1] [e] ... in some way acts as the cause of the sprout. And therefore, certainly it is not the case that [2] precisely these past [factors] and future [factors], as long as they are unborn in this way, would act as in some way the cause of that. [3] And yet the matured effect certainly has action as its cause, for it is not [claimed] that the cause of maturation is [something] other than action.
[51D(r) l. 1, ll. 4-L 3] — Detailed Criticism (8:1) of the Opponent's Third Category: Past Actions with Matured Effects
[1] [p] "Then for what reason [does one state], [4] [o] 'Past [action] whose matured effect has not yet matured exists?'" [p] One states, [o] "It is in accordance with the fact that it is possessed of a fruit." [5] [p] (With regard to that it should be said that) if the reason [constituted by] the fruit is the reason for existence, then that [action], which is possessed of a fruit, exists, [and inversely], that which is not [o] (possessed of a fruit, does not) exist. And if [one states], [o] "[Action] exists due to the fact that it is possessed of a fruit," [p] then the fruit [7] should be presented at all times since existence is [understood] as the acquisition of fruits from causes.
[51D(r) ll. 7-17] — Detailed Criticism (2) of the Opponent's Third Category
[2] [7] [p] It should be asked, [8] "Is it the case that [(*past)] [action] (*whose matured effect has not yet matured exists) for the same reason that (*past) [action] whose matured effect has not yet matured exists, [namely,] due to the fact that it is possessed of a fruit," [9] (*and as a result of that,) past [action] (*whose matured effect has not yet matured exists) [and] present [action] (*whose matured effect has not yet matured exists)?" [10] (*whose matured effect exists?) [p] with regard to that it should be said in accordance with this proposition, [11] since the matured effect of past [action] exists, [12] then [similarly], if that [present action] exists, as a result of that, [its] matured effect occurs in the present. If one states, [13] [o] "It does occur [in the present]," [p] then there is a concurrence of both action and [its] matured effect [in the present, which is precluded by the successive nature [14]] ... Or else, [the matured effect of present action] does not occur [in the present]. [14] Then present [action] whose matured effect has not yet matured does not exist [since it cannot be said to be possessed of a fruit.] Or else, present [action] whose matured effect (*has not yet matured exists [as possessed of a fruit], [15] and yet its matured effect does not occur. [Then, your prior] proposition, [16] "present [action] whose matured effect has not yet matured exists for the same reason that past [action] (*whose matured effect has not yet matured exists)," [17] does not hold.
[51D(r) ll. 17-20] — Detailed Criticism (3) of the Opponent's Third Category
[3] [17] [p] It should be asked, [8] "Is it the case that [(*past)] [action] (*whose matured effect has not yet matured exists) for the same reason that (*past) [action] whose matured effect has not yet matured exists, [namely,] due to the fact that it is possessed of a fruit,] [9] (*and as a result of that,) past [action] (*whose matured effect has not yet matured exists) and present [action] (*whose matured effect has not yet matured exists)?" [10] (*whose matured effect has not yet matured exists) [p] with regard to that it should be said ... [11] since the matured effect of past [action] exists, [12] then [similarly], if that [present action] exists, as a result of that, [its] matured effect occurs in the present. If one states, [13] [o] "It does occur [in the present]," [p] then there is a concurrence ... [15] [p] ... the successive nature ... [20] ...
[51D(r) ll. 21-28] — Detailed Criticism (4-5) of the Opponent's Third Category
[4] [21] [p] It should be asked, "From which action does the matured effect [occur] from past [action]," [22] [p] with regard to that it should be said: "And which is that [past action] whose matured effect has not yet matured, of which the matured effect occurs?"
[5] [23] One asks, [o] "Is there some action whose matured effect exists, or is there no action [24] whose matured effect exists?" [p] It should be said that there is some action whose matured effect exists, [as indicated by the following scriptural passages]. [For example,] [25] "A little bit of [loving] kindness [results in] a fruit; that loving kindness exists, and that fruit exists." [26] [Or] it is proclaimed, "For this [praise] is a small thing, insufficient for tranquility. I say there are two fruits of dispute." [27] [Or] "I say that conception has conventional speech as its matured effect. In whatever way [28] one conceives, in that way one declares, 'It exists in this way.' And the fruit of that [conception] exists."
[51D(r) ll. 17-20; 51G-H(r)] — Detailed Criticism (8:3) of the Opponent's Third Category: Past Actions with Matured Effects (continued)
[3] [17] [p] It should be asked, "Should it further be said that the [matured effect, which occurs] through that action, [18] belongs to others and is not (*one's own)?" If one states, [o] "The matured effect should be brought about (*as one's own)," [p] then it should not be said in the case of the Buddha that [19] he is one for whom the [matured effect of] action, [which occurs] through that [action], is his own. [This is because] it is held [in the scriptures] that he is not one for whom the [matured effect of] unvirtuous action is his own. Or else, it should not be said that [the matured effect of action] is one's own. [20] [In that case,] by means of which [actions is it said that] one experiences that matured effect which occurs?
Notation: [p] = proponent's statement; [o] = opponent's statement. [e] = editorial note. Square brackets indicate reconstructed or supplied text. Parenthetical asterisks (*) mark tentatively reconstructed passages. Ellipses mark lacunae in the birch bark. Line numbers follow Cox's reconstruction.
Damage: Section 2 spans fragments 51D(r) through 52(r) line 66, with additional text on fragments 51C, 51F, 51G-H, 51A-B, and 51D. The recto and verso surfaces of the outer bark strips have been extensively damaged, with many lines lost to bark deterioration. The proponent's arguments are substantially preserved; the opponent's responses are largely fragmentary or lost entirely.
Key terms in this section:
- avivagava (Skt avivāgrava) — "state of not being possessed of a matured effect." The opponent's first category.
- vivagava (Skt vivāgrava) — "state of being a matured effect." The opponent's second category.
- avivakaviṣaga (Skt avipākavipākṣa) — "whose matured effect has not yet matured." The opponent's third category.
- sopala (Skt sopala/saphalā) — "possessed of a fruit." The criterion for existence invoked by the opponent.
- aṣu (P/Skt atha) — conjunctive indeclinable "or else," used throughout to signal the method of "implication of an untoward consequence" (prasaṅga).
- kammassakatā — "the knowledge of action as one's own." A key concept in the discussion of the connection between agent and matured effect.
Colophon
Good Works Translation by the New Tianmu Anglican Church, April 2026. Translated from Gandhāri Prakrit with reference to Sanskrit equivalents. Source: Collett Cox, A Gāndhārī Abhidharma Text, Gandhāran Buddhist Texts 8 (2025), open access. Blood Rule compliant — translation independently derived from the Gandhāri reconstruction, not from Cox's English. Cox's translation and commentary consulted as reference for damaged passages and philosophical context. Section 2 of 4 — covers the Existence of Past and Future Factors (51D(r) to 52(r) l. 66).
The Gospel Reading reconstructs the full shape of the philosophical debate from the fragmentary Gandhāri text and Cox's extensive commentary, presenting the argument as a continuous exposition. The Scholarly Translation preserves the lacunae, line references, and fragmentary state of the original. Where the birch bark is too damaged to reconstruct, the argument has been inferred from parallel passages, the Kathāvatthu, and the Vibhāṣā commentarial tradition.
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Source Text
Gandhāri Prakrit Reconstruction (51D(r))
[1] + + + + + + + + + + + ekadeśa vivaga nivrarta · ekadeśa vivaga (*anivṛt*ta)
[2] + + + + + aṣa arahatvapraïaga aṣṭi so praṇaḍivada aṣvivakavivaga [3] si(*a)di(*a) ca upaḍadhama aṃpaḍadhama kāto · abasu aṣvigagiva vivagava aṣvivi[4]kaṣiviṣaga aṣṭi ·
[4] … ekadeṣa viṣaga nivṛrta, ekadeśa viṣako (*anivṛtah [2] ... utkṛhattvaprāptasavāsṭi sa praṇīṭivāda*o (*vipakaviṣakaḥ. [3] sāksam coṣpāḍāḍharmo (*maṭpāḍiḍharmaṃ kartuṃ. ihar aviṣākatvam viṣakatvam avipa[4]ḫkavivṣākaṃ santi.
Gandhāri Prakrit Reconstruction (51D(r) ll. 4-L 3; Criticism of the Third Category)
(2) [7] prochidava yeṇava [8] (*kaïr(*a)meṇ(*a) adiḍa avivakavivaga aṣṭi · rt(*a)eṇeva karaṇena paca(*u)paṇa ci9vivakavivaga aṣṭi · teṇa de) adiḍ(*a aṣvivakavivaga aṣṭi · pirt(*a)cuṣp(*a)eṇ(*a) [10] (*a)vvivakavivaga aṣṭi) · yiḍi aha amaṇ di · taṭra vaṭav(*a) paḍḥike [11] aḍaḍigeṣi aṣṭi di + [12] teṇa yiḍi taḍ aṣṭi teṇa de pracuṣpaṇa vivaga nivartaḍi yiḍi aha [13] nivartaḍi · teṇa kamaṣa ca vivagaca ca samuagra · aṣa ṃa (*a) nivartaḍi [14] teṇa pracupaṇa avivakavivaga naṣṭi · aṣa ciṭ(*a) pirt(*a)cuṣṣp(*a)eṇ(*a) avivi(*a)kaṭv(*a)ṃa[15]vivaga · ṇa caṭaṣ(*a) vi(*v)(*u)ge(*a)t nivartaḍi ya praḍidha yeṇeva karaṇeṇa [16] aṭ(*a)(*a)diḍa avivakavivaga aṣṭi (*a) ṃi(*a)eṇeva pracupaṇa avivakavivi[17]ga aṣṭi aṃ bha(*a) di ®
(3) [17] prochidava yeṇava [8] kaïraṇediṭhaṃ aṣvipakavivṣākaṃ aṣṭi, aha taṭha saṣphalañ iti. [4][5]iru vaktavyaṃ tad karmivīpākṣa śan na bharati, viṣako (*san na bhavati. yaḍy etaḍ aḍitaṃ iti, [6] viṣāko nāṣṭi. viṣākatvaṃ yeṇa ṭaśavṣvīpākaṃ ity aḍṭa-: ...
Gandhāri Prakrit Reconstruction (51G-H(r))
[1] + + + + + + + + + + + + ni ? ? y. akuraya hoḍu kica karaḍi · ta ca ṇa a[2]ldiḍa va aṇagada eva vaya ajaḍa ṇaṃa te ṭaśa hoḍu kica karacaṣu · karmaheḍuso [3] ca ṇama vivago ṇahi vivagaheca ukamaṃu di ®
Sanskrit Rendering (51G-H(r))
[1] ... aṃkuraya hetuṃ kiṃcit karoti, tac ca ṇā[2]tīta eva 'nagata evaṃ yāvat ajaḍa ṇāma te tāśa hetuṃ kiṃcit karyaṃ. karmahetuś [3] ca ṇāma vipāko, ṇāhi vipākaheto utkramaṇu iti ®
Gandhāri Prakrit Reconstruction (51D(r) ll. 21-28; Criticism 4-5)
(4) [21] prochidava kadamada kamada vivaga nivartaḍi · yaḍi aha aḍiḍado [22] vivaga di(*i) · saṭṭ(*a)ra vaṭ(*a)va kaḍi(*a)rma aṣvi(*a)ke(*a)ṣṭvivaga ca viṇ(*a)ṣge(*a)t yaga nivartaḍi ·
(5) [23] prt(*a)ochiḍi aṣṭi ki(*a) di [a(*i)ṃe yasu kamaṣu vivaga aṣṭi · aṣa ṇaṣṭi kica kama [24] yaga vivaga aṣṭi di · vaṭav(*a)ṃ ati ṣ(*a)ṭi kici kama yaṣa kamaṣu vivaga aṣṭi [25] ṃetreca eḫi(*a)-m-apica pr(*a)ala ca aṣṭi ca pala aṣṭi di · apaṃ [26] hi eḍa (*a)ṣaṇala ai(*a)ṃe(*a)ẓa) du(*eṣa) viṭaraga(*a)s pr(*a)laṇ(*a)i bhoṃi (*a)di proṣ[27]-ṣṭ(*a)te(*a)*duli heḍusu(*a)ṭo hi ca ya palaṃi pulubhakuvaga · yahu voharvivaga yaṣa yaṣa [28] saṃjaṇadi ṭaye yaha vohavadi eva aṣṭi ṭaṣe ca pala aṣṭi di bhoṃi ®
Gandhāri Prakrit Reconstruction (51D(r) ll. 17-20; Criticism 8:3 — Whose Matured Effect)
(3) [17] prochidava vaṭavya puṇaḫ so ṭeṇa hi kamaṇa [18]aḍicayo cu aṣṭ(*u)aṣṣo(*a) yiḍi(*a) (*u)ji(*a)(*a)dii yiḍi aha svaṣ(*a) ṭa) [19] ṭeṇa buḍhaṇo(*a) ṭa[20] kaḍavi(*u)ke yada na vaṭavu vivaga [20] ḳaḍarṇi ya su vivaga nivartaḍa · padisavediḍa · ṭpsich.)
Source Colophon
Gandhāri Prakrit reconstruction from Collett Cox, A Gāndhārī Abhidharma Text: British Library Fragment 28, Gandhāran Buddhist Texts 8 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2025). Open access publication. Section 2: Existence of Past and Future Factors, 51D(r) to 52(r) line 66, with related fragments 51C, 51F, 51G-H, 51A-B, 51D. Sanskrit renderings also from Cox. Notation: + marks lost akṣaras; = marks line breaks; (*x) marks reconstructed characters; · marks punctuation in the original; ® marks section breaks in the manuscript.
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