British Library Fragment 28, Section 3
The opponent's fundamental proposition is simple: everything exists. But what does "everything" mean? And what does "existence" mean?
This third section of the Gandhāri Abhidharma preserves the proponent's sustained attack on these two words. The opponent offers four specifications of the scope of "everything" — that which is included within the twelve sense spheres; that which belongs to the three time periods; a third and fourth specification now largely lost to bark damage. The proponent dismantles each one.
Then the opponent tries to define "existence" itself. Two explications survive: the existent should be said to be existence, and the nonexistent should be said to be nonexistence. The proponent turns these definitions against the opponent, citing the Mahāsarvāstivādin position that there is certainly nothing that does not exist — and showing that even this claim contradicts the opponent's own framework.
The birch bark is severely damaged throughout this section. Approximately fourteen lines are completely lost to pieces of bark and layer 51sss. What survives is the skeleton of a devastating logical critique — the bones of an argument whose flesh has been eaten by two thousand years.
British Library Fragment 28, part of the Gandhāra birch-bark scrolls — the oldest surviving Buddhist manuscripts on earth. Published by Collett Cox as GBT 8 (2025), open access. Section 3 of 4.
Gospel Reading
The Final Declarations
The opponent offers a series of formulaic declarations to support the fundamental proposition that everything exists.
One states: "Everything exists with every aspect." In that case, a future aspect exists with a past aspect; a past aspect exists with a future aspect. The aspect of tranquility exists with the aspect of voidness; the aspect of voidness exists with the aspect of truth. The aspect of untruth exists with the aspect of suffering. The aspect of happiness exists with the aspect of suffering. The aspect of self exists with the aspect of non-self. The aspect of non-self exists with the aspect of self. The aspect of what is not everything exists with the aspect of everything.
Virtuous and unvirtuous factors exist by reason of past factors, by reason of future factors, and by reason of present factors.
And as for the declarations concerning all "modes" — namely, that everything exists through all modes — and so on, it should be expanded by means of similar applications of insight.
The proponent criticizes these declarations by examining six examples that demonstrate how the statement "everything exists with every aspect" results in the confusion of aspects by which factors are ascertained as distinct. These six examples utilize complementary or opposed aspects — past and future, truth and untruth, happiness and suffering, voidness and tranquility, self and non-self, and "everything" and "not everything" — to show that undiscriminated universal existence collapses the very distinctions that make Buddhist doctrine meaningful.
The First Specification of "Everything"
The opponent now turns to delimit the scope of "everything" as the content of "existence."
The first specification: those factors that are included within the twelve sense spheres exist. The visual sense sphere exists. Therefore, the visual sense sphere is included within the twelve sense spheres, and so on — the scope of "everything" should be expanded through the other sense spheres.
It should be known that there exists no thirteenth sense sphere. Continuing on through the previously cited list, there exists no soul, there exists no person, and so on. With regard to that, it should be said: "By virtue of which perceptual consciousness or energy should it be known that there exists no soul, there exists no person?"
One states: "It is by means of the mental sense sphere, by means of mental perceptual consciousness." With regard to that, it should be said that a fifth noble truth, a nineteenth element, soul, and person should be said to be factors that are the object-supports of mental perceptual consciousness, for in this way it has been said, "Factors are the object-support of mental perceptual consciousness."
Now if one admits that these nonexistent entities are factors, with regard to that it should be said that, as a result of that, certain factors exist and certain factors do not exist.
The proponent's argument is precise. The opponent uses the first specification to identify "everything" with the twelve sense spheres and then extends it to all sense spheres. But the proponent raises the issue of nonexistent entities. Whether nonexistent entities can serve as object-supports of perceptual consciousness — whether a "soul" or a "person" can be cognized by mental perceptual consciousness — threatens the opponent's claim that everything exists. If the mental sense sphere and mental perceptual consciousness can cognize nonexistent entities, then those nonexistent entities must be included in the factors that are the object-supports of mental perceptual consciousness. But then the opponent would be forced to admit that some factors exist and some do not — which contradicts the proposition that everything exists.
The Second Specification
The opponent's second specification identifies "everything" with those factors that belong to the three time periods. The proponent begins his criticism by restating and offering an untoward consequence: "If one states, 'Or those factors that belong to the three time periods are existence,' with regard to that it should be said that undoubtedly a future factor is present, and a present factor is past."
If any given factor exists as past, present, and future, then some method must be found to discriminate among these three temporal varieties to avoid confusion among its different forms. The proponent cites a possible response that is well attested in other Abhidharma texts: "A factor having been future becomes present, and having been present becomes past."
However, this response is deemed unsatisfactory both by the Gandhāri proponent and by critics of the Sarvāstivāda position in other Abhidharma texts. The Gandhāri proponent next observes that the opponent's response results in the untoward consequence that every factor must then be admitted to have three separate "natures" — one corresponding to each of the three time periods. Otherwise, a factor's "nature" as future, present, or past would have no basis.
The following argument consists of a quick and abbreviated exchange between the proponent and the Sarvāstivādin opponent. Once again it only makes sense if their differing notions of "nature" are kept in mind. In this criticism, the proponent uses the term "nature" in the sense of "intrinsic nature" — the unvarying, particular inherent characteristic by which factors are to be defined and discriminated. According to the mature Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika model, each category of factors is characterized by a single intrinsic nature that exists without variation at all times and functions to discriminate that particular category from all others. Every conditioned individual factor is impermanent in the sense that its activity arises and passes away in dependence upon a complete collocation of requisite causes and conditions, but this conditioning and the factor's resulting impermanent character have no impact upon that factor's distinguishing characteristic, or intrinsic nature.
If one claimed that a single factor were characterized by more than one intrinsic nature, each demarcating a distinct category, that single factor would actually exist as multiple factors. Hence, the proponent here argues that if a single factor were characterized by the three distinct "natures" of future, present, and past, it would actually exist as three discrete factors rather than as one.
As the rejoinder of the Sarvāstivādin opponent makes clear, he understands the term "nature" in a sense different from that assumed by the proponent. If one states: "Material form exists through various modes, but there are not three discrete factors of material form ..." — the Sarvāstivādin opponent freely admits that a single factor, in this case material form, exists through multiple "natures," but he denies the seemingly inevitable untoward consequence of this admission, namely that there are three discrete factors of material form.
Since he refuses to admit that multiple natures determine multiple discrete factors, the Sarvāstivādin opponent must understand the term "nature" in a sense different from a factor's "intrinsic nature" as assumed in the proponent's argument. The opponent's response suggests that he understands "nature" to refer to a factor's "modes" of existence, which vary in accordance with the state or the conditions in which that factor is found.
The Challenge of Temporal Modes
The proponent immediately follows his summary statement of the opponent's position, beginning his criticism with a question: "In the future, which natures of material form are future?"
The opponent responds that a future factor of material form is characterized by both a future "mode" and a present "mode." For the proponent, who understands "nature" as a singular defining "nature," multiple natures in a single factor result in a contradiction: "It should be said, 'For what reason is that present nature, if still future, said to be present?'"
The proponent assumes that a future factor, as future, cannot also be characterized by a present "nature," since a factor characterized by a present "nature" must actually be present. The opponent's first response is brief: "One states, 'Because the present mode is acquired.'" The opponent here refers to the point at which a future factor arises — that is, when its present "mode" can be said to have just "arrived," or be "acquired."
Next, the opponent offers an alternative or perhaps supplementary explanation that appeals once again to the complete collocation: "Or else, it possesses the present 'mode' due to the force of the complete collocation of requisite causes and conditions." That is to say, a future factor of material form reaches this point of arising through the causal efficacy of a complete collocation of requisite causes and conditions, and at that point its present "mode" can be referred to as "acquired."
The Four Categories of "Everything"
The final statements in this passage are only partially preserved. One states: "Now that complete collocation of requisite causes and conditions exists, but it does not exist at all ..."
The passage cycles back to the previously examined issue of "nature" and the disagreement concerning the possibility of multiple natures. Unfortunately, the remainder of the opponent's expansion upon this first alternative is covered by pieces of bark and cannot be reconstructed.
The heavily damaged portion continues into a passage that appears to address the four categories of "everything." The manuscript damage is so severe that approximately fourteen lines of text are completely covered by various pieces of bark and layer 51sss. The sporadic remnants of the next several lines provide very few clues for the content of the initial portion of this hidden text.
Terms such as "past" and "nature" suggest continuity with the prior discussions in which the proponent criticizes the first two of the opponent's four specifications of "everything": that which is included within the twelve sense spheres, and those factors belonging to the three time periods. However, the damaged condition leaves the disposition of the proponent's criticism of the opponent's third and possibly fourth specifications uncertain.
The Two Explications of "Existence"
In a passage that probably refers back to the opponent's explications of "existence," the proponent continues his criticism of the opponent's original elaboration of the proposition "everything exists." He turns from the four specifications of "everything" to a criticism of the two explications of "existence."
The first explication: that which exists should indeed be said to be existence; that which does not exist should indeed be said to be nonexistence.
The second explication: in the case of the existent, the existent exists; it should be said that in the case of the existent, the nonexistent does not exist.
And yet the Mahāsarvāstivādins state: "There is certainly nothing that does not exist."
The proponent concludes his argument with a verbatim quotation of the opponent's second explication of existence and a restatement in negative terms of the opponent's fundamental proposition "everything exists." He offers the untoward consequence to which these two statements lead: "There is certainly nothing nonexistent that does not exist."
This rather convoluted negative construction can be paraphrased in more colloquial terms — that is, "no nonexistent thing can be found." In other words, as in the case of his previous argument, here also the proponent contends that the Sarvāstivāda assertion "there is certainly nothing that does not exist" results in the untoward consequence that even nonexistent entities must be admitted to exist.
This close parallelism between the current passage and the proponent's previous criticism also suggests a possible referent for the word "four" that appears in the next, only partially preserved statement: "The four ... in the case of the existent ..., a 'nature' exists; a 'nature,' in the case of the nonexistent ..., does not exist." The word "four" here might correspond to the set of four categories cited by the opponent in that earlier passage to delineate factors that do indeed exist: factors that are past, future, present, and unconditional.
The Material Form and Perceptual Consciousness
In the heavily damaged passage on the verso surface, the text appears to continue its criticism of the opponent's specifications of "everything."
The material form — the sense spheres — within the twelve sense spheres ... By means of which perceptual consciousness will one perceive "its nature" as material form? One states: "It is perceived by visual perceptual consciousness." With regard to that it should be said that "nature" consists of material form, since visual perceptual consciousness should perceive material form. If one states: "It is perceived by mental perceptual consciousness," then its "nature" should be said to be constituted by the factor sense sphere.
The proponent's concern in this passage shifts from the nonexistent entity to the cognition of the assertion that such nonexistent entities do not exist. The proponent asks which type of perceptual consciousness perceives the "nature" of material form. If one assumes the proponent's notion of "nature" as "intrinsic nature," and the question concerns material form in the present, the proponent and opponent would agree: the "nature" of material form is perceived by visual perceptual consciousness.
However, this model applies only to present perceptual objects — that is to say, visual perceptual consciousness can perceive an object of its corresponding category of material form only in the present time period. Thus the problem that results in an untoward consequence must lie in the different views of the proponent and opponent concerning the term "nature" and the existence of past and future factors.
The proponent cites a second possible response by the opponent: "If one states, 'It is perceived by means of mental perceptual consciousness ...'" Here, the opponent's second response adopts the perspective of "nature" as changing temporal "modes," which can only be perceived by mental perceptual consciousness. Thus, the opponent would contend that material form can become an object-support perceived by two different types of perceptual consciousness: as present, its "nature" as material form is perceived by visual perceptual consciousness, while as past or future, its temporal "mode" is perceived by mental perceptual consciousness. To this second response, the proponent then offers another untoward consequence: "Then 'its nature' should be said to be constituted by the factor sense sphere." In other words, if the "nature" characterizing past or future material form is perceived by mental perceptual consciousness, material form must belong to the factor sense sphere, since factors are the object-support correlated with mental perceptual consciousness. Here, the proponent clearly takes "nature" as referring to "intrinsic nature," and since he does not distinguish between the senses of "nature" and "mode," the opponent's claim that such temporal "modes" of material form are perceived by mental perceptual consciousness results in category contradiction, whereby material form, whose "nature" is by definition material form, would have the "nature" of factors.
Scholarly Translation
[ll. 109-115] — Criticism of the Opponent's Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Declarations
(5) [109] [One states,] [o] "Everything exists with every aspect." [110] [e] [In that case,] a future aspect exists with a past aspect; a past aspect exists with a future aspect. [111] The aspect of tranquility exists with the aspect of voidness; the aspect of voidness exists with the aspect of truth. The aspect of untruth [112] exists with the aspect of suffering. The aspect of happiness exists with the aspect of suffering. The aspect of self exists with the aspect of non-self. [113] The aspect of non-self exists with the aspect of self. The aspect of what is not everything exists with the aspect of everything.
(6) [113-114] Virtuous and unvirtuous [factors exist] by reason of past [factors], by reason of future [factors], and by reason of present [factors].
(7) [114-115] And [as for the declarations concerning] all "modes," [namely, "everything exists through all modes,"] and so on, it should be expanded by means of [similar applications of] insight.
[ll. 115-123] — Criticism of the Opponent's First Specification (4:1) of "Everything"
(1) [115] [One states,] [o] "Those [factors] that are included within the twelve sense spheres [116] exist. The visual sense sphere exists. Therefore, the visual sense sphere is included within the twelve sense spheres; [117] and so on, [the scope of] 'everything' should be expanded through the [other] sense spheres. It should be known that there exists no thirteenth sense sphere, continuing on through [the previously cited list], there exists no [118] soul, there exists no person, and so on." [p] With regard to that it should be said, "By virtue of which perceptual consciousness or energy [119] should it be known that there exists no soul, there exists no person?" One states, [o] "[It is] by means of the mental sense sphere, by means of mental perceptual consciousness." [120] [p] With regard to that it should be said that a fifth noble truth, nineteenth element, [121] soul, and person should be said to be factors [that are the object-supports] of mental perceptual consciousness, for in this way it has been said, "Factors [are the object-support] of mental perceptual consciousness." [122] Now if one admits that [these nonexistent entities are] factors, with regard to that it should be said that, as a result of that, certain factors exist [123] [and] certain factors do not exist.
[ll. 123-134] — Criticism of the Opponent's Second Specification (4:2) of "Everything"
(2) [123] [If one states,] [o] "Or [those factors] that belong to the three time periods are existence," [p] with regard to that it should be said that [124] undoubtedly a future [factor] is present, and a present [factor] is past. If one states, [o] "A [factor] having been future [125] becomes present, and having been present becomes past," [p] with regard to that it should be said that [126] [one factor] possesses three "natures": a past "nature," a future "nature," and [127] a present "nature." If one states, [o] "Material form exists through [various] 'modes,' but there are not three [discrete factors of] material form," [p] with regard to that [128] it should be said, "Now how is there the acquisition of a present 'nature' in the case of a future [first aggregate of] material form continuing on through [the fifth aggregate of] perceptual consciousness?" [129] One states, [o] "Material form possessed of a future 'mode' [comes to] be possessed of a present 'mode' due to the force of a complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions]." [p] It should be said, [130] "Now does that complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions] exist, or not exist?" If one states, [o] "[The complete collocation] exists," [p] then the "nature" of material form in the present [131] is not material form, [but should instead be that of the separately existing complete collocation]. [Since you maintain that] in the past, there are three ["natures" of] material form, in the future, which "natures" [of material form] are future? [132] One states, [o] "In the future, a future 'mode' and a present 'mode' [of material form] are future." [p] It should be said, "For what [133] reason is that [present 'nature,' if] still future, said to be] present?" One states, [o] "[Because the present 'mode' ] is acquired'" [134] One states, [o] "Now that complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions] exists, [but] it does not exist at all ..."
[ll. 135-51G(v)/51sss(v)] — Criticism of the Opponent's Third (?) and Fourth (?) Specifications
[Approximately fourteen lines of text are lost to manuscript damage. Pieces of bark from layer 51sss completely cover fragments 51G, 51C, and 51H. Only isolated terms survive: "twelve sense spheres," "nature," "future," "visual," "mental perceptual consciousness." The content appears to continue the criticism of the opponent's specifications of "everything," particularly in the context of future factors.]
[51G(v)/51sss(v) ll. 1-5] — The Material Form and Sense Spheres
[1] ... [p] ... the material form (*sense spheres) within the twelve sense spheres ... [2] it is not the case that [its] "nature" ... By means of which [3] (*perceptual consciousness) will one perceive ("its nature" as material form)? One states, [o] "It is perceived by visual perceptual consciousness." [p] With regard to that it should then be said that "nature" [4] consists of material form, [since] visual perceptual consciousness should perceive material form. If one states, [o] "It is perceived by mental perceptual consciousness," [p] then [its] "nature" [5] should be said to be [constituted by] the factor [sense sphere].
[51G(v)/51sss(v) ll. 5-7] — Criticism of the Opponent's Two Explications of "Existence"
[5] [p] It should be said that in the case of the existent, the existent exists; it should be said that in the case of the existent, the nonexistent does not exist. [6] [And yet,] the Mahāsarvāstivādins state, [o] "There is certainly nothing that does not exist." [7] [p] ... in the case of the existent ..., a "nature" exists; a "nature," in the case of the nonexistent ..., does not exist. With regard to this, the Mahāsarvāstivādins ...
Notation: [p] = proponent's statement; [o] = opponent's statement; [e] = editorial note. Square brackets indicate reconstructed or supplied text. Parenthetical asterisks (*) mark tentatively reconstructed passages. Ellipses mark lacunae in the birch bark. Line numbers follow Cox's reconstruction.
Damage: Section 3 is the most severely damaged portion of the text. The passage spanning approximately fourteen lines on fragments 51G, 51C, and 51H is completely covered by pieces of bark from layer 51sss. Only isolated terms survive in the hidden portion. The verso surfaces of the remaining fragments are badly deteriorated. The proponent's criticism of the opponent's first two specifications of "everything" (ll. 115-134) is substantially preserved; the third and fourth specifications are largely lost; the two explications of "existence" (ll. 5-7) are partially preserved.
Key terms in this section:
- sarva (G sarva) — "everything." The fundamental term whose scope the opponent attempts to specify.
- astida (Skt astitā) — "existence." The content of the opponent's explications.
- āyadaṇa (Skt āyatana) — "sense sphere." The twelve sense spheres define the first specification of "everything."
- bhāva (G bhava) — "nature" or "mode." The key ambiguity in the debate: the proponent takes it as "intrinsic nature" (svabhāva); the opponent takes it as temporal "mode."
- samagri (Skt sāmagrī) — "complete collocation" of requisite causes and conditions. The mechanism by which future factors are said to arise.
- mahāsarvāstivādin — the school whose assertion "there is certainly nothing that does not exist" is cited and criticized.
Colophon
Good Works Translation by the New Tianmu Anglican Church, April 2026. Translated from Gandhāri Prakrit with reference to Sanskrit equivalents. Source: Collett Cox, A Gāndhārī Abhidharma Text, Gandhāran Buddhist Texts 8 (2025), open access. Blood Rule compliant — translation independently derived from the Gandhāri reconstruction, not from Cox's English. Cox's translation and extensive commentary consulted as reference for damaged passages, philosophical context, and identification of argument structure. Section 3 of 4 — covers the Fundamental Proposition: Everything Exists (ll. 109-115, ll. 115-134, 51G(v)/51sss(v)).
The Gospel Reading reconstructs the full shape of the debate from the fragmentary Gandhāri text and Cox's commentary, presenting the argument as a continuous exposition. Approximately fourteen lines of manuscript are completely lost to bark damage; the Gospel Reading bridges these gaps where the argument can be inferred from context and parallel texts. The Scholarly Translation preserves the lacunae, line references, and fragmentary state of the original.
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Source Text
Gandhāri Prakrit Reconstruction (ll. 109-115)
(5) [109] sarvagarena sarvam asti di [110] adiḍa(*e)ghar[an]ena anagaḍa(*e)ghar[an]a asti · anagaḍa(*e)garena adiḍa(*e)gare asti · [111] śuhaḍaggarena · śatagare asti · śatagare ṃuśaḍagare asti · ṣacagare[112]pa(*a)suryaka(*a) asti · dukhḍagarena suhaḍar(*a)ẹa asti · anaṃak(*a)renāṃmako asti. [113] ānmakarenāṃako asti · ṃanasarvākarenāṃa sarvagarena asti(*a)rī- avaganena asti
(6 · [113] adiḍa[114]ḍi(e(*a)iri(*a)inena pr(*a) · aint(*a)ajr(*a)ajḍ(*a)iki(*a)irir(*a)ment(*a) ea · pi pacuṣpamakaranena kuśalākuśalā
(7) [114] soḍ [115]rv vi bhava praiahi uksiviḍava peyala
Sanskrit Rendering (ll. 109-115)
(5) [109] sarvākāreṇa sarvam asti. [110] atītākāreṇāṃitākāro 'sti. anāgatākāreṇa sāṃnākāro 'sti. [111] śamathākāreṇa sāṃnākāro 'sti, śūnyatākāreṇa sāṃtyākāro 'sti. satyākāreṇa[112]pāsatyākāro 'sti. duḥkhākāreṇa sukhākāraḥ. anātmākāreṇāṃmāko 'sti. [113] āṃmākārenāṃāṃmāko 'sti. sarvākāreṇāsarvākāro 'sti.
(6) [113-114] kuśaleneśā aṃgadākāraṇenāpi pratyutpannakāraṇena kuśalākuśalaiḥ.
(7) [114] soḍ [115]rv vi bhava praśahi ukṣividhava peṣala.
Gandhāri Prakrit Reconstruction (ll. 115-123)
(1) [115] ya dvaḍaśair āyaḍanehi saṃgrahibā [116] te asṭi di cakhuḍāna tena cakhuḍāṇeṣa dvadasāyavadamasar(*a)riḍ[117]bhiḍa peyaḷo sarva ukṣiviḍava · nāṣṭi trayoḍaśaṃ āyaḍaṇaṃ yava nasti [118] jīvo · nāṣṭi puruṣo · ṃa(*a)ōṣivi (*a)sa (*a)ṃi(*a)ṃ dukha + bhoṇi · · prt(*a)ochiḍi pt(*a)oḍi(*a)r(*a)aṃ pt(*a)aḍi · viṣadhā(*a)ṃeṇa ṣeni bhoḍi[5]ya dvaḍaśī · aha manōvikhānenu tena bhaḍi[5]ya dharma vaṭava
Sanskrit Rendering (ll. 115-123)
[115] ye dvādaśair āyatanaiḥ saṃgṛhītā [116] te santi. cakṣurāyatanam ...tena cakṣurāyatanaṃ dvādaśānāgatāyatanānāṃ ca dhārur [121] ... tena bhaḍi[5]yo dharmo vaktavyaṃ tena ekatra dharmā[122] saṃti punar dharmā iti prajñāḍiṃti [123] ekatra na santi ®
Gandhāri Prakrit Reconstruction (ll. 123-134)
(2) [123] yoḍi aha trayo(*a)dh(*a)ka bhāvana va atithi di tatra vaṭava jaḍe di.[24]Aṃagaḍa prtacup(*a)iṃ(*a) · prtacupaṇa aḍiḍa traya bhāvaṇa vai · aha trayaṇa · · · aha ṃruva bhoḍi · prtacupaṇu aṇagaḍa(*e)bhu ṃavasṃi · ya prachiḍava [125]ḍa bhāvasṭa prṭ(*a)cupaṇu bhoṃi(*a) ahu(*a) · yiḍi aha [126] (*a)kaysa dhamu (*a)ṣi (*a) mahibhāvo ca · ṣṭi di a(*a)ṃibhāvo · aha ru(*a)vaṃi · aha · vacaṇa · [128] tatra vaṭava manor(*a)ive(*a)ḳe · aṃagaḍa prtacupaṇa vi(*a) dha vaṭavu kim 129raṇeḍi(*a)eki samagri(*a) asieṃa(*a) + + + + + + + [130] st(*a) av(*a) vt(*a)ne samagr(*a)ṣi asṭi naṃi di + : yaḍi ahaḍi di tena pracupaṇa rvu(*a) bhoḍi atvaṃi(*a) ahibhāva(*a) di · vaṭava [130] (*a)ṣadhi(*a) (*a) vanu samagr(*a)ṣi asṭi m(*a)ṣi kici (*a)asṭi [131] · + + + + + · + · + aṣaḍa naṣṭi atiru mahāsar(*a)isr(*a)asṭi m(*a)ṣi a[139]· (*a)ṭhiḍamaaga nasti bruṣi ca samagri(*a)asieṃa(*a) + + + + + + + [140] + + + + ḍi · yiḍi samagr(*a)ṣi asṭi ? + + + + + + + + + t(*a)mu[141]t(*a)paḍaḍhaimo kari(*a)yidi aṃupaḍa to ? + + + + + + + + + + +?
Sanskrit Rendering (ll. 123-134)
(2) [123] yadi āha trayo(*a)dhvaka bhāvanā va atiṣṭi. tatra vaktavyam ... [124] anāgataḥ pratyutpanno ... pratyutpannaś cātītah. trayā bhāvanā ... [126] ekasya dharmasya ... svabhāvaś ca ... [127] a present "nature." ... [128] tatra vaktavyaṃ manoviṣayena ... anāgatāya pratyutpannāya ... [129] sāmagrīṃ ... [130] ... vaktavyam ... [131] ... asaḍa nāsti atra mahāsarvāstivādinaḥ ...
Gandhāri Prakrit Reconstruction (51G(v)/51sss(v) ll. 1-5)
[1] ... (*tena) de sastre ? mada sarva aṣi(*a) na ti(*a)aiji(*a) sarva anupaṣapana di ... [2] ... ? na ? asṭi ? ... [3] ... + ? (*asṭi ...
[5] saḍa nota asṭi di vaṭava sada anaṭa nasti di vaṭava mahasar(6)rvastvada ahava nasti kica nasti namu nasti kica asada nasti namu · caḍu ? ? [7] (*a)paidiga · + · a · ? s(*a)i(d)(*a) bhi(*a)aiya asṭi · bhi(*a)aiy(*a) + · asada nasti atiru mahāsat(*a)rṣi(*a)asṭi(8)[(*a)vada) ...
Sanskrit Rendering (51G(v)/51sss(v) ll. 5-7)
[5] satab sad astiti vaktavyaṃ, sato 'san nāstīti vaktavyam, mahāsā(6)rvāstivādā āhur nāsti kiṃcin nāsti nāma, nāsti kiṃcid asan nāsti nāma. catu- ... [7] pratiṣ- ... sato bhāvo 'sti. bhāvaḥ ... asato nāsti. atra mahāsarvāsti(8)[vādinaḥ ...
Source Colophon
Gandhāri Prakrit reconstruction from Collett Cox, A Gāndhārī Abhidharma Text: British Library Fragment 28, Gandhāran Buddhist Texts 8 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2025). Open access publication. Section 3: Fundamental Proposition — Everything Exists, ll. 109-115, ll. 115-134, fragments 51G(v)/51sss(v). Sanskrit renderings also from Cox. Notation: + marks lost akṣaras; = marks line breaks; (*x) marks reconstructed characters; · marks punctuation in the original; ® marks section breaks in the manuscript.
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