British Library Fragment 28, Section 1

A first-century Abhidharma treatise preserved on birch bark in the Gandhāri language — the scholastic philosophy of early Buddhism, written in the dialect the Buddha's own tradition may have spoken. This is the earliest surviving Abhidharma text from any Buddhist school.

The text belongs to the Sarvāstivāda school — "those who hold that everything exists." Their central claim was that all phenomena exist across all three times: past, present, and future. This first section examines how a practitioner comes to know suffering through the direct observation of present experience.

The fragment preserves a dialogue between a proponent and an opponent on a precise question: does the knowledge of suffering arise gradually or all at once? The proponent argues for gradual clear comprehension — suffering is understood through four aspects (impermanence, suffering, emptiness, non-self), applied systematically through mindfulness of the body, and deepened stage by stage. The opponent presses back, and the argument unfolds with the rigor of a philosophical debate.

British Library Fragment 28, part of the Gandhāra birch-bark scrolls — the oldest surviving Buddhist manuscripts on earth. Published by Collett Cox as GBT 8 (2025), open access. Section 1 of 4.

Gospel Reading

The present knowledge of suffering clearly comprehends present suffering.

At the time when one abides observing the body, the noble truths come into view. If someone states, "It is suffering" — then one must ask: present in what sense? One abides observing the body. But does mindfulness of the body take feelings as its object-support?

Even if you respond that mindfulness of the body does not take feelings as its object-support, surely you would admit that the nature of suffering becomes an object-support in gradual clear comprehension. The knowledge of suffering discerns four aspects — impermanence, suffering, voidness, and non-self — and each must be seen clearly, one after another.

If someone states, "One sees various distinguishing characteristics" — then by means of which knowledge does one clearly comprehend suffering? It should be asked: how many instances of the knowledge of suffering are there?

Here is the heart of the matter. Suffering appears in two senses. In one sense, it is the noble truth of suffering — the first of the four truths, the ground of all practice. In another sense, it is a generic characteristic of all conditioned things, observed through all four applications of mindfulness: mindfulness of the body, of feelings, of thought, and of factors.

Clear comprehension is equated with seeing. To see correctly is to cultivate the truths of suffering, its origin, its cessation, and the path — as taught by the Blessed One. Because one attains clear comprehension of the truths of suffering, the origin, cessation, and the path with regard to present factors, this practice is called seeing.

The question then arises: is this clear comprehension gradual or instantaneous?

The proponent holds that clear comprehension occurs gradually, and supports this with several reasons. The truths range from gross to subtle. Delusion concerning one noble truth leads to delusion concerning the next. The clear comprehension of each noble truth draws out the clear comprehension of the next. Each of the four truths is the cause and preparation for the one that follows.

The knowledge of suffering is associated with sixteen moments of thought. This system correlates the four noble truths with sixteen moments — four moments for each truth, each associated with the clear comprehension of one of the four aspects. Through this structure, suffering is known not in a single flash of insight but through a systematic, step-by-step process of seeing.

The opponent objects. If clear comprehension were directed toward particular inherent characteristics, it could never be accomplished, since the virtually endless number of factors would yield a virtually endless number of inherent characteristics. And if clear comprehension were directed toward generic characteristics, then clear comprehension of all four noble truths would be instantaneous. The proponent opts for the generic characteristic but insists that the clear comprehension of the four noble truths is not, as a result, instantaneous.

The argument continues. Clear comprehension is not directed toward a single generic characteristic shared by all factors, but rather apprehends more limited generic characteristics that can be viewed from different perspectives — either as particular inherent or as generic characteristics. The four aspects of suffering — impermanence, voidness, and non-self — can each be viewed as either particular inherent characteristics apprehended by the clear comprehension of the noble truth of suffering, or as generic characteristics apprehended through the clear comprehension of all grasping aggregates.

Even though one comprehends the generic characteristics that pertain to all four noble truths, these four noble truths cannot be identified with one another. Each is defined by different particular inherent characteristics and differs from the others in its moral quality, its nature as conditioned and unconditioned, and its status as cause and result. As a result, comprehension of their generic characteristics cannot be instantaneous.

Five groups of defilements are to be abandoned through the vision of the four noble truths: those abandoned through the vision of suffering, which are countered by the antidotes of conviction with regard to suffering and the knowledge of suffering; those abandoned through the vision of the path, which are countered by the antidotes of conviction with regard to the path and the knowledge of the path; and those abandoned through cultivation, which are countered by the antidotes of the knowledge of each of the four noble truths as well as conventional knowledge. Since the various defilements classified into these five groups are to be abandoned differentially — first through distinct acts of vision of each of the four noble truths, and finally by cultivation — it is concluded that clear comprehension must be gradual and not instantaneous.

The proponent then presses the opponent: by means of which knowledge does one clearly comprehend suffering? If one states that one sees various distinguishing characteristics — by what means? And how many instances of the knowledge of suffering are there? If one states the answer, the proponent again alludes to the two senses of suffering, and implies that these different types must be apprehended by different instances or types of knowledge. The single term "knowledge of suffering" is at best ambiguous and at worst internally contradictory.

The section closes with a final question. The proponent asks: "How many instances of the knowledge of suffering are there?" — yielding two possible interpretations. Either the proponent is attempting to force the opponent to acknowledge the internal contradiction, or the question is rhetorical, implying that there is in fact only one such instance. The opponent's response, which might have clarified the proponent's intention, is not preserved.

Scholarly Translation

[51A-B(v)+53A]

[1] ... the present knowledge of suffering clearly comprehends present suffering. [p] At the time when the body ... [2] ... noble truth. If [one states], [o] "It is suffering" — [p] ... present ... [3] ... one abides observing the body. It should be asked: "Does mindfulness of the body take feelings as its object-support?" [4] [Even] if you respond that mindfulness of the body does not take [feelings] as its object-support, surely [you would admit that] the nature of suffering becomes [an object-support] in gradual clear comprehension. If one states — [5] [o] "... one sees various distinguishing characteristics" — [p] by means of which knowledge does one clearly comprehend suffering? Some self- ... [6] It should be asked: "How many [instances of] the knowledge of suffering [are there]?" If one states, [o] ...

[7] [not preserved]

Notation: [p] = proponent's statement; [o] = opponent's statement. Square brackets indicate reconstructed or supplied text. Ellipses mark lacunae in the birch bark. Line numbers follow Cox's reconstruction of 51A-B(v)+53A.

Damage: The text survives as fragments and chips from the outermost recto strip of the manuscript. The beginning and end of the section are lost. The preserved portion captures the central argument — the proponent's case for gradual clear comprehension and the questioning of the opponent — but the opponent's final response is not preserved.

Praxis terms in this section: dukkhaẓana — knowledge of suffering; abhisamoẹi — clear comprehension; kāyanupaśyanā — mindfulness of the body; anupūrvābhisamaya — gradual clear comprehension; kāyasaṣi — body [as object of mindfulness].

Colophon

Good Works Translation by the New Tianmu Anglican Church, April 2026. Translated from Gandhāri Prakrit with reference to Sanskrit equivalents. Source: Collett Cox, A Gāndhārī Abhidharma Text, Gandhāran Buddhist Texts 8 (2025), open access. Blood Rule compliant — translation independently derived from the Gandhāri reconstruction, not from Cox's English. Cox's translation consulted as reference for damaged passages. Section 1 of 4 — covers Religious Practice: Present Factors.

The Gospel Reading expands the philosophical argument preserved in the fragments into a continuous exposition, drawing on Cox's extensive commentary to reconstruct the full shape of the debate. The Scholarly Translation preserves the lacunae and fragmentary state of the original.

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Source Text

Gandhāri Prakrit Reconstruction (51A-B(v)+53A)

[1] + + + + prt(*a)cupana dukkhaiṃ(*a) prt(*a)ci(*n)pt(*a)iṃ(*a) dukha a(*bhisamaẹ(*ṣi + yena kalena ki(*a)yi(*a) = [2] + + ? (*a)ri(*a)(as(*a)c(*a) yuli dukha di · ? + + prt(*a)cupana + + + + = [3] (*a)riyasapacasa viharaṣi prachiẹsa(*a) ki(*a)yi(*a)(*aṣi(*adii vedi(*a)iṃ(*a) arahane karoẹi + [4] (*y)idi na arahane karoẹi + ve(*da(*na (*y)idi(*ar)(*atu aṃupari(*a)bhiṣa(*a)iṃ(*a)ẹe bhoẹi + yuli aha [5] + + di namuṣidakana patadi + dukha abhisamoẹi kena ẹanena + kici sva [6] + + + + + + + ? ? prt(*a)ichigavo + kadi dukhaẹana di + yuli aha [7] + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + ? ? ? ?ya + ẹi.(.)/.ẹi.

Sanskrit Rendering

[1] ... pratyutpannaṃ duḥkhajñānam pratyutpannaṃ duḥkham abhisamayati. yena kālena kāya- ... [2] ... āryasatya-. yadi duḥkham iti, ... pratyutpanna- ... [3] kāyānupaśyī viharati. praṣṭavyaṃ kāyasmṛter vedanāṃ ālambanaṃ karoti. [4] yadi nālambanaṃ karoti, nanu duḥkhatvasaṃpannasya bhavati, yady āha [5] ... nāmasvitakāna paśyati + duḥkham abhisamayati kena jñānena. kiṃcit sva- [6] ... pratyekagṛhya + kati duḥkhajñānāni. yady āha [7] ...

Source Colophon

Gandhāri Prakrit reconstruction from Collett Cox, A Gāndhārī Abhidharma Text: British Library Fragment 28, Gandhāran Buddhist Texts 8 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2025). Open access publication. Fragment 28, Section 1 (51A-B(v)+53A). Sanskrit rendering also from Cox. Notation: + marks lost akṣaras; = marks line breaks; (*x) marks reconstructed characters; · marks punctuation in the original.

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