by Tang Huyen

The Bodhisattva not only does not commit an offense, but on the contrary he accumulates merit.

Fernando Tola and Carmen Dragonetti, "Buddhism
and Justification of Violence", Hakke-Bunka Kenkyu,
No. 27, March 2001, 63–100 has plenty of materials
on the topic in the title of the article. They, 90,
mention a sutra preserved in Chinese, T, III, 161b–162a,
and resume it thus:

"a Bodhisattva who travels in company of 500 persons;
they reach a road infested by robbers. The robbers send
one of them to spy the group. The robber recognizes the
Bodhisattva as one of his relatives and as such informs
him about the danger that threatens the caravan and
urges him to escape without informing his travel
companions. The Bodhisattva wants to inform the other
travelers, but at the same time he fears that, if he
informs them who the man is, his travel-fellows will
kill him; and thus will commit a great sin for which they
will sink in the three evil destinies (gati) (hells, hungry
ghosts, animals) and will endure infinite sufferings. He
also considers that, if he keeps silence, the robbers will
kill his travel-fellows; and in this case it is they who will
suffer the same bad consequences. Thus, after a
thorough reflection on all the aspects of the situation
and in order to benefit the other beings and save them
from committing a sinful action, and from the
consequent punishment, full of compassion, and not
thinking of himself, he decides to kill the robber and to
willingly assume for himself the evil retribution and the
punishment in hell which will be the consequence of
that murder."

A similar story appears in Sanskrit in Asanga,
Bodhisattva-bhūmi, ed. Wogihara, 165–166, which Tola
and Dragonetti resume, 90–91. "A Bodhisattva sees a
robber who is prepared to kill a great number of persons,
among which are śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas and
bodhisattvas. He reflects: 'If I kill this robber, I shall be
reborn in hell; if this robber commits a murder, he will
be condemned to hell.' Thus in order to save the robber
from this evil destiny, the Bodhisattva, horrified for the
crime he is about to perform and full of compassion for
the robber, kills the robber when he sees him having a
good thought or a neutral thought. Asanga concludes
that the Bodhisattva not only does not commit an
offense (punishable with the expulsion from the Sangha),
but on the contrary he accumulates merit."

Three sutras preserved in Chinese and two in Tibetan
(one translated from Chinese) tell a similar story, in
which "the Bodhisattva is presented as the captain of a
ship who kills a robber that had the intention to kill the
merchants traveling in the ship." Tola and Dragonetti, 92.

It is interesting that the last-cited sutras have in their
title Upāya-kausalya "Skill in means", whilst the first
has Upāya "Means".

Earlier in the article, Tola and Dragonetti, 86 present
the rules of discipline: "If a bhikkhu goes to see an
army drawn up in battle-array, without a cause thereto
sufficient — that is a fault requiring expiation"
(Pācittiya 48); "And if there be any cause for that
bhikkhu to go to the army, that bhikkhu may remain
in the army for two or three nights. If he remains longer
than that — that is a fault requiring expiation"
(Pācittiya 49). "If, while remaining in the army for two or
three nights, the bhikkhu goes to the battle-array or to
the numbering of the forces or to the formation of troops
or to see reviews of soldiers — that is a fault requiring
expiation" (Pācittiya 50).

Tang Huyen

Colophon

Posted to talk.religion.buddhism on June 23, 2005, in reply to a thread on enlightenment and violence that began with the question "can an enlightened being kill?" Author: Tang Huyen. Message-ID: <1119569974.ab7d582c6c72a97c37b452a4e917f748@bubbanews>.

The thread originated in a discussion of whether enlightened beings can commit violence. Tang Huyen responds not with abstract ethics but with primary sources: Tola and Dragonetti's 2001 survey of Buddhist canonical material across Sanskrit, Chinese, and Tibetan traditions. The Bodhisattva-who-kills scenario, attested in multiple independent sources and in Asaṅga's systematic Bodhisattva-bhūmi, presents the sharpest case: killing motivated purely by compassion, with full acceptance of karmic consequence, in which the killing prevents greater harm. The final observation — that the later versions carry the title Upāya-kausalya (Skill in Means) while the first carries only Upāya (Means) — is quietly significant: the tradition itself recognized that this doctrine required a more precise framing. The Vinaya passages on bhikkhus and armies close the post by showing the tension between the monastic prohibition and the Bodhisattva justification.

Preserved from the Usenet archive for the Good Work Library by the New Tianmu Anglican Church, 2026.

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