by Tang Huyen

In June 2008, Tang Huyen addresses the deepest technical problem in Buddhist and Daoist discourse: the paradox that arises when a teacher uses language to point at a state in which language has stopped. There is a difference, he argues, between a first-level state — the actual cessation of mentation, the actual absence of self — and a second-level intellective view about such a state. The Buddha himself condemns all intellective views, including his own views about no-self, because the moment one speaks, one is operating from within thought, not from within the state the teaching aims at. The same paradox structures the Xinxin Ming attributed to Sengzhao (traditionally the third ancestor of Chinese Chan): "Do not choose" is itself a choice, a contradiction — unless one reads it as pointing at a state where thought and choice have simply stopped, making the apparent contradiction intentional and precise. Tang Huyen extends the analysis to negative theology (if God is absolutely unknowable, how can one even say so?) and to the Buddhist theory of the made-up self — not that there is no self absolutely, but that whatever self one mentates for oneself is purely constructed, and the awakened holds it in a consciously assumed mode.

There is a difference between a state at the first level (like the absence of self, the absence of mentation) and an intellective view at the second level about it (like an intellective view about the absence of self, the absence of mentation). In that very state, whilst it is in act, one can well not be conscious of it (e.g., one can well be not conscious that one has no mentation, that one has no self), because just then there is no thought around to "make a case" for such a state in content. But afterward, upon reflection, one can become conscious in thought of such a state, e.g., that in it one had no self, that one had no mentation.

There is no doubt that the Buddha talks of the absence of self, the absence of mentation, as actual states, and he also talks of such states, but of course when he talks about such states, he talks about them from within thought and language, and in such condition of his, they are intellective views. He condemns intellective views, including such intellective views of his, namely his intellective views about the absence of self, the absence of mentation.

The Xinxin Ming — Sengzhao's Intentional Contradiction

Just like in the poem of Seng-zan, traditionally said to be the third ancestor of Chinese Chan. At face value, it contradicts itself, as when it says "Do not choose." Because when it says so, it is choosing, namely not to choose, so it is a flat contradiction. The problem is that it talks about a state where all thought and volition has stopped, and in such a state, there is no thought and volition, so there is no choice. Just then, in such a state, one is not conscious that one has no thought and volition, therefore that one has no choice and cannot make a choice. It feels heavenly, though one is not conscious of that fact as a state parsed through thought and language, even if one is conscious, and if anything, one is highly conscious!

But afterward, upon reflection, one is conscious that in such a state, one had no thought and volition, therefore that one had no choice, that in such state of the absence of thought, volition and choice, one felt heavenly. And one remembers that when what was absent (thought, volition, choice) became present again, such a heavenly feeling went away, so one is incentivised to return to such a state.

Thus the paradox in such a poem as Seng-zan's Xinxin Ming is intentional and precise, not sloppy. Seng-zan talks about a state where all thought and volition has stopped, from within a state where they haven't stopped (as he must, because he is writing), and his saying "Do not choose" would be a flat contradiction if taken at face value, from within the usual state of thought and volition. But it is not a flat contradiction, because he is pointing to a state where thought and volition have stopped, and in it, one does not choose, indeed cannot choose. In it, one is not conscious that one does not choose, because there is no thought to make the observation, but afterward, upon reflection, one notes that in such a state one did not choose.

Negative Theology and the Limits of Negation

There is no clean way to say, e.g., that something absolutely does not exist, because one must have some notion of it in order to deny it. The well-known example is a unicorn. One has a notion of a horn, one has a notion of a horse, and one combines them to make the notion of a unicorn, though no such animal exists. That is simple enough, but take the notion of something that absolutely and totally does not exist and cannot be known, like the God of negative theology. If such a God does not exist and cannot be known, absolutely and totally, how can one say that such a God does not exist and cannot be known? At least one knows that much about him, namely that such a God does not exist and cannot be known, therefore one contradicts oneself when one says that such a God does not exist and cannot be known. If something was absolutely and totally unknown and unknowable, one would be unable even to formulate that much about it.

One has to be aware of such sinewy and anfractuous logic when one deals with negations that are common in Buddhism and Daoism.

The Made-Up Self

Yes, deluded people have a self, and they create it for themselves to carry around, but it fails to have complete control over what happens, regardless how hard they wish the contrary. That absence of total control over what happens shows that such a self is made up, mentated, fictive, but ultimately unreal and untrue, though it does have some partial efficacy. They can quiesce their mentation so that they don't create it, and in that state they don't create suffering for themselves (and are awakened). So the self has some reality, but only made-up, mentated, fictive reality, and no reality independent from thought, from the thought that creates it. It is not the case that there is no self, absolutely and totally, but that whatever self one can think up for oneself is merely made-up, mentated, fictive. The awakened still needs a self to manage himself (unless he is in non-mentation, which is impractical and possible only in meditation), but takes it merely in a made-up, mentated, fictive mode, in a consciously "assumed" mode, and nothing more.

That complicated scenario explains why the Buddha says that there is no self, and yet condemns all intellective views, including the intellective view that there is no self. He wants to point to the state wherein mentation has been quiesced and does not create a self for its owner to carry around, but he cannot do it unless he engages in mentation, in thought and language. That irony forms the core of Buddhist and Daoist mindfuck.

Colophon

Originally posted to talk.religion.buddhism, alt.zen, alt.philosophy.zen, and alt.buddha.short.fat.guy on 2 June 2008. Author: Tang Huyen. The post responds to a thread on rebirth views, using it as a springboard for a sustained analysis of the two-level paradox in Buddhist and Daoist discourse. Key reference: the Xinxin Ming attributed to Sengzhao (third ancestor of Chinese Chan).

Preserved from the Usenet archive for the Good Work Library by the New Tianmu Anglican Church, 2026. Original Message-ID: [email protected].

🌲