by Tang Huyen

In June 2006, Tang Huyen posted to talk.religion.buddhism in reply to Stu, who had posed the classic two-ontology question: does Buddhism posit that objects have no inherent essence, making science and cross-cultural recognition impossible? Tang Huyen's response unfolds as a systematic statement of Buddhism's relationship to truth: it is a method to end suffering, not a theory of reality — and even its most sophisticated theoretical tools, including the Dependent Arisal itself, are rafts to be abandoned once they have done their work. A companion post to `[email protected]` (174L), written thirty minutes later to a different interlocutor in the same thread.

Buddhism in its strictest form is a practical method to
end suffering and is not a theory of reality per se, and
though it denies anything permanent, if per chance
such a permanent reality existed, it would not bother
an awakened Buddhist in the least. The calm and
peace of mind of a Buddhist awakened is internal
and does not depend on externalities like permanent or
impermanent thing-events.

Buddhism is not a theory about reality stricto sensu,
but a method to end suffering. It may broach the topic
of what is real and what is unreal, but such discussion
is purely pragmatic and didactic, and is never offered
(even less pushed down people's throats) as final,
definitive and ultimate — the very last word, period. Even
if it is factually true, it is still only a means to an end, and
the end is to calm thought completely, in order to bring
about the end of suffering. Once this end is reached, all
theoretical issues become moot, all of them have been
dropped, including whatever method that was used to
bring about that end.

Moreover the effectiveness of a method (dharma) has
nothing to do with its factual truth. The contemplation
of the unclean is one instance where the object of
contemplation is unreal: one contemplates for example
the whole world as a skeleton. Of course the whole
world is not a skeleton, but one contemplates it as a
skeleton, in order to cut lust. Now it may or may not
work, and it is well-known that people can kill
themselves in this kind of (apparently morbid)
contemplation, but it does work for some people, that
is, it helps them end their suffering. If it works, it works.
When it works, it merely works, and needs not imply
anything about its factual truth, beyond its working.

That said, it is unquestionable that there is a reality
out there and in here, which often frustrates and fails
our wishes and desires. It exists independently of our
mind, and our mind can scarcely bend it to its wishes
and desires.

"When a monk does not dwell devoted to cultivation
(bhāvanā), even though such a wish as this might
arise in him: 'Oh, that my mind might be liberated
from the cankers by non-clinging!', yet his mind is
not liberated from the cankers by non-clinging.
For what reason? It should be said: because of lack
of cultivation (a-bhāvitatta)." SN, III, 153 (22, 101).

"Form is not-self. If form was self, this form would
not lead to affliction, and it could be had of form:
Let my form be thus, let my form not be thus. And
because form is not-self that it therefore leads to
affliction, and that it cannot be had of form: Let my
form be thus, let my form not be thus." SN, III, 66
(22, 59).

Reality (which includes our mind) behaves in an
expectable manner, in a legal manner, and this
legality is what makes our reliance on reality a good,
though not perfect, bet. This legality is summarised
in Dependent Arisal. This scheme of legality to the
Buddha governs the world, serves as the bulwark of
expectability (what can happen in the world) and
exists independent of his discovering it.

Now let us look at the general formula of the law of
Dependent Arisal. It has two forms, the parallel and
the crossed (of course this appellation can be reversed).
The parallel one is:

"This being, that becomes; this arising, that arises.
This not being, that does not become; this ceasing, that ceases."

The crossed form is:

"This being, that becomes; this not being, that does not become.
This arising, that arises; this ceasing, that ceases."

The Buddha said:

"The Dependent Arisal has not been made by me (na
maya pratītyasamutpādaḥ kṛto), has not been made by
others (nāpy anyaiḥ). Whether the Tathāgatas were
to arise or Tathāgatas were not to arise (utpādād vā
tathāgatānām anutpādād vā), this nature of things has
remained (sthita eveyam dharmatā, this legality has
stood), the modality (dhātu) for the standing of things
(dharma-sthitaye)." SA, 299, 85b, Nidāna-saṃyukta,
164–165, Dà zhì dù lùn, T, 25, 1509, 298a11–20.

Tathāgata means "Thus come one" or "Thus gone one"
and both meanings apply to Buddhas. The Buddha
here said that the Dependent Arisal has not been made
by him, has not been made by others, and that
regardless whether Buddhas were to arise or not, this
nature of things (Dependent Arisal) has remained, as
the modality for the standing of things, to support all
things in their functioning.

However, the theory of Dependent Arisal suffers the
same fate as all teachings in Buddhism, theoretical and
practical, in that it is only a means to an end, not an
end in itself, and the end served by it is the ending of
suffering. The Buddha likened all teachings in
Buddhism, theoretical and practical, to a raft, which
can help one cross over from this shore of suffering to
the other shore of the ending of suffering, but is to be
forsaken once it has done its job and not to be held
on to forever (because if it was to be held on to
forever, one would be damned forever).

As to thought, the Buddha teaches that in liberation
(Nirvāṇa), one quiesces it so that it does not proceed,
and if one needs to do anything, one has to reactivate
it whilst one needs it but not beyond, and when one
reactivates it, one has critiqued it so that it is
transparent and not opaque, soft and not unyielding,
light and not muddy. Yet all thought whatsoever
never is fully adequate to its referent, assuming that
it has referent. "What and what they think it, it is
otherwise." This is distinctly anti-Platonic. However in
Buddhism, whilst thought and language are never
adequate to their referent, they do not miss
completely their referent, either. Inadequation
between thought and language on one side and their
referent on the other does not equate to total miss,
only to partial miss. If thought and language totally
missed their referents (were totally arbitrary), we
should be unable to communicate and should all die
very quick.

The best way to approach reality is however to drop
all the concepts and theories, all thought and language,
and stay with raw sensation instead. That way, we
experience reality as it is (yathā-bhūtam), not the way
we think it to be (yathā-cetayitam) or the way we
wish it to be (yathā-praṇihitam). That way, we
experience the flow as it really is (without calling it a
flow), without cutting it up and processing the
resulting bits with our language and thought. And that
is Buddhist awakening.

Buddhism denies only at the level of metaphysical
entities like essence, but does not deny anything at the
level of phenomena, and the compositions (the stuff of
our normal, deluded experience) are within
phenomena: they are our own actions, in the realm of
external bodily behavior, speech and thought, though
some are not within consciousness, at least for the
normal, deluded person. Phenomena exist and function
according to patterns, which are called modalities of
functioning (dhātu), and the overarching modality is of
course Dependent Arisal. These are empty and
abstract, as opposed to full and concrete essences.
Emptiness means only the inexistence of essence, but
implies nothing about the phenomena of which essence
is denied but which keep existing and functioning
just like before.

In Buddhism, there is no mutual exclusion between
what appears (form) and emptiness, even less
incompatibility, but just where we are, just there
emptiness is, because all thing-events that we face are
empty of essence, due to their dependent arisenness.
The Perfection of Wisdom scriptures say: Form is
emptiness, emptiness is form, just form is emptiness,
just emptiness is form.

The same world (our daily world), when perceived
with naming and attribution of essence, is delusion,
but when perceived without naming and attribution of
essence, is reality, ultimate reality. But when one
attains to ultimate reality, one does not mentate it
as anything, least of all as ultimate reality!

One does not vanish the world to arrive at emptiness,
and one does not vanish conventional truth to arrive at
ultimate truth, or vice versa, but one only stops all
mental activities other than mere reception of sensation
(and naming and attribution of essence are two of the
major components of those mental activities other than
mere reception of sensation), and just that is ultimate
reality. However in the state of quiescence of all
mental activities other than mere reception of sensation,
one does not attend to emptiness, one does not mentate
that all thing-events are empty, one doesn't mentate
anything, period.

Emptiness is an attempt to correct an error and is not
itself a truth on its own side, apart from that error.
Without that error it would be useless. In Buddhism
there is no truth in and of itself, but truth is of use in
dispelling error and is otherwise useless. Thus
emptiness needs a support, namely any thing-event at
all (us included), to apply to. It doesn't exist, like
thing-events, but holds or consists (Meinong: besteht),
like the laws of physics and the theorems of
mathematics. Much less does it exist on its own.

But that is only if one uses the theory of emptiness
to think what happens. The theory of emptiness itself
is not ultimate, does not exist ultimately, but is a mere
means, just like everything in Buddhism, to help one
end one's suffering, and to be forsaken once it has
done its job and not to be held on forever. When one
has ended one's suffering, one no longer mentates,
therefore no longer mentates anything as empty or full,
with essence or without essence, existing independently
(of mind, of the rest of the world) or not existing
independently. Such mentation is sure cause for
suffering, and the Buddhist sage does not engage in it.
The Buddhist sage refrains from mentating as much as
possible in general, and he would surely refrain from
such idle speculation in particular.

Thus, as to your question: you ask that if a tree falls in
a forest and nobody is around to hear it, is it possible
to leave a recording device that would prove it made a
noise at a later convenient date? That is speculative
and does not conduce to calm and peace of mind, and
therefore is outside the purview of Buddhism.

As to the classification of the five aggregates, the six
sense-fields, the six sense-organs, the six
sense-consciousnesses, the eighteen modalities (dhātu),
etc.: experience is whole and unitary, though fully
differentiated (and not a homogeneous blank), but is
cut up into such classifications only as a temporary
means of concentrating the mind and making the mind
workable. Such classifications — and any cutting-up of
experience into whatever scheme of whatever reference
classes — are never going to be wholly adequate to
reality — to their referent — but merely are serviceable
at best, if they indeed are serviceable, and in Buddhism
they serve only as a temporary means of concentrating
the mind and making the mind workable.

It is in the world of sense
that one binds oneself or liberates oneself. One
binds oneself by thinking, and one liberates oneself
by abstaining from thinking whilst remaining fully
aware of the world. That is the only theater of
bondage and freedom.

Colophon

Posted to talk.religion.buddhism on June 1, 2006, in reply to a thread initiated by Stu on "2 Ontologies" (Platonic essence vs. Buddhist emptiness). Interlocutor: Stu. Author: Tang Huyen. Message-ID: <[email protected]>.

The post's central argument is that Buddhism's theory of emptiness was never meant to be true in any final sense, only useful — and once useful, it is a raft to be discarded. The SA 299 citation establishes Dependent Arisal as a discovered law of nature, not a human construction: it would have stood whether or not any Buddha arose to name it. The Meinong distinction (emptiness "holds or consists" rather than "exists") is one of the corpus's most precise formulations. The tree-falls-in-the-forest deflection is clean Buddhism: that question neither ends suffering nor conduces to calm, so it is simply outside the discipline's concern. Companion post written thirty minutes later to Bill Snyder: <[email protected]>.

Preserved from the Usenet archive for the Good Work Library by the New Tianmu Anglican Church, 2026.

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