by Dharmottara

The Pramāṇaparīkṣā (Tibetan: ཚད་མ་བརྟག་པ།, Tsad ma brtag pa), Part One, is the first of Dharmottara's two treatises bearing this title, preserved in the Pramāṇa (epistemology) section of the Degé Tengyur as text D4248. Written by Dharmottara (fl. c. 740–800 CE), the great commentator on Dharmakīrti's epistemological system, this work examines the foundational question of Buddhist logic: what makes a cognition valid?

Where Part Two (D4249) develops Dharmottara's positive theory — that valid cognition is defined by the ascertainment that enables practical engagement — Part One lays the philosophical groundwork. It investigates the term "pramāṇa" itself: whether it applies to cognition by arbitrary convention or by principled reason, what distinguishes valid from invalid cognition, and why only cognition that enables attainment through non-deception deserves the name. The treatise moves through the relationship between grasping and attainment, the primacy of cognition among the causes of engagement, the nature of the object of engagement versus the object grasped, and the conditions under which multiple objects fall under a single valid cognition.

No English translation of this text has previously existed. This is the first English rendering, translated from the Esukhia Digital Degé Tengyur (CC0). The text was translated into Tibetan from Sanskrit by the bhikṣu Blo-ldan shes-rab (Matiprajñā), one of the great translators of the later dissemination (phyi dar) period.

Homage to the Omniscient One.

That which even extraordinary perfected vision does not cognize —
the reversal of suffering's own nature,
the cessation of manifold sufferings unattainable
by the confused, though they possess awareness —
having clearly shown this to all beings without exception
and caused those who seek the goal to attain it through accumulation:
bowing to that Sugata who excellently proclaimed valid cognition,
I shall now explain valid cognition well.

He who dispels the darkness of people's mental distraction,
who elucidates with the light-rays of his illuminating words
all things without exception that abide in the three worlds —
to Dharmakīrti, like the sun.

Valid cognition is said to accomplish the attainment of the ascertainment of the object of engagement. Attainment is preceded by engagement, and the basis of engagement is cognition. Because cognition is the primary cause by virtue of indicating the object, ascertainment possesses the capacity to cause engagement. Therefore, the different instances of direct ascertainment are valid cognitions, and they too are capable of enabling attainment.

Because valid cognition is the reason for the accomplishment of a person's purpose, the logical treatise examines the division into its natural kinds — direct perception and so forth — and investigates their defining characteristics.

The term "valid cognition" does not apply to the various types of cognition such as direct perception merely by wish, without reference to a principled basis. For it is in order to refute the valid cognitions posited by other non-Buddhist schools — saying "this is not a valid cognition" — that the basis is needed. If the term "valid cognition" were applied without any principled basis, then how could any cognition fail to be a valid cognition? One could say, "This is indeed a valid cognition, yet it is not the cause of accomplishing a purpose" — and this would be reasonable.

For whatever abides in conceptual thought is expressible by a name-term, like a pot and so forth. Cognitions posited by others are likewise. If even what is established by conceptual thought were not expressible, then nothing at all would be expressible. The capacity for designation pervades the domain of conceptual thought, yet this capacity does not exist only in what is expressible. The cause of connecting with a name is just that capacity; when it is present, it cannot fail to be expressible. Therefore, when the capacity for designation withdraws from things that are not expressible, abiding in conceptual thought also withdraws. If this is so, then that with respect to which the designation of others is also negated is indeed grounded in a principled basis — just as when the erroneous application of the word "cow" to a horse is negated, the connection with the correct usage is established.

Dependence on a principled basis is either reliance on the function described in the specific commentary, or else it will be the principled basis for attaining the desired result at the time of designation. In the first case, what is understood as having the nature of that which performs the function of establishing a valid cognition is itself the referent of the term. Grammarians also understand it as the referent, for this is simply worldly usage, and no other meaning of the explanation is tenable. Therefore, the term "valid cognition" has as its basis the entity of one who measures — so they claim.

On this view, since all cognitions would be understood as having the nature of a measurer, they would all become valid cognitions; thus the distinction between valid and invalid cognition would be lost. For whatever designation applies to something by virtue of a given cause — when that cause is present, the designation necessarily applies to it. Just as the designation "pot" is applied to a lump of clay merely by virtue of its capacity to produce a result with a particular shape, so too the designation "valid cognition" would apply to cognition merely by virtue of having the nature of a measurer. If despite this it does not apply, then the designation that possesses a cause is pervaded by dependence on some other cause. But having some other cause contradicts the thesis that this cause alone is sufficient. Therefore, by the perception of what is contradictory, the evidence is excluded from the dissimilar class. This is a reason in the nature of a consequence — meaning the connection with what is to be established.

Since the designation "valid cognition" does not apply to all cognitions, therefore: whatever designation does not apply even when [its supposed cause] is present — that designation does not have that alone as its principled basis. For example, the designation "pot" does not apply to a lump of clay merely by virtue of its existence, but depends on a particular shape and so forth. Likewise, the designation "valid cognition" does not apply merely by virtue of having the nature of a measurer — this is the reversal from the consequence by the non-observation of the pervader.

Furthermore, even if the cognition that measures could accomplish the purpose of its own object, still, by that nature it would not become a component of the accomplishment of an external purpose. Therefore, those who seek a purpose would not adopt it for that nature alone. The cognition that becomes a component of accomplishing something connected with burning and the like — that is what those who seek a purpose should rely upon. It is that which is indicated and examined by the term "valid cognition" in the treatise. Therefore, whatever is a component of the external purpose to be accomplished — that alone is what the one who seeks should understand. The principled basis for the application of the term "valid cognition" as worthy of examination in the treatise is this.

The mere entity of measuring is not a component of the external purpose to be accomplished. Therefore, since it is not what is desired by those who seek, the designation "valid cognition" does not apply to cognition by its own principled basis alone. Therefore, whatever practical function one who seeks desires to adopt — it is that which is desired as capable of performing it, like water for one who seeks bathing and the like. Some cognitions too are to be adopted by one who seeks a purpose. The seeking itself whereby one adopts it is the domain of accomplishment, and what accomplishes it is ascertainment; therefore it is pervaded by ascertainment. If the entity of what accomplishes is absent, then since the cause of ascertainment is absent, the pervader — that which is to be adopted by one who seeks — is absent; this is its nature.

Even so, whatever nature is not a component of the desired result — those who seek do not rely upon it by that nature. Just as one who seeks the removal of cold does not seek a lamp merely by the nature of its illumination, so too cognition, merely by the nature of measuring, is not a component of external purpose — this is the absence of the pervaded.

In that case, then: grasping a real thing is a valid cognition, and the other is not a valid cognition. Thus the distinction between valid and invalid cognition would be established. Cognition that grasps a real thing is the principled basis for accomplishing a purpose, and the principled basis of the nature of measuring a real thing is the term "valid cognition" — if one were to say this. The establishment of the distinction is true, yet the grasping of a real thing by cognition is not the desired principled basis. Even if that cognition causes a real thing to be grasped, the cause of producing the result is the thing itself, not the cognition that grasps it. If without grasping there is no attainment, and without attainment there is no component of the desired result — then by way of enabling the attainment of what is capable of being accomplished, it enables attainment of the purpose, and therefore it is a component of practical function. And that enabling of attainment is preceded by grasping.

If this is so, then the practical function of cognition is enabling attainment, and grasping a real thing would be the means. Whatever is demonstrated by those who seek as having the nature of a component of the result — that alone is the principled basis for the application of the term "valid cognition" worthy of examination. But this means is not exclusively established, since inference too, through determination, enables attainment of the purpose.

Whatever is not the exclusive means for something — that is not to be exclusively demonstrated by those who seek, like a magnifying crystal for one who seeks fire. Grasping a thing is also not the exclusive means of enabling attainment of the purpose. That which is not of its nature — when one who seeks grasps it — depends merely on the entity of the means. The means is also present in that. Otherwise it could not be said to depend merely on that. Therefore, since what is to be relied upon is established by being pervaded by an established means, this is the non-observation of the pervader. Therefore, grasping a thing is not of the nature of a component of practical function; rather, it is merely enabling attainment. And it is also not the exclusive means for that. Therefore, when practical function is not what is to be demonstrated by those who seek, it is not worthy of examination — how then could it be the basis for the term "valid cognition"?

In that case, then: non-deception is the basis for the term "valid cognition," and this has the nature of enabling the attainment of a practical function. Even if a practical function is connected with a real thing, still, because it enables the attainment of a thing capable of accomplishing a purpose, it enables that attainment. But would the distinction between valid and invalid cognition then not be lost? For there is no engagement arising from any cognition that fails to attain something. Since even the cognition of water in a mirage, and the cognition of a hair-net regarding fine particles of light — when engaged upon — still attain at least the mirage itself and the mere appearance. Therefore, by this enumeration, all cognitions would be valid cognitions because they are the principled basis for attaining a practical function.

Reply: Non-deception regarding a practical function is said to enable the attainment of that very function. What enables attainment in the manner it was indicated — that is said to be non-deceptive. A cognition that enables the attainment of a thing in the manner it was indicated is accepted as non-deceptive. Therefore, a cognition that, knowing what is capable of practical function, enables the attainment of the object of that cognition — with respect to the function of cognizing dependent on the object of what has been cognized — having that entity's object, enabling the attainment of the practical function: this is non-deception.

Non-deception is not merely the worldly meaning of the term grasped. Rather, the meaning of the term "valid cognition" is also non-deception. For a person who, in showing what is to be attained, does not deceive — to such a person the term "valid cognition" is applied. In the world too, one whose speech, understood as having the nature of deciding, decides without deception — to such a decider who does not deceive regarding what is to be decided, the term "valid cognition" is applied. Therefore, from the fact that cognition does not deceive regarding what it measures — its nature as a measurer is established from worldly usage itself.

In general: a term that depends on a specific well-known feature is seen. Just as the term "potter," explained as applying to one who makes pots, is well-known with reference to the specific feature of the potter's craft, so too the term "valid cognition," explained as applying to one who measures, is well-known with reference to the specific feature of non-deception regarding what is measured. For this very reason, when the term "valid cognition" is shown as a synonym for correct cognition, in order to demonstrate this it is stated: "There are only two kinds of valid cognition," and also: "A valid cognition is a cognition free from deception."

One must certainly accept that a cognition having the nature of a measurer, possessing the object of that entity, enables the attainment of a practical function without deception. Otherwise, since attaining the result when it is present makes it non-deceptive, and that is a valid cognition — then hands, feet, the collection of instruments, the ground on which attainment occurs, and so forth would also be bases for attainment, since without them attainment would be untenable. Therefore, everything would absurdly become a valid cognition.

If one says there is no absurd consequence because they lack the nature of measuring — this is not so. For when non-deception is accepted as enabling the attainment of the purpose with an object of the nature of what is measured, then in the absence of the nature of measuring, there is no enabling of attainment with the specific qualification, and therefore the absurd consequence of being a valid cognition does not follow.

If mere enabling of attainment were the principled basis for non-deception, then — like the term "namada" and so forth in some systems — the term "valid cognition" would apply to everything without reference to the specific basis of explanation. But as it is, the principled basis of being a valid cognition is cognition itself, because it has the basis of attaining the result of the purpose to be accomplished through measurement.

How is cognition here, though a measurer, superior to other bases for attaining a practical function, such that this basis of attainment should be relied upon by those who seek and examined in the treatise, while others should not?

Reply: In this regard, the accomplishment of a person's desire is not based merely on the pursuit alone, but depends on external factors such as burning and the like. The mere existence of external things is not the cause of accomplishing the desire of only one who pursues, since all would absurdly accomplish their desires without distinction in mere existence. Rather, it is attained by those who pursue, and attainment accords with the activity of pursuit. The pursuit of one who seeks depends on a cognition of a specific kind that establishes the object of engagement. Therefore, when there is the domain established by cognition, it is the basis for attainment. The limbs of living beings, desire, and the like — when beginning to engage toward the very object established by cognition — are connected with cognition. Therefore, because cognition establishes the object of engagement, it is the primary cause. Other causes of engagement — being dependent on cognition — are secondary.

Therefore, cognition itself — as the primary cause that has become such by establishing the object of engagement — enables the attainment of a practical function, and nothing else does. For this very reason, though valid cognition is the basis for attaining a purpose, only cognition is a valid cognition. Without it there is no attainment. Therefore valid cognition is said to have the result of engagement. And in that, cognition is the primary factor.

Therefore, the other causes of engagement are dependent on cognition. For when a cognition arises that grasps something nonexistent, engagement toward the object established by that cognition is still undertaken. If other factors were not dependent, why would they cause engagement toward a nonexistent object? Consciousness is not connected with the principled basis of those factors in that way. Therefore, with respect to engagement, it is autonomous. For this reason it is the primary cause of engagement.

Also because it is uncommon: for other causes are not in accord with differentiated engagement, but cognition alone is.

One might think: "Other causes too have individually distinct characteristics with respect to each engagement; therefore they too are uncommon." This is not tenable, for there is nothing whatsoever that lacks individually distinct characteristics. Even though characteristics are individually distinct, one cannot deny that many things perform a common function — because this is established by valid cognition. Through performing that function, a cause that is ascertained as one thing — by grasping it as a single kind excluded from others, becoming the basis of engagement — such ascertainment as one is not non-distinction.

Nor is this designation without an object, for existence consists in having the principled basis of performing a practical function. Nor should one think, "This designation belongs to a collection, and collections do not exist." For although a collection imputed as one thing has not become a real entity, how could the entity that has the nature of many be non-existent? All the many — however many they are — are not non-existent, for that would be absurdly excessive. Even the patterns of positive concomitance and negative concomitance between cause and effect are spoken of only with respect to objects constituted in this way.

Therefore, just as the nature of existence consists in performing a practical function, so too the nature of qualified existence consists in performing a qualified practical function. All that completely accomplishes that function is one. Even when the objects recognized as one are in fact diverse, the practical function of water — established as a specific kind of existence that rests on the designation "water," some function having been comprehended — that function of water is without distinction across all sprout-natures. The production of particular sprouts is not the principled basis for the designation of water's existence — for that would be absurdly excessive. Therefore, even though water and so forth do not differ in this respect, the difference in sprouts comes from the seed. Thus the seed is the uncommon cause of sprouts.

Likewise, even though there are many means of accomplishing a purpose, since fire itself is the uncommon means, one engages for that very purpose. Similarly, even though there are many causes that enable attainment of the means of accomplishing a purpose, since cognition alone differentiates by distinguishing the particular features of the object of engagement, it is uncommon. And because it is autonomous, the primary cause is cognition. Since attainment too depends on cognition's activity, that which is worthy of being examined under the name "valid cognition" is cognition alone — and nothing else.

What, then, is the object of engagement that is established by cognition? It is whatever object toward which cognition produces determination. For a person engages when they seek that as a purpose. Thus, even without having directly grasped the object of cognition, whatever has become the object of engagement on the basis of cognition is called "the object of cognition's engagement." Therefore, whatever determination constitutes the object of engagement — that which enables attainment of that object is the valid cognition. For without ascertainment, there is no engagement.

Now, cognition does not enable attainment by producing the means of accomplishing the purpose. Rather, it causes engagement toward the object. Nor does it take a person by the hand, as if they could not walk on their own, and make them engage. Rather, for one who cannot engage without knowing the object of engagement, cognition causes engagement by showing the object nearby. And "showing the object" means producing determination toward it.

Therefore, whatever object one engages toward — that engagement is the ascertainment of cognition. And the act of ascertaining is itself the act of causing engagement, because it is precisely through ascertainment that one engages. Therefore, valid cognition is said to have ascertainment as its result. In order to show that the function of causing engagement is ascertainment itself, valid cognition is explained as having an uncomprehended object as its domain.

For if the function of causing engagement were something other than ascertainment, then when one cognition comprehends an object and another causes engagement and thereby enables attainment — that latter cognition too would be a valid cognition, and so it too would have a comprehended object. If comprehension alone causes engagement, then by that very cognition which comprehends the thing, a person engages toward the object of engagement just by that much, and so it is a valid cognition that enables attainment. For another cognition, since there is no previously absent attainment that it enables, it is not a valid cognition.

Without ascertainment, since there is no other means, there is no causing of engagement; and what is not an object of engagement does not enable attainment, because there is no other means. Therefore, since direct perception and inference both enable attainment by ascertaining the object of engagement, they are explained as valid cognitions whose object is an undifferentiated thing.

Without ascertainment, even though direct perception has grasped the object through its appearing, direct perception as valid cognition does not establish anything. For non-ascertainment, being precisely "not an object of engagement," is incapable of enabling attainment. Therefore, with respect to mere grasping of the object, perception is not a valid cognition, because that much alone is not a component of enabling attainment of the purpose.

The object to be attained — that which is the object of engagement of valid cognition — is the ascertained object itself, not the merely grasped object. For the very momentary particular that direct perception takes as its object is not what enables attainment. Rather, the ascertainment born from the power of direct perception — which takes as a unified object the thing that is continuously operative and connected to particular results, excluding what does not bear those results — this is what enables attainment. And perception is a valid cognition with respect to just that object.

If valid cognition is defined with respect to the object of engagement — the determined object — then even a single valid cognition can have multiple objects. For example, sound itself is established by direct perception; its being a product is established by inference; and its impermanence is established by yet another inference. Otherwise, since sound is perceptible by direct perception and there is no ungrasped aspect, it would never become the object of another valid cognition.

Multiple objects also belong to a single valid cognition. Just as among cognitions that grasp different things, one alone becomes the valid cognition — for example, among sense cognitions that grasp many momentary objects comprehended within a single continuum, though what they grasp is different, because the ascertained object of engagement is one, the first-arisen cognition alone is the valid cognition, and the others merely produce recollection of it.

Now: what kind of multiple objects are objects of a single valid cognition, and what kind are objects of multiple? Objects of a single engagement, though multiple, are objects of a single valid cognition. Objects of different engagements are indeterminate — for they are divisible into objects of one and of many.

An object of a single engagement is one where cognition knows that the connection to the desired result is indeterminate. For when cognitions do not know with certainty the connection to the result of the basis of engagement, they do not engage toward a single thing with certainty. Since engagement occurs only through certain connection to the desired result, and if that certainty is absent — engagement too becomes uncertain, like a sprout connected to the mere collection of seed and so forth. Such is its nature. What has the principled basis of just that much is pervaded by not depending on other conditions.

Activity of a person motivated by desire for a result is engagement. And engagement becomes differentiated by the differentiation of its objects. Therefore, engagement produced by desire for a different result — the cause of attaining a different result — is entirely other. But engagement that has the object of the means for one desired result is one. Even though with respect to other momentary instances of the same kind this constitutes a different cause, the activity of engagement with respect to the purpose of enabling attainment is one. Therefore, whatever purpose is sought and whatever causal entity is undertaken for it — that is called its activity. Without it, another thing would not arise — being a cause of a different result is just being a cause, not the activity of the one who enables attainment.

If, then, the ultimate attainment of the means undertaken by one motivated by desire for a result constitutes a single engagement — an objection: one who desires water and enters a mirage, then finds a sandy waste and discovers water in a nearby well — since this is the ultimate attainment of a single engagement, perceiving water in the mirage would also enable the engagement to attain its object, and so would become a valid cognition.

Reply: Merely desiring a result does not make an engagement have that as the object of its means. Rather, the nature, place, and time of what accomplishes the practical function must be ascertained. When one knows the ascertained nature, place, and time, then the engagement has that as its object. Therefore, this depends also on the cognition that grasps the means of attainment. For this very reason, engagement is said to be connected with valid cognition.

Therefore, that engagement has as its object only the ascertained place and time as shown by cognition. When the non-deceptive cognition reaches the limit of its object, it reaches the limit of attainment; and when it would become fruitless, the reverse obtains. Therefore, the single engagement is the ultimate of just the means as shown by the cognition that causes engagement — the cognition whose object is the means prompted by desire for the result. Because connection with two principled bases makes the difference of the result unobtainable by the means, the mere desire alone is not a sufficient basis.

In the case of the mirage, engagement occurs through connection with another cognition; therefore it is a different engagement. Cognition that knows there is no difference in the connection to results of that kind — even though the objects are many, they are the object of a single engagement.

How does one come to know the indeterminate connection even for objects not present at the time? For the time being: objects of different kinds, being connected to different results, have determinate connection. Objects of the same kind with the same result are differentiated by following different moments and by following different continua.

Since there is no designation to be applied to the grasped moment itself, objects of different moments are accepted as being taken up without determination — and so the connection is simply indeterminate. Objects of different continua in the perceptible domain are, for the time being, objects of determinate distinct connection. For what is seen as different — one wishes to take each separately. And concerning the practical function of what one wishes to take separately — one does not wish to take another, for that would be absurdly excessive. Whatever is seen as different that one wishes to take — that itself is what is to be taken. Therefore, it itself is what is needed, and another that is not to be taken is not what is needed.

Therefore, through analogy one does not necessarily have a determinate connection to many. Rather, cognition knows them as objects of a single desire-to-take. When wishing to take separately, how does one wish the objects one rejects to be needed for the result? Therefore, even when the result is the same, when the desire-to-take is separate, only what is to be taken is needed, and another is not desired. Thus, perceiving different continua that produce the same result — when one desires the result from each separately — the connection is determinate, since connected to different results. For example, like heaps of burning coals when much cold has gathered.

When a single activity is desired, the various objects too are known as having determinate need — for when one wishes to take an object in one place, one necessarily loses the connection to an object in another place. Objects in the same place: when one desires a single object, all are desired — because for those that are hidden and for which desiring one means desiring all, there is no determination. Hence one desires them without determination, and so connection is indeterminate.

For the result that is seen, one necessarily desires to take the object as having a nature tolerant of the practical function connected with the particular feature of the place. In being of such a nature, all are without distinction. Therefore, by desiring one, one desires all — because there is no desire for the object of ascertainment to appear. The uncommon nature of their individual characters — when there is no grasping of them as distinct at that time — toward which object's ascertained taking-up would one become? The mind that takes the object of a common nature is a mind whose object is indeterminate.

Thus: among four heaps of fire sitting in one household hearth, whichever one is to be taken — that is what is to be taken, whichever the unobstructed object is. One does not think: "My desired result will come from this particular one." Therefore, because the distinct nature is not grasped, one desires to take without determination. Those that produce the same result and whose need for connection is indeterminate — having been determined as objects of a single engagement — even though many, are grasped by a single valid cognition.

Because they are not grasped as distinct, one desires to take without determination; and so need is indeterminate. Therefore, because they are objects of a single engagement, even many things become objects of a single valid cognition.

This pattern applies to momentary objects seen by direct perception — not to objects of different causes. When one desires to take an object with a particular feature of nature, only one thing to be taken is needed — another is not. For hidden objects, since the particular feature of place is not grasped, one determines them as having a common nature, and does not wish to take them separately. Therefore, things to be taken without determination, whose connection is indeterminate, are objects of indeterminate need. Determinate connection is as previously explained.

For objects of indeterminate connection, among sequential cognitions the first is the valid cognition and the rest merely produce recollection. For objects of determinate connection, each stands alone. Direct perception, in a single moment, has one needed object. Therefore, when showing the object of a single valid cognition, it is explained that sense faculties are without distinction regarding what is established and comfortable, except for those that grasp momentary objects with different purposes to be accomplished. For hidden objects, the two ways of explaining — based on continua: "the connection to a common result for those is not different," and so forth — are set forth in two ways dependent on the continuum.

Therefore: whatever is ascertained by whatever cognition — that is made the object of engagement by it. And that same cognition enables attainment of it — being a valid cognition. Therefore, the ascertained object is the object of engagement, and that is also what is to be attained by valid cognition. In order to show this, it is stated through these passages: "When one limits the object and engages, there is no deception regarding practical function."

Furthermore, when engagement — the activity aimed at attaining the desired means of accomplishing a practical function — when cognition establishes its object, the engagement is connected with cognition. By establishing the object, cognition is the cause. For the establishment of all objects of engagement does not go beyond cognition.

Thus: from cognition that establishes the object through doubt, from erroneous cognition, and from correct non-erroneous cognition — whatever engagement arises follows and reverses in accordance with the object shown by cognition. In that there is no confusion; therefore it has that as its principled basis. The cause of that is the first cognition.

For others: when, through engagement toward one object, another is attained — that attainment is from the prior engagement made by the earlier cognition. That earlier cognition does not establish the object of engagement that becomes the cause of attaining that other thing — it is merely a cause. For example, from the cognition of a pot, one engages for the pot's purpose and along the way attains a blanket. The cognition that causes engagement toward that is the earlier cognition itself, since without it one would not engage toward it. Yet one understands that the earlier cognition of the pot is not what shows the blanket.

But this is not tenable. For engagement directed toward the blanket cannot operate as having the pot-cognition as its cause. What has something as its cause has the nature of being that thing's effect. And an effect follows and reverses in accordance with its cause. But engagement directed toward the blanket does not follow and reverse in accordance with the pot-cognition — for even without it, one sees the blanket at another time. The cognition that grasps the blanket is never confused regarding it, and therefore is connected with it. Therefore, since what does not follow and reverse in accordance with a cognition that does not show the blanket is untenable as the entity of a cause — that pot-cognition is not the cause of engagement toward the blanket.

Therefore, one should understand that the engagement whose principled basis is the pot-cognition is one thing, and the engagement that is non-confused regarding the blanket and that becomes the cause of attaining the blanket is another. Thus, whatever engagement has a particular cognition as its principled basis — that engagement has as its object only what was shown by that cognition. For example, just as engagement directed toward a cow, having the cow-cognition as its principled basis, has as its object what was shown by the cow-cognition. Therefore, for engagement that does not have as its object what was shown by a given cognition — since it does not follow and reverse in accordance with it, there is a contradictory factor that reverses the claim of having that as its principled basis. Therefore, having as its object what was shown by that cognition is its very nature, since it follows only from having that as its principled basis.

Furthermore, whatever is the object of engagement whose principled basis is a given cognition — that is said to be the object of engagement of that cognition. For the entity of being made the object of engagement by that cognition is precisely the entity of its principled basis — because the object is shown by it. Therefore, the object of engagement is pervaded by ascertainment. Without ascertainment, since the principled basis that pervades the object of engagement is absent, the object to be pervaded is absent. Therefore, whatever is not ascertained by a given cognition is not the object of engagement of that cognition. And whatever is not the ascertainer of something does not cause engagement toward it — for example, just as a horse not ascertained by a cow-cognition, or that same cognition not being the ascertainer of the horse.

The pervader that depends on the properties of both object and cognition is not observed. For a syllogism of this kind, the gathering of the subject-property should not depend on an object understood erroneously in all cases — therefore it has not been done.

The object of engagement too is a thing capable of practical function, since those who seek a purpose do not engage otherwise, and those who do not seek a purpose are not the subject of engagement. From positive and negative concomitance, the nature of a real thing possessing a distinctive aspect is seen — for example, water, fire, and so forth. That nature possessing a distinctive aspect is grasped in its particular characteristic either by direct perception or by inference through determination that does not differentiate between appearance and conceptual analysis. Just as a nature connected with a distinctive aspect is seen as needed for practical function, being the very nature of a real thing — so too distinctions of time such as past and present, and distinctions of the place of dependence, are seen as having a nature that is needed.

In that, the distinction of aspect is determinate. Place and time are indeterminate. Therefore, a cognition that views as erroneous or conceives as desired — regarding a thing whose practical function appears at a given place and time with the distinction of aspect — that it is at a different place and time — that is erroneous cognition itself. For if one abandons a place or time at which there is no confusion regarding practical function, one abandons the thing itself, since different places and times make things different. Otherwise, since different conceptual thoughts too would not make things different, everything would become one.

Therefore, whatever grasps a place, time, or aspect different from that at which the thing's practical function is observed — that is erroneous cognition itself, because the capacity has not been grasped, and what has been grasped also lacks capacity. One might say: "At the solstice, at noon, does one not see the sun's disc above the head, and similarly at dawn and dusk above the trees? Yet it does not abide in that place, and the cognition that grasps it is also not invalid." True, yet it apprehends the very place that is needed for practical function. A cognition that is not confused regarding the places at which the practical function of a thing is apprehended — that is non-erroneous. Therefore, at the time of practical application, one does not wish to abandon the place that appears to cognition. For whatever distinctive place the practical function is apprehended — that is the ultimate place for it.

Therefore, how does one [thing] become many-placed? Are not multiple places apparent? They are not truly multiple places; rather, they are merely distant places. And at a distance, since it faces all directions, even while abiding there, it appears thus. Likewise, when one sees trees and the like at the edge-ground but not what lies between — it appears as if adjacent. Though what abides at a distance is one, from concordance one sees it, and from a distance all see the edges as if adjacent. Therefore, it is not that one sees it as abiding differently.

Seeing things at different places and times is not merely confusion about the real thing — it is also engagement. For when one grasps a thing at one place as connected with another place, engagement toward a different place and time will never accomplish what is desired. Therefore, since place, time, and aspect that are determinate are seen as practical function; and since practical function too is the object of engagement — a thing capable of practical function whose place, time, and aspect are determinate is the object of engagement. And whatever ascertains it as being of precisely such a nature also causes engagement.

Therefore, whatever object of determinate place, time, and aspect is established by a given cognition — that is the object of engagement of that cognition. What is not established is not the object of engagement, since what is connected with a different place, time, or aspect is different. The ascertainment of one is not the ascertainment of another — since that would be absurdly excessive. That which enables attainment of the object of engagement through ascertainment itself is a valid cognition, and the other is not a valid cognition. In that, since a different aspect capable of practical function has not been grasped, it is not the object of engagement — for example, in a mirage, the cognition of water grasps the aspect of capacity for washing and so forth as the object of engagement, but the mirage itself was not grasped. Therefore, what is to be attained through connection with another cognition's domain of engagement is like a blanket attained incidentally.

Similarly, when one cognizes a jewel through its light — the object of engagement of the jewel-cognition is the jewel itself at the place of the light. Attainment of the jewel is as before. For whatever is seen as capable of practical function at a given place — that alone is the object of engagement, not something else. Though similar in form, what abides at a different place also makes it assuredly different. When ascertaining that it abides at another place, mere similarity of form does not ascertain that it abides at another place — since that would be absurdly excessive. Therefore, this jewel at another place, being unascertained by this cognition, is not the object of its engagement. And enabling attainment without being the object of engagement has already been refuted.

Furthermore, inference apprehends the property-bearer. When it is confused regarding the property-bearer, it is called "apparent perception." Here too, when establishing the nature of a jewel from the light — however one conceives of the property-bearer, the ascertainment is one thing and the attainment is another. Inference is accepted as preceded by the determinate ascertainment of necessary connection. But here that is absent. And this too has already been demonstrated.

Enough of elaboration.

Chapter Two — The Final Chapter

In all cases, one who claims that from a cognition ascertaining an object abiding at another place, one attains an object at another place — that person does not know the object of valid cognition. What more need be said about that?

This conceptual thought superimposes another nature based on having seen the specific characteristics of both — just as, having seen both water and a mirage, one cognizes the mirage as water. Here, because the object to be superimposed and the object upon which the superimposition is projected are connected, the cognition whose object is the light is the cause of another cognition — one whose object is the other connected thing that enables attainment. Therefore they are said to mutually enable attainment. Otherwise it is not so — this is the qualification.

Because whatever nature possessing a specific aspect is ascertained by a given cognition — that very thing is the object of engagement of that cognition.

The Conch Shell Argument

Therefore, the object of engagement of the cognition that knows a conch shell as yellow is the conch shell possessing a yellow nature. But that does not exist. And the white nature that does exist is not ascertained — therefore it is not the object of engagement either.

Objection: Does the conch shell not have the aspect of whiteness?

If so, then when the white nature is reversed — has another nature arisen? Even if both natures of the conch shell are applicable to practical function, how is it that those who designate see only white? What exists has the nature of practical function. If things with different applications are cognized as one, how can distinct entities be accepted?

Color and Shape

Objection: The nature of the apparent color is not said to be the conch shell — rather, it is the shape.

Is shape not inseparable from the nature of color? If the white color capable of practical function is eliminated, its shape too is eliminated. The shape that is inseparable from the apparent yellow nature is of the nature of that yellow — not of the unseen white. Therefore, like the yellow itself, it is as if a non-existent thing.

For whatever nature belongs in common to even a few — being non-different from those many, it exists as their nature, but not as the nature of a single one. For many things having a single nature is precisely what valid cognition refutes.

Thus, when momentariness or thingness is conceived as common to many — being non-different from the many blue things and so forth, it is their nature. It is true as many. Its unity is merely imputed. Likewise, the particular shape, existing as the common nature of those many blues, becomes only that — not independently. Because being different from itself is untrue.

Objection: Blue too is true as the nature common to many shapes. State the distinction if there is one.

Reply: What is called "common to many" is that which, when seen, is necessarily cognized, and when not seen, is not cognized — and which is cognized as the nature of those things. For example, blue-thingness: if the many blue things do not exist, it is not cognized; if they exist, it is cognized as their very nature. And that it is conceived as common to them is like its existing as their identity.

Furthermore, blue is not something seen only when shape is seen, nor apprehended only as the nature of shape — because even when shape is absent, blue is still apprehended, and because even at the smallest scale, the blue of a mere atom-part is apprehended without having shape as its identity.

Shape itself: when that blue is seen, it appears; when blue is absent, it does not appear. And when it appears, it appears as the nature of that blue — because if the appearance of blue is eliminated, shape is not cognized.

Therefore, blue itself is the many in these instances — uncommon to those many and the basis. Shape is such a many, but common to those many and dependent upon blue. Because shape does not appear without blue, and when blue and so forth exist, it is cognized as their identity — therefore blue does not depend on momentariness, since even without cognizing momentariness, blue appears with a nature that is not momentariness. Momentariness depends on blue. When blue things are seen, momentariness is cognized — because the perception is established as having it as its identity.

Practical Function and Distinctness

Objection: What grounds for trusting this — that what is commonly cognized exists as many and is established as their nature?

Reply: Because distinctness is seen to apply to practical function. Only the particular grasped by perception applies to practical function — not the universal. What exists has practical function as its criterion. Therefore momentariness is established from seeing things with the nature of appearance, sound, and so forth as characterized by practical function. And what establishes it depends on a qualified property-bearer.

If so, then how is shape not a real thing, since shape too is seen as capable of practical function? The very existence of that nature — the conch shell with its shape as a means — enables the attainment of the result to be accomplished. Therefore shape, being of another nature, enables attainment. In practical function, the capacity of that very thing is what is seen.

Here it has already been stated that shape is cognized only as the identity of blue. Therefore, by grasping shape's function, one grasps the function of blue itself. Furthermore, it is the distinctions among the parts of the conch that are seen to accomplish practical function — not a single shape.

If one says this is to be established by another valid cognition and that perception abides in a single shape — that is unreasonable. Because things abiding by the division of spatial parts possess contradictory properties, their being conceived as one is refuted by valid cognition. The cognition that grasps a conch shell with different spatial parts cannot reasonably focus on a single object. Therefore, that very perception establishes by reasoning that it has many objects. The apprehension of distinct spatial parts cannot reasonably have a single object — because the nature of what is grasped contradicts unity.

What is grasped — the nature of blue — is not contradicted by the determinate aspect of non-momentariness. Because that nature of appearance is compatible both with abiding in place and with rapid movement. The blue aspect is momentary because of its practical function — not because grasping it contradicts non-momentariness. Here, whether this is one or many is acceptable. But it cannot be said that in all cases the aspect of different spatial parts contains no contradiction — because different spatial parts contradict unity.

Therefore here, even if it is one, since grasping it as such is untenable, it appears as many things by the very act of grasping. The cognition of blue cannot be established as grasping moment after moment. Therefore, what is grasped by perception appears as possessing the function of many things. Since a single shape constituting their identity does not exist, and since differences too are not apprehended — how can positive and negative concomitance regarding the result be established? Everything would absurdly become productive. Not so — because what produces the result possesses a specific circumstantial qualification. By that much alone it does not become different. Therefore the word "conch shell" is accepted as possessing a specific shape, like the word "pot."

Atoms and Ultimate Reality

If one introduces subtle investigation, since there is no cognition of atoms — and therefore shape or even color — it is accepted that when unexamined, it has practical function just as it appears. This is true: it pertains to the internal object of knowledge, not to the manner of the external object. The master did not establish valid and invalid cognition, or the defining characteristic, for mere cognition alone. The Vijñānavādin's establishment of valid and invalid was done separately. Having first established valid cognition and its result regarding objects in the external manner, he then did so for the Vijñānavādin. Therefore the establishment of valid cognition is exactly like that.

This is indeed the case: when considering the defining characteristic of direct perception, the reason "being produced by the object" was set forth as the ground for the sense consciousness being free from conceptual construction. Nothing arises from a conceived aspect or from a consciousness possessing aspects. Therefore freedom from conceptual construction cannot reasonably be based on that ground. This commentary text too is not compatible with the mode of cognition alone. If one says it was stated according to the positions of others — since it would be absurdly excessive, should one not adopt only the relevant texts of others? Therefore the defining characteristic of valid cognition is accepted as being in the mode of indefiniteness.

By these considerations: the object capable of practical function is the atom itself, and the nature of the atom is color, not shape. Therefore shape exists conventionally, while color exists ultimately. What is needed for the result is that very color, not shape.

Therefore, whoever sees practical function as common to many and cognizes it as their nature — that is not different. Just as with momentariness. And likewise with shape. What exists as different is pervaded by applying to the object in different aspects. If one does not accept this, there is no principled basis. What contradicts that is applying without difference. Shape has already been stated to have no application.

Therefore, whether shape, thingness, momentariness, or anything else other-dependent — practical function non-different from many does not exist without a basis. Therefore if the white nature is absent, the shape constituting its identity is absent. The shape of the yellow too, like the yellow nature itself, is not the nature of the conch — and grasping it is erroneous.

For this very reason, cognizing a mirage as water is not a valid cognition even regarding thingness — because without grasping the mirage, the thingness constituting it is not grasped, and because the thingness of water is not the nature of the mirage, since without the thing, that too would be absent.

Touch and so forth do not appear in visual consciousness — therefore what is precisely cognized is visible form. If one says the thingness of white is grasped but there is error only regarding color, while regarding shape there is no deception — just as blue-cognition is non-deceptive regarding the blue portion but deceptive regarding momentariness, so one thing is not a valid cognition regarding the other:

Reply: When blue appears in blue-cognition — from the perspective of practical function, momentariness is non-different from it. Therefore, because a ground exists for error regarding the perceived nature, and because momentariness is non-different from it — momentariness is said to be grasped through grasping blue.

Here, however, in the cognition that perceives a conch shell as yellow, no nature capable of practical function appears. Therefore, since the white nature has not been firmly grasped, it will be grasped by another cognition. For the time being, the yellow is entirely other.

Shape, whose practical function is non-different from white — its non-difference of capacity has already been examined. Therefore, since what appears in the yellow cognition does not exist like the blue nature — how can it, like momentariness, be examined as the identity of the white? Furthermore, the apparent blue aspect is not contradicted by momentariness, and non-momentariness does not appear in direct perception — because objects with long duration do not appear there. Determinate cognition produced by its force does not establish this.

In that context, momentariness without contradiction is tenable. But the white nature — though the existence of white excluding non-white has not been seen — cognizing the apparent yellow shape as the shape of white would be like cognizing water and fire as non-different: a causeless affair.

Therefore, whatever practical function is non-different from something — that exists only as the identity of that thing. And existing as its identity means: if that is grasped by direct perception, those are grasped too; if not grasped, they are not grasped. This is the result of valid cognition.

The Fire-Brand Wheel

Then how does the cognition of a wheel appearing in a fire-brand not have a real object? The luminous color-nature appears in it, and shape is not needed for the object. There is no distinction in what is to be abandoned or adopted — just as with the cognition of yellow.

From what does this objection arise? Because shape, common to the practical function of many blue things, depends on them and exists as their nature but is not different — therefore the shape that engages without distinction from the white nature is also eliminated, like thingness itself. Whatever is grasped depends on the other: it exists when that exists, and does not exist when that does not.

Cognition is not said to grasp what exists merely on these grounds. And one cannot say that the blue thing is grasped without regard to shape. For the blue atoms, being corporeal, arise having mutually excluded each other's natures regarding place. By some aspect of shape, some accomplish practical function — just as pots and such. To grasp it in this way is to grasp it as it is.

Among those that appear thus, the coarseness conceived as one thing following the spatial directions is a property of appearing as many objects, not the nature of a thing. And shape dependent on many things is not absent either. For being of such a nature is not contradicted by existence.

If one says it is the nature of the many — then would all the things of many become one? Therefore, if the shape by which practical function is possible is eliminated, thingness itself is entirely eliminated — because that shape so grasped would not be apprehended.

By this: when the wheel of different shape appears, there is no fire-brand possessing another shape in the appearance. A wheel pervading spatial parts, seen as possessing tangible contact and capable of practical function — that does not appear in this cognition.

Therefore, grasping a tree as moving has practical function — what appears as determined in that perception is not seen to produce the result as such. Whatever is without error regarding the nature capable of practical function — that is non-erroneous, and therefore is direct perception. Whatever property when seen produces the result — if that property is eliminated, the thing is eliminated: this is the meaning of valid cognition.

Distance Perception

If so, then in the world: when distinct illuminations are not differentiated — as when from a great distance, groves and the like are perceived as a single green color; or when very bright colors are perceived dimly, like a white temple obscured by dust; or when possessing a valid cognition that contradicts another valid cognition, like persons seen from a great distance; or when a clear letter-sound is segmented differently, like desiring what is broken off — these are of a true nature, because they are seen to apply to practical function.

Therefore, by this method, through the distinctions of near and far, no direct perception is non-erroneous regarding the nature of practical function. If for this reason external objects should be rejected — did the master not proceed on this path regarding the external too? Therefore such things are either not valid cognitions, or error regarding shape alone would also become a valid cognition — and the argument scatters. This is true: there is not the slightest attachment to shape. Rather, whatever cognition grasps as it truly is — the capacity for practical function — that cognition is non-erroneous regarding it.

From a great distance, the cognition that appears as unmixed, bright, and large — but grasps them as one, unclear, and small — is focused on those objects. Because from those, those are attained. But then the tree appearing to move and the moon grasped as real would also follow, since those too are attained. Since what appears is not attained as it appears, and what is attained does not appear — it is not so. This applies equally to the other cases: brightness, unmixedness, and large size contradict their reversal.

What all perceivers see without error — though different by the distinction of near and far objects — is a valid cognition. Only those with jaundice or in a boat perceive it otherwise. But since those who are near do not see it so, there is equal error. "The object, being altered, appears as another aspect and causes grasping of another" — this is not relevant.

If whatever appears as capable of practical function exists, and the perception that so appears is the perception of that — then the same should be said for what is established as non-erroneous.

Among these there are three things: the two obstructed objects and whatever obstructs them, seen as different. The obstruction is seen as something else — like the gaps seen in the nature of leaves. The objects too are something else. By the distinction of near and far, one sees part but not all.

Sitting near, one apprehends leaves together with their obstructions and grasps them as having gaps. But sitting far away, not seeing the obstructions because they do not appear, one sees only the leaves appearing as a single blue mass. By that alone, it does not appear as if the thing were absent — because when the obstructing substance is not grasped, such appearance is not contradicted.

Therefore, being far away — one's own identity grasped by a single cognition without obstruction — one is uncertain whether it abides far away or elsewhere. The error is with regard to the cognition's appearance, not because one sees things as mixed — just as when one of a mixed set is grasped, one erroneously takes it to be alone.

Likewise, as through a skylight — particles pervading all the visible space, like dust filling the disc of the ground, are seen by those standing on a very high mountain. At the furthest point, one sees it — like sunlight. When many things standing far away are accumulated, perception transforms. But few gathered do not harmonize.

Therefore, the shape possessing the practical function of a thing, appearing from a distance mixed with particles — even though its two aspects do not appear as different, it appears unclear. Just as a bit of silver mixed with gold makes the gold appear impure. When a mixture is grasped, such is the appearance — not that a different substance has arisen, because the skilled can separate them, but a single thing cannot be separated.

Even granting another color has arisen — how do two objects of contradictory nature arise from the same material causes? Therefore the clear aspect grasped when mixed with few particles — that very same appears unclear when mixed with many. That thing, grasped with another object, appears unclear — like a color obscured by dust raised by a horse's hooves.

How is it untenable that what grasps the unclear has a clear object? Or else: all proximate perception is truth mixed with untruth. The capacity demonstrating untruth in consciousness must be accepted by all schools — Cittamātrins and realists alike. The common nature cannot be transgressed — therefore there is no contradiction in grasping what is at a distance mixed with another nature not present there.

If differentiation is what matters and beyond it the grasped becomes uncertain — not so. What makes its own cognition bright assigns the absence of its own thing's grasped meaning, nothing else. Connection with another object does not make the thing unclear — it merely becomes a color to be examined as the determinate content of an imperceptible nature.

For this reason, grasping the color to be determinately examined appears unclear because it has not been differentiated — as shown by the example, or like seeing a color mixed with dust. Therefore what appears unclear is also a grasping of a real thing. Whatever grasps a thing capable of practical function, with its perceived aspect inseparable from another nature, has an object capable of practical function — just as conceptual cognition with an inseparable superimposed aspect is non-deceptive direct perception regarding itself. The cognition that appears unclear from distance is likewise.

From such unclear appearance, when the previously described object mixed with another is attained — that the grasping cognition lacks a real object is groundless. What merely appears unclear is not solely without an object — it is also mixed with another object: this is the ultimate meaning.

For this reason, as long as one sees unclearly from a distance what possesses the specific feature of shape — for that long it is direct perception. When color is eliminated, what appears at the furthest boundary is the aggregate of particles. The particles within, having the same shape — seeing the color-thing abiding in the center, one infers the shape.

Darkness at night is explained as inference by conceptual thought — just as grasping a fence possessing a specific shape, one infers a thing inside it. Atoms arising having excluded each other's natures and places, being corporeal — possess a defining shape pervading spatial distinctions. But a single measure is untenable. Whether large or small — there is no measure following spatial direction. Therefore it becomes an appearance, not a real thing.

Among many similar things appearing without interruption, an external measure preceded by spatial differentiation of corporeality also appears. That too exists as imputed. When many are seen at a distance, a measure appears to cognition from a small visible portion of one thing pervading the domain of many. Even though that measure is not a property of the thing — being non-erroneous about few substances, when one sees many as having a different measure, how can seeing non-many substances serve as the apprehender? Grasping many as few is not non-erroneous engagement.

If a few are determinately grasped by superimposing a different measure — nonetheless, the function of suppressing the specific distinction of the domain means that from a distance, even when a small measure is grasped, the thing pervading the domain of many is not grasped as few, even with a different measure. If function diminishes as it becomes obscured — then another thing is grasped, and so it is merely appearance of what is not as it is. Therefore from a distance, even when appearing with a small measure, it is a grasping of a real thing.

Why then is grasping with a different measure in a desert far away an error? Because when grasping it as large, the domain it pervades does not contain a real thing. It grasps what is not of the nature of that domain as being of that nature — therefore it is an erroneous cognition. Regarding others, it does not grasp where the thing is absent.

Sound too: when the sense faculty is unimpaired, one sits close, and sounds are heard one by one without confusion — all the letter-parts become objects. In distinct moments, contacts of location and agent produce manifest intervals.

Sounds whose letter-aspects are not grasped — whether truncated or carried far — are the objects of perception at a distance and of impaired hearing. In conditions of clamor, arising from confused contact of location and agent, they too are objects as before. In these cases, valid cognition comes only from distance. At close range, engagement with another object having another nature is not a valid cognition.

Doubt and Erroneous Cognition

Any cognition that arises regarding a conch shell where it exists — that is because erroneous cognitions have determinate causes. The erroneous cognition of two moons and so forth engages precisely in dependence on the specific conditions of object, time, and so forth. Just as in a cloudless part of the sky near the moon, there arises the cognition of a second moon. From positive and negative concomitance: the moon, like the eye-disease, is a cause but not an object — since it cannot establish its own determination. Likewise with the white conch shell.

For this reason, if such a cognition does not follow a single moon or trees at a single place — there is no contradiction. Because valid cognition enables the attainment of the ascertained object of engagement, erroneous cognition does not attain its object. If the object of engagement were attained, it would be correct cognition. If it does not enable attainment — how is the object attained? By the method previously described: since in the other case its function is absent, whatever is erroneous cognition is not a cause of attaining the determined object. Just as cognizing water in a mirage. What stands at the root of dispute is also erroneous cognition.

Being the cause of attaining the object is pervaded by correct cognition — because no correct cognition connected with another principled basis exists. If doubt also attains what is desired yet is not correct cognition — from doubt the object is not attained. Because doubt, focusing on both — "does it exist or not?" — engages with both. An uncertain entity apart from existence and non-existence does not exist in the world. From doubt, another valid cognition arises that enables determinate attainment.

If from sound or from anything else a cognition with a naturally determinate aspect arises and the object is attained — this is unreasonable. Because either a consciousness in which the object's nature appears will arise, or a cognition that determines without grasping that nature. If grasped by a consciousness in which it appears, one engages with certainty in the appearance. Conceptual cognition, not possessing that aspect, is without principled basis — how can it determine? If one sees that it does not arise without that, determination is reasonable. Therefore, cognizing a thing without determination — since there is no principled basis, if one claims engagement on one side, that is cognized as the nature of doubt.

When one sees a swarm of bees that might be smoke and a cognition of fire arises — since it focuses on neither exclusively, it is non-deceptive. The ascertainment grounded in smoke: if smoke is present, it is present; if indeterminate, it is mere doubt. Following the smoke, since the true nature of the smoke has not been determinately cognized, is it not established in the domain of the indeterminate? Therefore it is doubt.

Ascertainment is only this: grasping the nature of something, or grasping what does not arise without it. Otherwise, cognition in the domain of the indeterminate is of the nature of doubt. Since an entity of the nature of both does not exist, it does not enable attainment. For this reason, demonstrating with effort that valid cognition attains the determined object — otherwise it would be pointless, since another cause of attainment could exist. Therefore determination is stated.

If enabling attainment of the determined is not valid cognition — then either from some cause one has not engaged regarding what is to be abandoned and adopted, or engagement that fails to attain due to proximate obstruction would be invalid. Not so: cognition need not cause engagement or remove proximate obstruction — it solely indicates the object of engagement. By that alone it is not said to fail as valid cognition.

Attainment is the nature of a later cognition focused on the object. Otherwise, something would become of another's nature — absurdly excessive. What has perished — whatever enables its attainment — its nature is not that of later attainment. Therefore the capacity to enable attainment — valid cognition's status as enabler — should be understood as the very nature of cognition.

That capacity cannot be without principled basis — everything would absurdly become so. Nor is it made by later cognition — because capacity is non-different from nature. When examined, the cause is the very object to be attained — arising from it, it necessarily enables attainment. Whatever has not arisen from the determined object, being unconnected, does not enable attainment. The capacity grounded in arising from it — even regarding what does not cause engagement, since there is no negation, it too is valid cognition.

Even if the proximate cause is the capacity — in speech tending toward reversing another thing, this is enhanced by co-operating conditions and is the capacity, not the pot. Just as the seed inside the pot is said to cause the sprout. Likewise, since erroneous cognition's engagement is shown to lack capacity even indirectly, the indirect enabler of attainment is correct cognition alone.

What causes engagement toward the desired object of pursuit — that is here what enables attainment. Others are examined separately. No engagement from a cognition appearing to accomplish practical function accomplishes the intended purpose — because that itself is what is desired, and no other thing to be attained exists. That cognition's momentary proximate perception cannot be examined. The remainder that examines is what causes engagement. Standing in the causal position of indeterminate continuity, it is valid cognition — because no other exists.

If arising from it — how is the capacity to attain determinately grasped? For inference and direct perception of practical function: from seeing the nature itself. What exists has the nature of practical capability — when grasped, what other thing remains to seek? It is determined as meaningful by itself alone.

Direct perception that grasps a thing without practical function — seeking the domain to be established by its own object — whatever causes engagement of the seeker toward the object is valid to some extent from another. It is determined as grasping a thing, but not a particular. Just as from a great distance, when a reddish-glowing aspect arises, one doubts whether it is a mass of red-flower garlands or a pile of fire — yet the reddish-glow is determinately grasped, even if the particular is not. Regarding merely the reddish-glow, the grasping of a thing is determinate and also causes engagement. The particular is determined from smoke and so forth, or from direct perception up close. Enabling attainment of that object: the earlier cognition itself is accepted.

Habituation and Expert Perception

Inference is the valid cognition that determines a thing from the ascertainment of necessary connection. Direct perception comes from the determination of the grasped aspect — not from seeing necessary connection.

Here, whatever reddish-glow is needed for practical function — its place, time, and aspect are determinately established in that earlier cognition's appearance. Otherwise doubt regarding the object would not arise. By that much, the function of direct perception regarding a thing is complete.

Thereafter, from some cause, when one sees and is uncertain about necessary connection with the determinate object, one will engage with the thing. If it becomes determinate, doubt regarding the seen and determined thing does not remain.

Therefore from another cognition, the valid cognition characterized by the cognition's own necessary connection — what was formerly indeterminate — is to be determined, not the thing itself. The determination relying on the undiminished formations of earlier perception is memory. If a different thing is grasped, it is valid cognition regarding its own object — like grasping concomitant touch. Momentariness is grasped and determined in this way — but that thing itself is what is to be known.

Just as cognition grasping a mirage's specific characteristic is not valid because the superimposition of water is not absent — so too momentariness and other things are objects of inference, not direct perception. If no other determining cognition intervenes, then it comes from the cognition of practical function.

Just as regarding a true particular valid cognition comes from another — so too grasping merely a thing is determined as valid cognition regarding the specificity of its object. The two types of doubt about whether a particular has been grasped — these too are determined from another.

As when a cognition appearing as fire arises and one is aware it has arisen — "has it arisen?" — or when one experiences the fire-appearance without doubt but wonders "is it without an object?" — in both cases the object of engagement is the appearance itself. Since appearance establishes the object of engagement, the earlier cognition is the valid cognition. Some cognitions are valid from themselves alone — those grasping a thing of a particular that becomes distinctive through connection.

Because erroneous cognition arises with determinate conditions of object, time, illumination, and cause: in desert and small things, one errs into large; at a distance, what is mixed appears as one. When the sun at noon impairs cognition — water is determined in a mirage. When a lamp illuminates, a blue lotus is grasped as red. When eye-disease corrupts, two moons are grasped. All these errors are produced by determinate things.

Therefore: when the object is near, the time possesses its specific condition, the illumination its condition, the sense faculty is unimpaired, and one's own state is undisturbed by sleep and the like — the grasping that arises from seeing a thing with determinate conditions — from that grasping, one will know that the object's function cannot fail to arise.

When consciousness of such a kind repeatedly grasps the object — from habituation to the conventions of experience, one comes to know its nature. The one who cognizes determines its identity by experience alone.

It is untrue to say that at the time of arising, because they are similar in aspect, there is no difference between direct perception and mere appearance. Because what is grasped — the particular possessing the distinctive connection — is determinate.

In such conditions one may doubt or err — but not in all cases. Otherwise, how would direct perception demonstrate the discriminating of smoke? The cause of error indeed exists — determined as its effect by direct perception, not by cognition alone.

From convention, "valid cognition" is explained with regard to habituation — referring to conventional usage, not solely to practical-function cognition. Therefore regarding such things, valid cognition does not come from inference. "When the content is determined from prior habituation, it is what is to be inferred" — if so, even smoke would absurdly be inferred. For smoke was formerly determined as fire's effect, and later, from seeing, one recalls "this is that" — not inference.

What is stated in terms of the worldly — "this has not gone beyond what is to be inferred" — there, the power of all clear sense-cognitions in one's own and others' continuums is to be inferred regarding attainment of the object, not experienced. For this reason it is stated: "What has experience as its domain is not cognized." Here, necessary connection with the object is experience. From some aspect, one infers its capacity for attainment — not the clarity of experiential cognition. Therefore the cases are not equivalent.

Seeing cognition near its object as non-deceptive — one knows from that that the sense faculty is unimpaired, and regarding objects not near, one cognizes them as of that nature. This too is incorrect — because cognitions of two moons, however many, are seen to be non-deceptive regarding the nearby clear sky. To say those cognitions are different is an appeal to trial by ordeal. Even granting they are different, it is not trustworthy — because true and untrue are grasped simultaneously.

Therefore, all direct perceptual cognitions whose objects are things possessing a distinctive connection — known through habituation to convention — the necessary connection of these is always valid from themselves alone. Doubt regarding the particular in the domain of distance is always valid from another. Regarding the mere general nature of the thing — from itself alone. The two types of doubt about whether a particular has been grasped — always from another.

Direct perception determinate as "thing" or "tree" but with the particular not cognized, or determined as fire but doubted regarding truth — that is determined from another. Because doubt arises preceded by knowing the object of engagement. What causes engagement is direct perception, not later doubt — since doubt does not engage with its own aspect. If the world does not engage from doubt, then at the arising of doubt one would not engage at all. Therefore valid cognition from another is valid — engagement is not from doubt.

If at the beginning of engagement one has determined it as of a contradictory nature — it is not the basis for engaging from the direct perception's aspect, like grasping a mirage. If conceptual cognition has no appearing aspect making the object known, and no extra-determination from necessary connection — doubt is eaten.

Therefore that is engagement from doubt itself. Whatever direct perception that once failed to cognize the difference — things similar to other objects — those things, even when seen three or four times, though the difference is not discriminated, by the power of habituation, some make the difference directly perceptible. Just as goldsmiths, jewelers, and the like know the nature of their materials. Likewise with direct perceptual cognition. The reason is not unestablished — because it is self-awareness.

Even when the difference is not ascertained — cognitions whose determinate conditions of object, time, illumination, and apprehender are such that the object would not arise without them, and which indicate non-error — these can demonstrate: having seen once without ascertaining the difference, the principled basis for later making the difference directly perceptible is just this. And that exists here.

If it does not make it directly perceptible — it is pervaded by dependence on another principled basis, contradicting this as sufficient basis. Since the principled basis is not incomplete — from the observation of what contradicts, reversal from the dissimilar class establishes the nature of the similar class.

The ascertainment of the universal "tree" is the object of sandalwood and the like that are non-different from it. What causes engagement is the earlier direct perception. But that earlier cognition's capacity for grasping the particular is indeterminate from itself — it becomes determinate later from another.

Thus, regarding whether cognition grasps a particular — that is to be examined with doubt. By that much, no mutual dependence exists — because the world is seen to engage even from doubt.

Concluding Verses

Non-deception regarding practical function —
that which has the capacity to enable attainment is accepted as valid cognition.
If it depends on what is to be measured,
then it is not the valid cognition of all things.

Therefore, it is not other than that —
the understanding of what possesses it is itself valid cognition.
Since engagement has attainment as its fruit,
and cognition is primary in that, two kinds are accepted.

Because cognition is autonomous and distinct
in establishing the object,
enabling attainment is accepted as belonging to cognition itself.
Therefore cognition alone is valid cognition.

The ascertained object of engagement
and what is to be attained do not engage otherwise.
Attainment too does not exist otherwise.
Therefore what causes engagement is ascertainment.

Without the cognition that knows the object, there is no other.
That is well known as valid cognition.
Regarding the object of engagement, valid cognition itself
is of two kinds regarding real things:

Generated by desire for the result,
having the appropriation of that as its domain —
the activity of engagement is proclaimed
as the ultimate of the entity of knowledge.

Following the presence and absence
of its own object's cognition, it is one —
not connected with another consciousness,
for the ascertainment of another is attained without the other.

What is understood as needed for a single purpose,
what is to be grasped by one who desires to take —
whatever becomes determined as without distinction,
even if many, is the object of a single engagement.

And what is the object of a single engagement
is the domain of a single valid cognition.
Since there is no other abiding for the object,
that same one enables attainment.

From the distinctions of place, time, illumination,
unimpaired sense faculties, and apprehender —
even from itself alone,
this becomes determinate.

Even when valid from another valid cognition,
there is no mutual dependence —
for this world, seeking a purpose,
engages even from doubt.

One who is swollen with pride and who hates the learned — I do not know such a person. And the joy of unraveling the knots of the treatise is also hard to find — I do not know such a person. Yet seeing the appearance itself with the gaze of an elephant and making the rest uncertain, the world does not fail to engage toward the object it desires and delights in.

By the merit gained from the master's own teaching
of the word "valid cognition," demonstrating each and all,
gathering the real things together —
may Dharmottara himself accomplish the purpose of all beings.

Colophon

Good Works Translation from Classical Tibetan. Translated by Rinchen, Zangpo, Drakchen, and Lotsawa (Tibetan Translator tulkus) from the Esukhia Digital Degé Tengyur (D4248). No existing English translation was consulted — none exists. The translation is independently derived from the Classical Tibetan source text.

The Pramāṇaparīkṣā was composed by the master Dharmottara (Chos mchog, fl. c. 740–800 CE) and translated into Tibetan from Sanskrit by the bhikṣu Blo-ldan shes-rab (Matiprajñā).

This is Part One of Dharmottara's two-part Examination of Valid Cognition. Part Two (D4249) is separately published in this archive.

First English translation. No previous English rendering of D4248 exists in any form — free or paywalled. The text is now complete.

Scribal credit: Rinchen (folios 201a–204b.4), Zangpo (folios 204b.4–208b), Drakchen (folios 208b.3–210b.4 + concluding verses 221a.4–221b.4), and Lotsawa (Chapter Two prose, folios 210b.4–221a.3), Tibetan Translator tulkus of the Good Work Library, New Tianmu Anglican Church, April 2026.

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Source Text: ཚད་མ་བརྟག་པ། (Pramāṇaparīkṣā)

Classical Tibetan source text from the Esukhia Digital Degé Tengyur (D4248, folios 201a–221b). CC0 license. Presented for reference and verification. Folios 201a–210b.4 (Chapter One) are included below; the complete source text including Chapter Two (folios 210b.4–221b) is in Tulku/Tools/tibetan/file190_raw.txt, lines 3192–3522.

[201a.2]སློབ་དཔོན་དགེ་སྲུངས་ཀྱིས་མཛད་པ་རྫོགས་སོ།། །།{D4248}༄༅༅། །རྒྱ་གར་སྐད་དུ། པྲ་མཱ་ཎ་པ་རཱིཀྵ། བོད་སྐད་དུ། ཚད་མ་བརྟག་པ། བམ་པོ་དང་པོ། ཐམས་ཅད་མཁྱེན་པ་ལ་ཕྱག་འཚལ་ལོ། །ཐ་མལ་མ་ཡིན་མིག་གྲུབ་པས་ཀྱང་རིག་མིན་དེ་ཡི་རང་བཞིན་
[201a.3]ལས་ལྡོག་པ། །རིག་པ་དང་ལྡན་འཁྲུལ་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་མི་ཐོབ་སྣ་ཚོགས་སྡུག་བསྔལ་ཟད་པ་ནི། །གང་གིས་འགྲོ་བ་མ་ལུས་གསལ་བར་བསྟན་ནས་དོན་དུ་གཉེར་བས་ཐོབ་མཛད་པ། །ཚད་མ་རབ་བརྗོད་བདེ་གཤེགས་དེ་ལ་ཕྱག་འཚལ་ནས་ནི་ཚད་མ་རབ་བཤད་བྱ། །སྐྱེས་བུའི་
[201a.4]སེམས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པར་གཡེང་བའི་མུན་པ་ནི། །སེལ་བར་མཛད་ཅིང་འཇིག་རྟེན་གསུམ་ན་གནས་པ་ཡི། །དངོས་པོ་མ་ལུས་གསལ་བའི་ཚིག་གི་འོད་ཟེར་གྱིས། །རྣམ་པར་འགོད་མཛད་ཆོས་ཀྱི་གྲགས་པ་ཉི་མ་བཞིན། །ཚད་མ་འཇུག་ཡུལ་ངེས་པའི་ཐོབ་པ་སྒྲུབ་པར་བྱེད་པ་
[201a.5]ཡིན་པར་བརྗོད། །ཐོབ་པ་འཇུག་པ་སྔོན་འགྲོ་ཅན་ཏེ་འཇུག་པའི་གཞི་ནི་ཤེས་པ་ཡིན། །ཡུལ་རབ་སྟོན་པས་གཙོ་བོ་ཡིན་ཕྱིར་ངེས་བྱེད་འཇུག་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཅན། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་ངེས་པའི་ཐ་དད་དངོས་ངེས་དེ་ཡིན་དེ་ཡང་ཐོབ་པར་ནུས། །སྐྱེས་བུའི་དོན་འགྲུབ་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ནི་ཚད་མ་ཡིན་
[201a.6]པའི་ཕྱིར་རྟོག་གེ་བའི་བསྟན་བཅོས་ལས་དེའི་མངོན་སུམ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་རང་བཞིན་གྱི་རབ་ཏུ་དབྱེ་བ་དང་། དེའི་མཚན་ཉིད་རྗེས་སུ་རྟོག་པར་བྱེད་དོ། །ཚད་མའི་སྒྲ་འདི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ལ་ལྟོས་པ་མེད་པར་འདོད་པ་ཙམ་གྱིས་མངོན་སུམ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་ཤེས་པའི་བྱེ་བྲག་རྣམས་ལ་འཇུག་
[201a.7]པ་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། གང་གི་ཕྱིར་མུ་སྟེགས་བྱེད་གཞན་གྱིས་བརྟགས་པའི་ཚད་མ་ལ་འདི་ནི་ཚད་མ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་འགོག་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །རྒྱུ་མཚན་མེད་པར་ཚད་མའི་སྒྲས་བརྗོད་པར་བྱ་བ་ཡིན་ན་ནི་ཤེས་པ་ཚད་མ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཇི་ལྟར་འགྱུར། འདི་སྐད་དུ་འདི་ནི་ཚད་མ་ཡིན་མོད་ཀྱི་
[201b]
[201b.1]འོན་ཀྱང་། དོན་འགྲུབ་པའི་རྒྱུ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་ནི་བརྗོད་པར་རིགས་སོ། །འདི་ལྟར་རྣམ་པར་རྟོག་པའི་ཤེས་པ་ལ་གནས་པ་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ནི་མིང་གི་སྒྲས་བརྗོད་པར་བྱ་བར་ནུས་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དཔེར་ན་བུམ་པ་ལ་སོགས་པ་བཞིན་ནོ། །གཞན་གྱིས་མངོན་པར་འདོད་པའི་ཤེས་པ་ཡང་དེ་
[201b.2]བཞིན་ནོ། །རྣམ་པར་རྟོག་པས་བཀོད་པ་ཡང་བརྗོད་པར་བྱ་བ་མ་ཡིན་ན་ནི་འགའ་ཡང་བརྗོད་པར་བྱ་བར་མི་འགྱུར་རོ། །མངོན་པར་བརྗོད་པ་དང་འབྲེལ་པར་རུང་བ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ནི། རྣམ་པར་རྟོག་པའི་ཡུལ་ལ་ཁྱབ་པ་ཡིན་གྱི། དེ་ཡང་བརྗོད་པར་བྱ་བ་ཡིན་པ་ལ་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །མིང་
[201b.3]དང་འབྲེལ་པར་བྱེད་པའི་རྒྱུ་ནི་དེ་ཉིད་ཡིན་ཏེ། དེ་ཡོད་ན་བརྗོད་པར་བྱ་བ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ཉིད་དུ་མི་འགྱུར་རོ། །དེས་ན་བརྗོད་པར་བྱ་བ་མ་ཡིན་པ་རྣམས་ལས་མངོན་པར་བརྗོད་པ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་རུང་བ་ཉིད་ལྡོག་པ་ན་རྣམ་པར་རྟོག་པ་ལ་གནས་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱང་ལྡོག་པར་འགྱུར་རོ། །དེ་ལྟར་ཡིན་ན་
[201b.4]གང་ལ་བརྗོད་པར་བྱ་བ་གཞན་འགོག་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ནི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་དང་བཅས་པ་ཉིད་དེ། དཔེར་ན་བ་ལང་གི་སྒྲ་འཁྲུལ་བ་རྟ་ལ་སྦྱར་བ་བཀག་པ་ན་དེ་དང་འབྲེལ་པ་བཞིན་ནོ། །རྒྱུ་མཚན་ལ་ལྟོས་པ་ཡང་བྱེ་བྲག་ཏུ་བཤད་པའི་ལས་ལ་བརྟེན་པ་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ཉིད་དམ། ཡང་ན་མངོན་
[201b.5]པར་བརྗོད་པའི་དུས་སུ་བརྟེན་པ་མངོན་པར་འདོད་པའི་འབྲས་བུ་ཐོབ་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཡིན་པར་འགྱུར་གྲང་། དེ་ལ་བྱེ་བྲག་ཏུ་བཤད་པ་ལ་བརྟེན་པ་ནི་བྱེད་པ་སྒྲུབ་པའི་ཚད་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་སྒྲའི་བརྗོད་པར་བྱ་བ་བྱེད་པའི་དངོས་པོར་རྟོགས་པ་ཡིན་ལ། དེ་ཉིད་ཀྱང་སྒྲ་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་བརྗོད་
[201b.6]བར་བྱ་བར་རྟོགས་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། གང་གི་ཕྱིར་དེ་ནི་འཇིག་རྟེན་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཡིན་གྱི། རྣམ་པར་བཤད་པའི་དོན་གཞན་མི་རིགས་པ་དེས་ན་ཚད་མའི་སྒྲ་ནི་འཇལ་བར་བྱེད་པ་བྱེད་པ་པོའི་དངོས་པོའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེའོ། །ཕྱོགས་འདི་ལ་ནི་ཤེས་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་འཇལ་བར་བྱེད་པ་པོའི་
[201b.7]དངོས་པོར་རྟོགས་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཚད་མར་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་ཚད་མ་དང་ཚད་མ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་རྣམ་པར་དབྱེ་བ་མེད་པར་འགྱུར་རོ། །གང་གི་ཕྱིར་གང་ཁོ་ནའི་རྒྱུས་གང་ལ་བྱེད་པའི་ཐ་སྙད་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ནི་དེ་ཡོད་ན་དེ་ལ་འཇུག་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཉིད་ཡིན་ཏེ། དཔེར་ན་དབྱིབས་ཀྱི་ཁྱད་པར་ཅན་
[202a]
[202a.1]གྱི་འབྲས་བུ་སྒྲུབ་པའི་ནུས་པ་ཙམ་གྱི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་གྱིས་འཇིམ་གོང་ལ་བུམ་པར་ཐ་སྙད་བྱེད་པ་བཞིན་ནོ། །དེ་བཞིན་དུ་ཚད་མའི་ཐ་སྙད་ཀྱང་འཇལ་བར་བྱེད་པ་པོ་དངོས་པོ་ཙམ་གྱི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་གྱི་ཤེས་པ་ལ་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེ་ཡོད་ཀྱང་མི་འཇུག་ན་ནི་རྒྱུ་དང་ལྡན་པའི་ཐ་སྙད་རྒྱུ་
[202a.2]གཞན་ལ་ལྟོས་པས་ཁྱབ་ལ། རྒྱུ་གཞན་དང་ལྡན་པ་ཉིད་ནི་དེ་ཙམ་གྱི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཅན་མ་ཡིན་པས་གཏན་ཚིགས་དེ་ཙམ་གྱི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཉིད་དང་འགལ་བའི་ཕྱིར་འགལ་བ་དམིགས་པས་གཏན་ཚིགས་མི་མཐུན་པའི་ཕྱོགས་ལས་ལྡོག་པས་བསྒྲུབ་པར་བྱ་བ་དང་འབྲེལ་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་
[202a.3]ཐལ་བར་འགྱུར་བའི་རང་བཞིན་གྱི་གཏན་ཚིགས་སོ། །ཤེས་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ་ཚད་མའི་ཐ་སྙད་མི་འཇུག་པ་དེའི་ཕྱིར་གང་ཞིག་ཡོད་ཀྱང་མི་འཇུག་པ་དེའི་ཕྱིར་གཞན་ཞིག་ཡོད་ཀྱང་མི་འཇུག་པའི་ཐ་སྙད་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ནི་དེ་ཙམ་གྱི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཅན་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དཔེར་ན་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་
[202a.4]ཀྱིས་འཇིམ་གོང་ལ་བུམ་པའི་ཐ་སྙད་མི་འཇུག་པ་ནི་དབྱིབས་ལ་སོགས་པའི་ཁྱད་པར་ལ་ལྟོས་པ་བཞིན་ནོ། །དེ་བཞིན་དུ་ཚད་མའི་ཐ་སྙད་ཀྱང་འཇལ་བར་བྱེད་པ་ཉིད་ཡོད་ན་ཡང་འཇུག་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་ཁྱབ་པར་བྱེད་པ་མི་དམིགས་པས་ཐལ་བ་ལས་ལྡོག་པའོ། །གཞན་ཡང་གལ་
[202a.5]ཏེ་གཞལ་བྱར་བྱེད་པའི་ཤེས་པ་རང་གི་བསྒྲུབ་པར་བྱ་བའི་དོན་བྱ་བར་ནུས་པ་དེ་ལྟ་ན་ཡང་རང་བཞིན་དེས་ཕྱི་རོལ་གྱི་བསྒྲུབ་པར་བྱ་བའི་ཡན་ལག་ཏུ་མི་འགྱུར་བས་ན་དེ་དོན་དུ་གཉེར་བ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་དེ་བླང་བར་བྱ་བ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ཉིད་དོ། །སྲེག་པ་ལ་སོགས་པ་དང་འབྲེལ་པའི་ཡན་ལག་ཏུ་གྱུར་
[202a.6]པའི་ཤེས་པ་ནི་དེའི་དོན་བྱ་བ་དོན་དུ་གཉེར་བ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་བསྟེན་པར་བྱ་བ་བསྟན་བཅོས་ལས་ཚད་མའི་སྒྲས་ཉེ་བར་བསྟན་ཅིང་བརྟག་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེས་ན་ཤེས་བྱའི་ཕྱི་རོལ་གྱི་བསྒྲུབ་པར་བྱ་བའི་ཡན་ལག་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ཉིད་དོན་དུ་གཉེར་བར་རྟོགས་པར་བྱ་བ་ཡིན་པ་ན་བསྟན་བཅོས་ལས་
[202a.7]བརྟག་པ་འོས་པའི་ཚད་མའི་སྒྲ་འཇུག་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཡིན་ནོ། །འཇལ་བར་བྱེད་པའི་དངོས་པོ་ནི་ཕྱི་རོལ་གྱི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་ཡན་ལག་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དེས་ན་དོན་དུ་གཉེར་བར་འདོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པས་ཤེས་པ་ལ་རང་གི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཅན་ཚད་མའི་ཐ་སྙད་མི་འཇུག་གོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་གང་ཞིག་དོན་བྱེད་པ་གང་དོན་དུ་གཉེར་བས་བླང་བར་བྱ་བ་
[202b]
[202b.1]དེ་ནི་དེ་བྱེད་པར་རུང་བར་འདོད་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དཔེར་ན་ཁྲུས་ལ་སོགས་པ་དོན་དུ་གཉེར་བས་ཆུ་བཞིན་ནོ། །རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་འགའ་ཞིག་ཀྱང་དོན་དུ་གཉེར་བས་བླང་བར་བྱ་བ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེ་དོན་དུ་གཉེར་བ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ལེན་པ་ནི་སྒྲུབ་པའི་ཡུལ་ཡིན་ལ། སྒྲུབ་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཡང་ངེས་པ་ཡིན་པ་དེས་ན་ངེས་པར་ཁྱབ་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །སྒྲུབ་
[202b.2]པར་བྱེད་པའི་དངོས་པོ་མེད་ན་ནི་ངེས་པའི་རྒྱུ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཁྱབ་པར་བྱེད་པར་ངེས་པ་མེད་པས་ན་ཁྱབ་པར་བྱ་བ་དོན་དུ་གཉེར་བས་བསླང་བར་བྱ་བ་མེད་དོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་རང་བཞིན་ནོ། །དེ་ལྟ་ན་ཡང་གང་གི་རང་བཞིན་གང་ཞིག་མངོན་པར་འདོད་པའི་འབྲས་བུའི་ཡན་ལག་མ་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ནི་དོན་དུ་
[202b.3]གཉེར་བ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་རང་བཞིན་དེས་དེ་ལ་བརྟེན་པར་བྱ་བ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དཔེར་ན་གྲང་བ་ལྡོག་པ་དོན་དུ་གཉེར་བས་སྣང་བ་ཙམ་གྱི་རང་བཞིན་གྱིས་སྒྲོན་མ་དོན་དུ་གཉེར་བར་བྱ་བ་མ་ཡིན་པ་བཞིན་ནོ། །དེ་བཞིན་དུ་ཤེས་པ་ཡང་འཇལ་བར་བྱེད་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཕྱིའི་དོན་གྱི་ཡན་ལག་མ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་
[202b.4]བྱ་བ་ནི་ཁྱབ་པར་བྱ་བ་མེད་པའོ། །དེ་ལྟར་ན་ནི་འོ་ན་ཡོད་པའི་དོན་འཛིན་པ་ཚད་མ་ཡིན་ལ་ཅིག་ཤོས་ནི་ཚད་མ་མ་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ལྟར་ན་ཚད་མ་དང་ཚད་མ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་རྣམ་པར་དབྱེ་བ་གྲུབ་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །ཡོད་པའི་དོན་འཛིན་པའི་ཤེས་པ་ནི་དོན་གྲུབ་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཡིན་ལ། ཡོད་པའི་དོན་
[202b.5]འཇལ་བར་བྱེད་པའི་དངོས་པོའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཅན་ཡང་ཚད་མའི་སྒྲ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེ་ན། རྣམ་པར་དབྱེ་བ་གྲུབ་པ་ནི་བདེན་ན་ཤེས་པའི་ཡོད་པའི་དོན་འཛིན་པ་ནི་མངོན་པར་འདོད་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །གལ་ཏེ་དེས་དོན་ཡོད་པ་བཟུང་དུ་བཅུག་པ་དེ་ལྟ་ན་ཡང་། འབྲས་བུ་སྒྲུབ་པའི་རྒྱུ་ནི་དོན་དེ་
[202b.6]ཉིད་ཡིན་གྱི་དེ་འཛིན་པའི་ཤེས་པ་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །གལ་ཏེ་མ་བཟུང་ན་ནི་མི་འཐོབ་ལ། །མ་ཐོབ་ན་ནི་འདོད་པའི་འབྲས་བུའི་ཡན་ལག་མ་ཡིན་པ་དེས་ན་བསྒྲུབ་པར་བྱ་བ་སྒྲུབ་པར་རུང་བ་ཐོབ་པར་བྱེད་པའི་སྒོ་ནས་དོན་ཐོབ་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་དོན་བྱ་བའི་ཡན་ལག་ཡིན་ལ། ཐོབ་
[202b.7]པར་བྱེད་པ་དེ་ཡང་འཛིན་པ་སྔོན་དུ་འགྲོ་བ་ཅན་ཡིན་པ་ཉིད་དོ་ཞེ་ན། གལ་ཏེ་དེ་ལྟ་ན་ནི་ཤེས་པའི་དོན་བྱ་བ་ཐོབ་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཉིད་དོན་གྲུབ་པའི་ཡན་ལག་ཡིན་ལ། ཡོད་པའི་དོན་འཛིན་པ་ནི་ཐབས་ཡིན་པར་འགྱུར་རོ། །གང་ཁོ་ན་ལས་དོན་དུ་གཉེར་བ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་འབྲས་བུའི་ཡན་
[203a]
[203a.1]ལག་གི་རང་བཞིན་དུ་བསྟན་པ་དེ་ཉིད་ཚད་མའི་སྒྲ་འཇུག་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་བརྟག་པར་འོས་པ་ཡིན་ན། ཐབས་འདི་ནི་ངེས་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། གང་གི་ཕྱིར་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པས་ཞེན་པས་ཀྱང་དོན་ཐོབ་པར་བྱེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །གང་ཞིག་གང་གིས་ངེས་པའི་ཐབས་མ་ཡིན་
[203a.2]པ་དེ་ནི་དོན་དུ་གཉེར་བས་ངེས་པར་བསྟན་པར་བྱ་བ་མ་ཡིན་གྱི། དཔེར་ན་མེ་དོན་དུ་གཉེར་བས་མེ་ཤེལ་བཞིན་ནོ། །དོན་འཛིན་པ་ཡང་དོན་ཐོབ་པར་བྱེད་པའི་ངེས་པའི་ཐབས་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེའི་རང་བཞིན་མ་ཡིན་པ་དེ་དོན་དུ་གཉེར་བས་ཡོངས་སུ་འཛིན་པ་ནི་དེའི་ཐབས་ཀྱི་དངོས་པོ་
[203a.3]ཙམ་ལ་ལྟོས་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །ཐབས་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ཡང་དེ་ལ་ཡོད་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། གཞན་དུ་ན་དེ་ཙམ་ལ་ལྟོས་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ཉིད་དུ་མི་འགྱུར་རོ། །དེས་ན་བསྟེན་པར་བྱ་བ་ངེས་པ་ལ་ཐབས་ངེས་པས་ཁྱབ་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཁྱབ་པར་བྱེད་པ་མི་དམིགས་པའོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་དོན་འཛིན་པ་ནི་དོན་
[203a.4]བྱེད་པའི་ཡན་ལག་གི་རང་བཞིན་མ་ཡིན་གྱི། འོན་ཀྱང་དོན་ཐོབ་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཉིད་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེའི་ཐབས་ངེས་པ་ཡང་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དེའི་ཕྱིར་དོན་བྱེད་པ་དོན་དུ་གཉེར་བ་བསྟན་པར་བྱ་བ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ན་བརྟག་པར་འོས་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ཚད་མའི་སྒྲའི་རྒྱུར་ཇི་ལྟར་འགྱུར། དེ་ལྟ་ན་འོ་ན་ནི་མི་སླུ་བ་ནི་
[203a.5]ཚད་མའི་སྒྲའི་རྟེན་དུ་འགྱུར་ལ། དེ་ཡང་དོན་བྱེད་པ་ཐོབ་པར་བྱེད་པའི་རང་བཞིན་ནོ། །གལ་ཏེ་ཡང་དོན་བྱ་བ་དངོས་པོ་དང་འབྲེལ་པ་དེ་ལྟ་ན་ཡང་དོན་གྲུབ་པར་ནུས་པའི་དངོས་པོ་ཐོབ་པར་བྱེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་དེ་ཐོབ་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །གལ་ཏེ་དེ་ལྟ་ན་ཡང་ཚད་མ་དང་ཚད་མ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་
[203a.6]རྣམ་པར་དབྱེ་བ་མེད་པར་མི་འགྱུར་རམ། གང་གི་ཕྱིར་ཤེས་པ་འགའ་ཞིག་ལས་ཞུགས་པ་ནི་འགའ་ཡང་མི་འཐོབ་པ་ནི་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །གང་གི་ཕྱིར་ཆུའི་ཤེས་པས་སྨིག་རྒྱུ་དང་། སྐྲ་ཤད་ཀྱི་ཤེས་པས་སྣང་བའི་རྡུལ་ཕྲ་རབ་ལ་ཞུགས་པ་ན་སྨིག་རྒྱུ་ཙམ་དང་སྣང་བ་ཙམ་ཡང་མི་
[203a.7]འཐོབ་པ་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་རྣམ་གྲངས་འདིས་ནི་ཤེས་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་དོན་བྱ་བ་ཐོབ་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཡིན་པས་ཚད་མར་འགྱུར་རོ་ཞེ་ན། བཤད་པ། དོན་དེ་བྱེད་པ་ལ་མི་སླུ་བའི་དོན་དེ་ཐོབ་པར་བྱེད་པར་བརྗོད་དོ། །སྔར་རྟོགས་པར་བྱས་པ་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ལྟར་ཐོབ་པར་བྱེད་པ་ནི་འཇིག་རྟེན་ན་མི་སླུ་
[203b]
[203b.1]བར་བརྗོད་ཀྱི་ཐོབ་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཙམ་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །འདི་ལྟར་དོན་གང་ཇི་ལྟར་བསྟན་པ་དེ་དེ་ལྟར་ཐོབ་པར་བྱེད་པ་ནི་མི་སླུ་བར་བརྗོད་དོ། །ཤེས་པ་ཡང་དོན་གང་ཇི་ལྟར་བསྟན་པ་དེ་ལྟར་ཐོབ་པར་བྱེད་པ་ནི་མི་སླུ་བར་འདོད་དོ། །དེས་ན་དོན་བྱེད་པར་རུང་བར་ཤེས་པ་གང་ཞིག་ཤེས་པའི་དོན་
[203b.2]དེ་ཐོབ་པར་བྱེད་པའི་སྒོ་ནས་ཤེས་པར་བྱེད་པའི་བྱ་བ་ལ་ལྟོས་པ་ཤེས་པར་བྱས་པའི་དངོས་པོའི་ཡུལ་ཅན་ནི་དོན་བྱེད་པ་དེ་ཐོབ་པར་བྱེད་པ་མི་སླུ་བ་ཡིན་ནོ། །མི་སླུ་བ་ཉིད་འཇིག་རྟེན་ན་གྲགས་པའི་དོན་གཟུང་བ་ཡིན་པ་འབའ་ཞིག་ཏུ་མ་ཟད་ཀྱི། ཚད་མའི་སྒྲའི་དོན་ནི་མི་སླུ་བ་ཡིན་པ་ཡང་འཛིན་
[203b.3]པ་ཉིད་དོ། །འདི་ལྟར་ཐོབ་པར་བྱ་བའི་དོན་སྟོན་པར་བྱེད་པ་མི་སླུ་བའི་སྐྱེས་བུ་ལ་ནི་ཚད་མ་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །འཇིག་རྟེན་ན་ཡང་གང་ཞིག་གི་ངག་ཡོངས་སུ་གཅོད་པར་བྱེད་པའི་དངོས་པོར་རྟོགས་པ་ཡོངས་སུ་གཅོད་པ་ལ་མི་སླུ་བ་ཅན་དུ་གྱུར་པ་ཡོངས་སུ་གཅོད་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཡོངས་སུ་གཅད་
[203b.4]པ་ལ་མི་སླུ་བ་ཅན་དེ་ལ་ནི་ཚད་མའི་སྒྲ་རྟེན་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེས་ན་གཞལ་བ་ལ་མི་སླུ་བའི་ཤེས་པ་ལ་འཇལ་བར་བྱེད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་ནི་འཇིག་རྟེན་པ་ཉིད་ལས་གྲུབ་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །སྤྱིར་བཤད་པ། གྲགས་པའི་ཁྱད་པར་ལ་བརྟེན་པའི་སྒྲ་ནི་མཐོང་བ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དཔེར་ན་རྫ་མ་བྱེད་པ་ལ་འཇུག་པར་བཤད་པ་
[203b.5]ནི་རྫ་མཁན་གྱི་སྒྲ་རིགས་ཀྱི་ཁྱད་པར་ལ་འཇུག་པ་བཞིན་ནོ། །དེ་བཞིན་དུ་འཇལ་བར་བྱེད་པ་ལ་བཤད་པའི་ཚད་མའི་སྒྲ་འདི་ནི་གཞལ་བ་ལ་མི་སླུ་བ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཁྱད་པར་ལ་གྲགས་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཕྱིར་ཚད་མའི་སྒྲ་ཡང་དག་པའི་ཤེས་པའི་རྣམ་གྲངས་སུ་སྟོན་པར་མཛད་པ་ན། དེ་བསྟན་པའི་
[203b.6]ཕྱིར་ཚད་མ་རྣམ་གཉིས་ཁོ་ན་ཞེས་དམ་བཅས་པ་དང་། ཚད་མ་སླུ་མེད་ཅན་ཤེས་པ། །ཞེས་ཀྱང་གསུངས་སོ། །གདོན་མི་ཟ་བར་ཤེས་པར་བྱེད་པ་པོའི་བྱ་བའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཅན་ཤེས་པའི་དངོས་པོའི་ཡུལ་ཅན་དོན་བྱ་བ་ཐོབ་པར་བྱེད་པ་མི་སླུ་བ་ཁས་བླང་དགོས་ཏེ། གཞན་དུ་ན་དེ་ཡོད་ན་
[203b.7]འབྲས་བུ་ཐོབ་པས་མི་སླུ་བ་དེ་ཚད་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ལག་པ་དང་། རྐང་པ་དང་། བྱེད་པའི་ཚོགས་དང་། ཐོབ་པར་བྱེད་པའི་ས་གཞི་ལ་སོགས་པ་ཡང་ཐོབ་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཡིན་ཏེ། དེ་དག་མེད་ན་ཐོབ་པར་མི་འཐད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེས་ན་ཐམས་ཅད་ཚད་མར་ཐལ་ལོ། །འཇལ་བར་བྱེད་
[204a]
[204a.1]པ་ཉིད་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཐལ་བར་མི་འགྱུར་རོ་ཞེ་ན། དེ་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ་གང་གི་ཕྱིར་དེ་གང་གི་ཚེ་གཞལ་བའི་དངོས་པོའི་ཡུལ་ཅན་གྱི་དོན་ཐོབ་པར་བྱེད་པ་མི་སླུ་བར་འདོད་ན་ནི་དེའི་ཚེ་འཇལ་བར་བྱེད་པ་ཅན་མེད་པ་ན་ཁྱད་པར་ཅན་གྱིས་དོན་ཐོབ་པར་བྱེད་པ་མེད་པས་ཚད་
[204a.2]མར་ཐལ་བར་མི་འགྱུར་རོ། །དོན་ཐོབ་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཙམ་མི་སླུ་བའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཡིན་ན་ནི་དཔེར་ན་རྣམ་པ་འགའ་ཞིག་ལྟར། ན་མ་ད་ལ་སོགས་པའི་སྒྲ་བཞིན་དུ་ཚད་མའི་སྒྲ་བཤད་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ལ་མི་ལྟོས་པར་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ་འཇུག་པར་འགྱུར་རོ། །ད་ལྟ་ནི་གཞལ་བའི་དངོས་
[204a.3]པོའི་བསྒྲུབ་པར་བྱ་བའི་འབྲས་བུའི་ཐོབ་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཚད་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཤེས་པ་ཉིད་དོ། །ཇི་ལྟར་ཤེས་པ་འདིར་འཇལ་བར་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན་ཡང་དོན་བྱ་བ་ཐོབ་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་གཞན་དག་ལས་ཁྱད་པར་དུ་འཕགས་པ་ཅི་ཞིག་ཡོད་དེ། གང་གིས་ཐོབ་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་དེ་ཉིད་དོན་བྱ་བ་
[204a.4]དོན་དུ་གཉེར་བས་བསྟེན་པར་བྱ་བ་ཡིན་པས་ན་བསྟན་བཅོས་ལས་རྗེས་སུ་རྟོགས་པར་བྱ་བ་ཡིན་གྱི་གཞན་མ་ཡིན། ཐོབ་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཉིད་དུ་ནི་ཁྱད་པར་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ་ཞེ་ན། སྨྲས་པ། འདི་ལ་སྐྱེས་བུའི་འདོད་པ་གྲུབ་པ་ནི་དོན་དུ་གཉེར་བ་ཙམ་གྱི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཅན་ནི་མ་ཡིན་གྱི་
[204a.5]འོན་ཀྱང་ཕྱི་རོལ་གྱི་སྲེག་པ་ལ་སོགས་པ་ལ་རག་ལས་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །ཕྱི་རོལ་གྱི་དངོས་པོ་དེ་ཡོད་པ་ཙམ་གྱིས་ནི་དོན་དུ་གཉེར་བ་འབའ་ཞིག་གི་འདོད་པ་གྲུབ་པའི་རྒྱུ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཡོད་པར་ཁྱད་པར་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱི་འདོད་པ་གྲུབ་པར་ཐལ་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །འོན་ཀྱང་དོན་
[204a.6]དུ་གཉེར་བ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ཐོབ་པ་ཡིན་ལ། ཐོབ་པ་ཡང་དོན་དུ་གཉེར་བ་དེའི་བྱ་བ་དང་མཐུན་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དོན་དུ་གཉེར་བའི་འཇུག་པ་ཡང་ཤེས་པའི་ཁྱད་པར་གྱི་རབ་ཏུ་གཞག་པའི་ཡུལ་ཡོད་ན་ཐོབ་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཡིན་ནོ། །སྲོག་ཆགས་ཀྱི་ཡན་ལག་དང་འདོད་པ་ལ་སོགས་པ་ནི་ཤེས་
[204a.7]པས་ཉེ་བར་གཞག་པའི་ཡུལ་དེ་ཉིད་ལ་འཇུག་པར་རྩོམ་པ་ན་ཤེས་པ་དང་འབྲེལ་པ་ཉིད་དོ། །དེས་ན་འཇུག་པའི་ཡུལ་རབ་ཏུ་འཇོག་པར་བྱེད་པས་ཤེས་པ་ནི་གཙོ་བོའི་རྒྱུ་ཡིན་ལ། རྒྱུ་མཚན་གཞན་ཤེས་པ་དང་འབྲེལ་བས་འཇུག་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཤེས་པ་དང་འབྲེལ་པས་འཇུག་པ་དེའི་
[204b]
[204b.1]གཞན་གྱི་དབང་དུ་གྱུར་བ་ནི་གཙོ་བོ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་འཇུག་པའི་ཡུལ་ཉེ་བར་འཇོག་པས་གཙོ་བོའི་རྒྱུར་གྱུར་པའི་ཤེས་པ་ཉིད་དོན་བྱེད་པ་ཐོབ་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན་གྱི་གཞན་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཕྱིར་ཚད་མ་དོན་ཐོབ་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཡིན་ཡང་ཤེས་པ་ཁོ་ན་ཚད་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེ་
[204b.2]མེད་པར་མི་ཐོབ་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཚད་མ་ནི་འཇུག་པའི་འབྲས་བུ་ཅན་དུ་བརྗོད་ལ། དེ་ལ་ཡང་ཤེས་པ་གཙོ་བོར་གྱུར་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་འཇུག་པའི་རྒྱུ་གཞན་ནི་ཤེས་པའི་གཞན་གྱི་དབང་དུ་གྱུར་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །གང་གི་ཕྱིར་དོན་མེད་པ་འཛིན་པའི་ཤེས་པ་སྐྱེས་པ་ན་ཡང་དེས་གཞག་པའི་ཡུལ་
[204b.3]ལ་འཇུག་པ་རྩོམ་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །གལ་ཏེ་གཞན་གྱི་དབང་མ་ཡིན་ན་དོན་མེད་པའི་ཡུལ་ལ་ཅིའི་ཕྱིར་འཇུག་པར་བྱེད། རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་ནི་དེ་ལྟར་དེའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་དང་འབྲེལ་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དེས་ན་འཇུག་པ་ལ་རང་དབང་ཅན་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་འཇུག་པའི་གཙོ་བོའི་རྒྱུ་ཡིན་ནོ། །ཐུན་
[204b.4]མོང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཡང་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། གང་གི་ཕྱིར་རྒྱུ་མཚན་གཞན་རྣམས་ནི་འཇུག་པ་ཐ་དད་པ་དང་མཐུན་པ་མ་ཡིན་གྱི། འོན་ཀྱང་ཤེས་པ་ཉིད་ཡིན་ནོ། །འདི་སྙམ་དུ་རྒྱུ་གཞན་དག་ལ་ཡང་འཇུག་པ་སོ་སོ་ལ། རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཐ་དད་པ་ཡོད་པ་དེས་ན་ཐུན་མོང་མ་ཡིན་པ་ཉིད་དོ་སྙམ་
[204b.5]ན་དེ་ནི་མི་རིགས་ཏེ། འགར་ཡང་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཐ་དད་པ་མེད་པ་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ལ་ཐ་དད་ཡོད་ཀྱང་མང་པོ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་ཐུན་མོང་དུ་བྱེད་པ་དགག་པར་ནི་མི་ནུས་ཏེ། ཚད་མས་གྲུབ་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེ་བྱེད་པས་དེ་ལས་གཞན་དག་ལས་ལྡོག་པ་རྣམ་པ་གཅིག་
[204b.6]ཏུ་འཛིན་པར་འཇུག་པའི་རྒྱུར་གྱུར་པ་གཅིག་ཉིད་དུ་ངེས་པ་ནི་ཐ་མི་དད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །ཐ་སྙད་འདི་ཡུལ་མེད་པ་ཡང་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཡོད་པ་ནི་དོན་བྱེད་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཅན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཐ་སྙད་འདི་ནི་ཚོགས་པའི་ཡིན་ལ། ཚོགས་པ་ཡང་མེད་པ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་ཀྱང་བསམ་པར་མི་བྱ་
[204b.7]སྟེ། གང་གི་ཕྱིར་གཅིག་ཏུ་བརྟགས་པའི་ཚོགས་པ་དངོས་པོར་མ་གྱུར་མོད། དུ་མའི་བདག་ཉིད་ཀྱི་དངོས་པོ་དངོས་པོ་མེད་པར་ཇི་ལྟར་འགྱུར་དུ་མ་གང་ཇི་སྙེད་པ་དེ་ཐམས་ཅད་དངོས་པོ་མེད་པ་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཧ་ཅང་ཐལ་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །རྒྱུ་དང་འབྲས་བུ་དག་གི་རྗེས་སུ་འགྲོ་བ་དང་ལྡོག་
[205a]
[205a.1]པའི་རྗེས་སུ་བྱེད་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱང་འདི་ལྟ་བུར་གྱུར་པའི་ཡུལ་ཅན་ཁོ་ནར་བརྗོད་དོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་ཇི་ལྟར་དོན་བྱེད་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ཡིན་པ་དེ་བཞིན་དུ་ཁྱད་པར་ཅན་གྱི་དོན་བྱེད་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཁྱད་པར་ཅན་གྱི་ཡོད་པ་ཡིན་ལ། ཇི་སྲིད་དུ་དེ་བྱེད་པ་ཡོངས་སུ་རྫོགས་པ་དེ་ཐམས་ཅད་
[205a.2]ནི་གཅིག་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེ་ལ་གཅིག་ཏུ་ངོ་ཤེས་པའི་ཡུལ་གྱི་དོན་རྣམས་ཐ་དད་པ་ཡིན་ན་ཡང་དོན་བྱེད་པ་འགའ་ཞིག་རྟོགས་ནས་ཆུའི་ཐ་སྙད་རྟེན་པའི་ཡོད་པའི་ཁྱད་པར་དུ་རྣམ་པར་གཞག་པའི་ཆུའི་དོན་བྱེད་པ་དེ་ནི་མྱུ་གུའི་རང་བཞིན་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ་ཁྱད་པར་མེད་དོ། །ཁྱད་པར་ཅན་གྱི་
[205a.3]མྱུ་གུ་བྱེད་པ་ཉིད་ཆུའི་ཡོད་པའི་ཐ་སྙད་ཀྱི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཧ་ཅང་ཐལ་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་ཆུ་ལ་སོགས་པ་ཁྱད་པར་མེད་ཀྱང་མྱུ་གུའི་ཁྱད་པར་ནི་ས་བོན་ལས་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེས་ན་དེ་ནི་མྱུ་གུའི་ཐུན་མོང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་རྒྱུ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེས་ན་ཇི་ལྟར་གལ་ཏེ་དོན་གྲུབ་པའི་ཐབས་
[205a.4]མང་པོ་ཡོད་པ་དེ་ལྟ་ན་ཡང་མེ་ཉིད་ཐུན་མོང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཐབས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་དེའི་དོན་ཉིད་ལ་འཇུག་གོ། །དེ་བཞིན་དུ་གལ་ཏེ་དོན་གྲུབ་པའི་ཐབས་ཐོབ་པའི་རྒྱུ་མང་པོ་ཡོད་པ་དེ་ལྟ་ན་ཡང་འཇུག་པའི་ཡུལ་གྱི་ཁྱད་པར་འཇིག་པར་བྱེད་པས་ཐ་དད་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཉིད་ནི་ཐུན་མོང་མ་ཡིན་
[205a.5]པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། རང་དབང་ཅན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་གཙོ་བོའི་རྒྱུ་ནི་ཤེས་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །ཐོབ་པ་དེ་ཡང་དེས་འཚོ་བ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཚད་མའི་མིང་ཅན་བརྟག་པར་འོས་པ་ནི་དེ་ཉིད་ཡིན་གྱི་གཞན་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །ཤེས་པར་རབ་ཏུ་གཞག་པའི་འཇུག་པའི་ཡུལ་དེ་ཡང་གང་ཡིན་ཞེ་ན་ཤེས་པས་ཞེན་
[205a.6]པར་བྱེད་པའི་དོན་གང་ཡིན་པ་སྟེ། གང་གི་ཕྱིར་དེ་ལ་ནི་དོན་དུ་གཉེར་བར་འགྱུར་ན་སྐྱེས་བུ་འཇུག་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །འདི་ལྟར་ཤེས་པའི་དོན་ནི་མ་བཟུང་ཡང་ཤེས་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཅན་གྱི་འཇུག་པའི་ཡུལ་དུ་གྱུར་པ་ཤེས་པའི་འཇུག་པའི་ཡུལ་དུ་བརྗོད་དོ། །དེས་ན་གང་གང་གི་ཞེན་པ་དེ་ནི་དེའི་

[205a.7]འཇུག་པའི་ཡུལ་ཡིན་པ་དེའི་ཐོབ་པར་བྱེད་པ་ནི་དེ་ཡིན་ཏེ། མ་ངེས་ན་ནི་མི་འཇུག་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །འདི་ལྟར་ཤེས་པ་ནི་དོན་བྱེད་པའི་ཐབས་སྐྱེད་པས་ཐོབ་པར་བྱེད་པ་ནི་མ་ཡིན་གྱི། འོན་ཀྱང་འདི་ལ་འཇུག་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན་ལ། སྐྱེས་བུ་རང་ཉིད་འགྲོ་མི་ནུས་པ་ལག་པ་ནས་
[205b.1]བཟུང་ནས་འཇུག་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཡང་མ་ཡིན་གྱི། འོན་ཀྱང་འཇུག་པའི་ཡུལ་མ་ཤེས་པར་འཇུག་པར་མི་ནུས་པ་ལ་ཡུལ་ཉེ་བར་སྟོན་པར་བྱས་པས་སོ། །དོན་བསྟན་པ་ཡང་ལྷག་པར་ཞེན་པར་བྱས་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་དོན་གང་ཁོ་ན་ལ་འཇུག་པ་
[205b.2]དེ་ནི་ཤེས་པས་ངེས་པ་ཡིན་ལ། ངེས་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཡང་དེའི་འཇུག་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཉིད་དེ། དེ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་འཇུག་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེས་ན་ཚད་མ་ངེས་པའི་འབྲས་བུ་ཅན་དུ་བརྗོད་དོ། །འདིའི་འཇུག་པར་བྱེད་པའི་བྱ་བ་ནི་ངེས་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཉིད་དོ་ཞེས་བསྟན་པའི་ཕྱིར་
[205b.3]མ་རྟོགས་པའི་ཡུལ་ཅན་ཚད་མར་བཤད་དོ། །འདི་ལྟར་གལ་ཏེ་འཇུག་པར་བྱེད་པའི་བྱ་བ་ངེས་པ་ལས་ཐ་དད་པ་ཡིན་ན་ནི་གཅིག་གིས་རྟོགས་པའི་དོན་དེ་ལ་གཞན་གྱིས་བཅུག་ནས་ཐོབ་ལ་འཇུག་པའི་ཐོབ་པར་བྱེད་པ་དེ་ཉིད་ཀྱང་ཚད་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རྟོགས་པའི་
[205b.4]ཡུལ་ཅན་ཡང་འགྱུར་རོ། །རྟོགས་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཙམ་འཇུག་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན་ན་ནི་གང་གིས་དངོས་པོ་དེ་རྟོགས་པར་བྱེད་པ་དེ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་འཇུག་པའི་ཡུལ་དེ་ལ་སྐྱེས་བུ་དེ་ཙམ་གྱིས་འཇུག་པར་འགྱུར་བས་ཐོབ་པར་བྱེད་པའི་ཚད་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །གཞན་ལ་ནི་སྔ་ན་མེད་
[205b.5]པའི་ཐོབ་པར་བྱེད་པ་མེད་པས་ཚད་མ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །མ་ངེས་ན་ནི་ཐབས་གཞན་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་འཇུག་པར་བྱེད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ལ་འཇུག་པའི་ཡུལ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ཡང་ཐོབ་པར་བྱེད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཐབས་གཞན་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེས་ན་མངོན་སུམ་དང་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་
[205b.6]པ་དག་འཇུག་པའི་ཡུལ་ངེས་པར་བྱས་པའི་ཐོབ་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཁྱད་པར་མེད་པའི་དངོས་པོའི་ཡུལ་ཅན་ཚད་མ་ཞེས་བཤད་དོ། །མ་ངེས་ན་ནི་མངོན་སུམ་གྱིས་དེ་སྣང་བའི་སྒོ་ནས་བཟུང་དུ་ཟིན་ཀྱང་མངོན་སུམ་གྱི་ཚད་མས་རྣམ་པར་མི་གཞག་སྟེ། མ་
[205b.7]ངེས་པ་ནི་འཇུག་པའི་ཡུལ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཐོབ་པར་མི་ནུས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེས་ན་དོན་འཛིན་པ་ལ་ལྟོས་ན་ནི་ཚད་མ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དེ་ཙམ་ནི་དོན་ཐོབ་པར་བྱེད་པའི་ཡན་ལག་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཚད་མའི་འཇུག་པའི་ཡུལ་ཐོབ་པར་བྱ་བ་ནི་ངེས་པར་
[206a.1]བྱས་པའི་དོན་ཉིད་ཡིན་གྱི། གཟུང་བ་ཙམ་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །འདི་ལྟར་མངོན་སུམ་སྐད་ཅིག་གང་ཡུལ་དུ་བྱས་པ་དེ་ཉིད་ཐོབ་པར་བྱེད་པ་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དོན་གང་རྒྱུན་དུ་འཇུག་པ་ཁྱད་པར་ཅན་གྱི་འབྲས་བུ་ལ་ཉེ་བར་སྦྱོར་བ་དེའི་འབྲས་བུ་ཅན་མ་ཡིན་པ་དག་ལས་ལྡོག་
[206a.2]པ་མངོན་སུམ་གྱི་སྟོབས་ཀྱིས་སྐྱེས་པའི་ངེས་པས་གཅིག་ཏུ་ཡུལ་དུ་བྱས་པ་དེ་ཐོབ་པར་བྱེད་པས་ཡུལ་དེ་ཙམ་ལ་ཚད་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །ཞེན་པར་བྱས་པ་འཇུག་པའི་ཡུལ་ལ་ལྟོས་ནས་ཚད་མ་ཡིན་ན་ནི་གཅིག་ཀྱང་དུ་མའི་ཡུལ་དུ་འགྱུར་ཏེ། དཔེར་ན་སྒྲ་དེ་ཉིད་ནི་མངོན་སུམ་གྱིས་
[206a.3]གྲུབ་པོ། །བྱས་པ་ཉིད་ནི་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པ་ཡིན་ལ་འདི་མི་རྟག་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱང་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པ་གཞན་གྱིས་སོ། །གཞན་དུ་སྒྲ་མངོན་སུམ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་མ་བཟུང་བའི་ཆ་མེད་པས་ཚད་མ་གཞན་གྱི་ཡུལ་དུ་མི་འགྱུར་རོ། །དོན་དུ་མ་ཡང་ཚད་མ་གཅིག་གི་ཡུལ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཇི་ལྟར་གང་དུ་དངོས་
[206a.4]པོ་ཐ་དད་པ་འཛིན་པར་བྱེད་པ་རྣམས་ལ་གཅིག་ཉིད་ཚད་མར་གྱུར་པ་ལྟ་བུ་སྟེ། དཔེར་ན་རྒྱུད་གཅིག་ཏུ་རྟོགས་པའི་སྐད་ཅིག་མ་དུ་མ་འཛིན་པར་བྱེད་པའི་དབང་པོའི་ཤེས་པ་རྣམས་བཟུང་བ་ཐ་དད་ཀྱང་ངེས་པའི་འཇུག་པའི་ཡུལ་གཅིག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་སྔར་སྐྱེས་པ་ཚད་མ་མ་ཡིན་ལ། གཞན་
[206a.5]དག་ནི་དེ་ལ་དྲན་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །ཡང་ཅི་འདྲ་བའི་དུ་མའི་དོན་ཚད་མ་གཅིག་གི་ཡུལ་ཡིན་ལ། ཅི་འདྲ་བ་ཞིག་ཀྱང་དུ་མའི་ཡིན་ཞེ་ན། འཇུག་པ་གཅིག་གི་ཡུལ་ནི་དུ་མ་ཡིན་ཡང་ཚད་མ་གཅིག་གི་ཡུལ་ཡིན་ནོ། །འཇུག་པ་ཐ་དད་པའི་ཡུལ་ནི་མ་ངེས་ཏེ། གཅིག་གི་ཡུལ་དང་དུ་མའི་
[206a.6]ཡང་ཞེས་རྣམ་པར་དབྱེ་བས་སོ། །འཇུག་པ་གཅིག་གི་ཡུལ་ཡང་གང་གི་དོན་དུ་དེར་འཇུག་པ་དེ་ལ་ཉེ་བར་སྦྱོར་བ་མ་ངེས་པར་ཤེས་པ་སྟེ། འདི་ལྟར་འཇུག་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་གྱི་འབྲས་བུ་ལ་ཉེ་བར་སྦྱོར་བ་མ་ངེས་པར་ཤེས་པ་རྣམས་ལ་དངོས་པོ་གཅིག་ལ་ངེས་པར་འཇུག་པ་ནི་མ་ཡིན་
[206a.7]ཏེ། མངོན་པར་འདོད་པའི་འབྲས་བུ་ལ་ངེས་པར་སྦྱོར་བ་ཙམ་གྱིས་ཡུལ་ལ་འཇུག་པ་ཡིན་ན་དེ་མ་ངེས་ན་ངེས་པར་ཇི་ལྟར་འགྱུར།
[206b.1]ནོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་རང་བཞིན་ནོ། །དེ་ཙམ་གྱི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཅན་ལ་ནི་གཞན་ལ་མི་ལྟོས་པས་ཁྱབ་པོ། །དེས་ན་ནི་རྒྱུ་གཞན་ལ་ལྟོས་པས་དེ་ཉིད་མི་འཐད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ།
[206b.2]དེ་བརྩམས་པ་ན་མེད་ན་མི་འབྱུང་བས་འབྲས་བུ་གཞན་ཐོབ་པ་དེ་ནི་འཇུག་པ་གཞན་དང་འབྲེལ་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །འབྲས་བུ་འདོད་པས་བསྐྱེད་པའི་སྐྱེས་བུའི་བྱ་བ་ནི་འཇུག་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེ་ཡང་ཡུལ་གྱི་བྱེ་བྲག་གིས་ཐ་དད་པ་འཇུག་པའི་ཡུལ་ཐ་དད་པ་ཅན་དུ་བྱེད་པའི་
[206b.3]ཕྱིར་ཐ་དད་པར་འགྱུར་རོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་འབྲས་བུ་གཞན་འདོད་པས་བསྐྱེད་པའི་འཇུག་པ་འབྲས་བུ་གཞན་ཐོབ་པའི་རྒྱུ་ནི་གཞན་ཁོ་ནའོ།
[206b.4]མང་པོ་ཡོད་པ་དེ་ལྟ་ན་ཡང་འཇུག་པའི་ཡུལ་གྱི་ཁྱད་པར་འཇིག་པར་བྱེད་པས་ཐ་དད་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཉིད་ནི་ཐུན་མོང་མ་ཡིན་
[206b.5]པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། གལ་ཏེ་དེ་ལྟར་འབྲས་བུ་འདོད་པས་རབ་ཏུ་སྦྱར་བ་དེའི་ཐབས་ཐོབ་པའི་མཐར་ཐུག་པ་འཇུག་པ་གཅིག་ཡིན་པ་དེས་ན་ཆུ་འདོད་པས་སྨིག་རྒྱུ་ལ་ཞུགས་པ་ལས་བྱེ་མའི་ཐང་རྙེད་ནས་གམ་ན་འདུག་པའི་ཁུང་གི་ཆུ་མཐོང་བར་གྱུར་པ་དེས་ན་དེ་ཐོབ་པའི་མཐར་ཐུག་པ་འཇུག་པ་
[206b.6]གཅིག་ཡིན་ལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར་སྨིག་རྒྱུ་ལ་ཆུར་ཤེས་པ་ཡང་འཇུག་པ་ཐོབ་པར་བྱེད་པ་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཚད་མར་འགྱུར་རོ་ཞེ་ན་སྨྲས་པ། འབྲས་བུ་འདོད་པ་འབའ་ཞིག་གིས་ནི་འཇུག་པ་དེའི་ཐབས་ཀྱི་ཡུལ་ཅན་དུ་མི་འགྱུར་གྱི།
[206b.7]དོན་བྱ་བ་བསྒྲུབ་པ་དེའི་ཡུལ་དང་དུས་དང་རང་བཞིན་ངེས་པ་ཤེས་ན་ནི་འཇུག་པ་དེའི་ཡུལ་ཅན་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེས་ན་འདི་ནི་ཐོབ་པ་དེའི་ཐབས་འཛིན་པའི་ཤེས་པ་ལ་ཡང་རག་ལས་པ་ཡིན་ནོ།
[207a.1]ཤེས་པར་ཉེ་བར་བསྟན་པ་ཡུལ་དང་དུས་ངེས་པ་དེའི་ཐབས་ཀྱི་ཡུལ་ཅན་ཡིན་ནོ། །མི་སླུ་བར་བྱེད་པའི་ཤེས་པས་ཤེས་པའི་ཡུལ་གྱི་མཐར་ཐུག་པར་གྱུར་ན་ནི་ཐོབ་པའི་མཐར་ཐུག་པར་འགྱུར་ཞིང་འབྲས་བུ་མེད་པར་འགྱུར་ན་ཡང་དེ་ལས་བཟློག་པ་ཡིན་ནོ།
[207a.2]འབྲས་བུ་འདོད་པས་བཅུག་པ་དེའི་ཐབས་ཀྱི་ཡུལ་ཅན་དུ་གྱུར་པའི་རབ་ཏུ་འཇུག་པར་བྱེད་པའི་ཤེས་པས་བསྟན་པ་དེའི་ཐབས་ཙམ་གྱི་མཐར་ཐུག་པ་ནི་འཇུག་པ་གཅིག་ཡིན་ནོ། །རྒྱུ་མཚན་གཉིས་དང་འབྲེལ་པའི་ཕྱིར་འབྲས་བུ་ཐབས་མི་ཐོབ་པའི་ཁྱད་པར་གྱིས་འདོད་པ་ཙམ་གྱི་རྒྱུ་
[207a.3]མཚན་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །སྨིག་རྒྱུ་ལ་ནི་ཤེས་པ་གཞན་དང་འབྲེལ་པས་འཇུག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་གཞན་ཉིད་དོ།
[207a.4]རེ་ཞིག་རིགས་ཐ་དད་པ་ནི་འབྲས་བུ་ཐ་དད་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཉེ་བར་སྦྱོར་བ་ངེས་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །རིགས་འདྲ་བ་འབྲས་བུ་གཅིག་པ་ནི་སྐད་ཅིག་ཐ་དད་པའི་རྗེས་སུ་འབྲང་བ་དང་རྒྱུད་ཐ་དད་པའི་རྗེས་སུ་འགྲོ་བས་ཐ་དད་དོ།
[207a.5]མེད་པས་སྐད་ཅིག་ཐ་དད་པ་ནི་མ་ངེས་པར་བླང་བར་འདོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་མ་ངེས་པར་ཉེ་བར་སྦྱོར་བ་ཁོ་ནའོ། །རྒྱུད་ཐ་དད་པ་ཡང་མངོན་སུམ་ནི་རེ་ཞིག་ཉེ་བར་སྦྱོར་བ་ཐ་དད་པ་ཁོ་ནའོ།
[207a.6]རང་བཞིན་གྱི་དོན་བྱེད་པ་ལ་ནི་གཞན་བླང་བར་འདོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཧ་ཅང་ཐལ་བར་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ།
[207a.7]མཚུངས་པར་བྱེད་པས་ནི་དུ་མ་ལ་ངེས་པར་ཉེ་བར་སྦྱོར་བ་མ་ཡིན་གྱི། འོན་ཀྱང་བླང་བར་འདོད་པ་གཅིག་གི་ཡུལ་དུ་ཤེས་པས་སོ།
[207b.1]མཐོང་བའི་རྒྱུད་ཐ་དད་པ་ལ་ནི་ཉེ་བར་སྦྱོར་བ་ངེས་པ་ཉིད་དོ།
[207b.2]དཔེར་ན་གྲང་བ་མང་པོ་ཚོགས་པ་ན་མེ་མདག་གི་ཕུང་པོ་བཞིན་ནོ།
[207b.3]ཡུལ་གཞན་ན་འདུག་པ་ངེས་པར་ཉམས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ།
[207b.4]དེ་ལྟ་བུའི་རང་བཞིན་དུ་ནི་ཐམས་ཅད་ཁྱད་པར་མེད་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེས་ན་གཅིག་བླང་བར་འདོད་པས་ཐམས་ཅད་བླང་བར་འདོད་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ།
[207b.5]དེ་དག་གི་བདག་ཉིད་ཐུན་མོང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་རང་བཞིན་ནི། དེའི་ཚེ་ཐ་དད་པར་གཟུང་བ་མེད་ན་གང་གི་ཡུལ་ངེས་པར་ལེན་འདོད་པར་འགྱུར།
[207b.6]འདི་ལྟར་ཁྱིམ་གྱི་དང་ར་གཅིག་ན་འདུག་པའི་མེའི་ཕུང་པོ་བཞི་ལས་གང་ཡང་རུང་བ་ཞིག་བླང་བར་བྱ་བ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཡུལ་བར་མ་ཆོད་པ་གང་ཡིན་པའོ། །དེ་དག་ལས་བདག་གི་འདོད་པ་འདི་ལ་འབྱུང་ངོ་ཞེས་ནི་མི་སེམས་སོ།
[207b.7]བར་མཁོ་བ་མ་ངེས་པར་ཞེན་པར་བྱས་པ་འཇུག་པ་གཅིག་གི་ཡུལ་ནི་མང་པོ་ཡང་ཚད་མ་གཅིག་གིས་བཟུང་བ་ཡིན་ནོ།
[208a.1]མ་གཅིག་གི་ཡུལ་དུ་འགྱུར་རོ།
[208a.3]མ་ངེས་པ་རྣམས་ལ་ནི་སོ་སོ་ཁོ་ནར་རོ། །མངོན་སུམ་ནི་སྐད་ཅིག་གིས་ཡུལ་མཁོ་བ་གཅིག་པ་ཉིད་དོ།
[208a.5]གང་ཞིག་གང་གིས་ངེས་པ་དེ་ནི་དེས་འཇུག་པའི་ཡུལ་དུ་བྱས་པ་ཡིན་ལ། དེ་ཉིད་དེའི་ཐོབ་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན་པ་ན་ཚད་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།
[208a.6]དོན་བྱ་བ་ལ་སླུ་བ་མེད་དོ་ཞེས་བཤད་དོ།
[208a.7]འདི་ལྟར་ཐེ་ཚོམ་གྱིས་ཡུལ་འཇོག་པར་བྱེད་པའི་ཤེས་པ་དང་། ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་གི་ཤེས་པ་དང་། ཕྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པའི་ཡང་དག་པའི་ཤེས་པ་རྣམས་ལས་འཇུག་པ་གང་ཡིན་པ།
[208b.1]དེ་ལ་འཁྲུལ་བ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་དེའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཅན་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེའི་རྒྱུ་ནི་དང་པོའི་ཤེས་པ་ཡིན་ནོ།
[208b.2]ཤེས་པ་སྔ་མ་དེ་དེ་ཐོབ་པའི་རྒྱུར་གྱུར་པའི་འཇུག་པའི་ཡུལ་འཇོག་པར་བྱེད་པ་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ལ། རྒྱུ་ཡིན་པ་ཁོ་ནའོ།
[208b.3]སྔ་མ་བུམ་པའི་ཤེས་པ་དེ་སྣམ་བུ་སྟོན་པར་བྱེད་པ་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ནོ།

[Source text continues through folio 221b — see file190_raw.txt lines 3313–3522 for the complete remainder. Chapter One concludes at folio 210b.4 (line 3346). Chapter Two prose spans folios 210b.4–221a.3 (lines 3346–3513). Concluding verses at 221a.4–221b.3 (lines 3514–3521). Colophon at 221b.4 (line 3522).]

Source Colophon

Esukhia Digital Degé Tengyur, text D4248 (Tohoku catalogue number). Unicode Tibetan etext transcribed from the Degé woodblock print edition (sde dge par phud). CC0 license. Repository: github.com/Esukhia/derge-tengyur.

The original Sanskrit text is lost. This Tibetan translation, made by the bhikṣu Blo-ldan shes-rab (Matiprajñā), is the sole surviving witness.

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